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PROCEEDINGS  
OF THE  
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
(IN THE CITY OF) NEW YORK,

Volume VI]

JULY, 1916

[Number 4

MILITARY TRAINING  
COMPULSORY OR VOLUNTEER

A SERIES OF ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SEMI-ANNUAL  
MEETING OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

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PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY  
THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY  
116TH STREET AND BROADWAY, NEW YORK

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*Entered as second-class matter Nov. 27, 1910, at the post office at New York, N. Y.  
under the Act of Congress, July 16, 1894.*

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The **Proceedings** are issued by the Academy as a record of its activities and as a means of giving detailed treatment to special subjects of importance. Each volume consists of four numbers. At least one number in each volume usually gives in full the papers read and a verbatim report of the discussion at the annual meeting of the Academy.

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- No. 2. The Reform of the Currency.
- No. 3. Year Book of the Academy.
- No. 4. The Reform of the Criminal Law and Procedure.
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              Illinois, Colorado and California.
- No. 3. Constitutional Imperialism in Japan.
- No. 4. Military Training: Compulsory or Volunteer?

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## EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE purpose of the Program Committee in bringing together this series of addresses and papers at the semi-annual meeting of the Academy, May 18, 1916, was to make expert information popularly available in compact form as to the fundamentals of the military policy of the United States and to give accurate information as to the opinions of great elements in America's composite population and life. The aim was to present concretely and authoritatively the varying recommendations and points of view; to present every angle of opinion on this subject which finds its footing in facts, in patriotic concern for the national welfare, and in reasoned inference from the facts.

The Committee recognized that no small part of the current discussion of military policy has proceeded with no ascertainable relation to actual facts and with no clear analysis of the purposes which changes in policy are sought to serve. No particular "side" or "program" has had a monopoly of this advocacy through unreason, prejudice, detachment from disclosed facts and clearly thought-out comprehension of fundamental policy; and the purpose of the Committee was to bring together only those possessing accurate, first-hand, competent information and reasoned opinion upon those matters which may prove of value in the development of an ultimate consensus of American public opinion.

If the contents of this volume disclose diversity of view and sharp divergence of recommendation even as to rudiments of policy, that is due to the fact that public opinion on this vital subject is still "in the making"; due also to the purpose of the Committee to present authoritatively and fairly all points of view, rather than to give advantage to any particular propaganda. The reader is left to form his own impressions and conclusions from the data, the greater portion of which is for the first time brought together in form available to any considerable part of the reading public.

The discussion was grouped around a very definite question of fundamental policy, viz., whether the basis of military training in the United States ought, in the ultimate analysis, to be purely casual and "volunteer," or whether there should be introduced into it that element of compulsion and universality which comes from a recognition that a duty of participating adequately and effectively in the defense and preservation of the nation goes hand in hand with the right and duty of participating in the determination of its internal policies and domestic concerns. The pivot of the present discussion was made thus concrete, because of a desire that the discussion itself should be directed to concrete and tangible factors, rather than to the vague and undefined issue of advocacy or opposition to "preparedness." It was also the belief of many members of the Program Committee that, no matter what may be the form or scope of measures of army increase and reorganization within this year or the next, the nation will eventually be brought face to face with the question whether any considerable number of citizens can with safety be left wholly untrained and unready to perform with effectiveness any part of that task which all citizens may at almost any time be called upon to perform, to the utmost limits of patriotic devotion. Although the discussion was thus centered around the concrete issue whether military training should be left altogether casual and "volunteer" or whether some degree of training should be made general and obligatory, it was recognized that, in passing upon this question, many citizens feel disposed to inquire first as to the necessary objects of any increased attention to military matters—the question of the potential dangers, if any, against which preparation must fore-handedly be made, the question of the concrete problems of defense with which our military and naval experts would have to deal, should danger come from any source to be regarded as potential. These questions also are in considerable measure dealt with in this volume, notably in some of its earlier pages. In all respects, however, the Committee has sought to exclude mere rhetoric and resentment, as well as mis-information, and to present the messages of men who speak accurately and authoritatively.

DR. ALBERT SHAW, editor of the *American Review of Reviews* since he founded it in 1891, student of governmental and economic systems in many countries, gave a most admirable introduction to the whole subject, as presiding officer of the opening session.

HENRY B. BRECKINRIDGE, of Kentucky, spoke from the point of view of his experience as Assistant Secretary of War, and the extensive studies which he conducted in that post, under the leadership of Secretary Lindley M. Garrison, of New Jersey. It was commonly said in Washington that Mr. Breckinridge had acquired a greater mastery of military problems than is often gained by a civilian in the War Department.

WALTER L. FISHER was Secretary of War in President Taft's Cabinet. As one of the leaders of the Chicago Bar, he has been a deep student of the foreign relations of the United States. Probably more insistently and effectively than anyone else in the country, Mr. Fisher has emphasized the truth that to proceed intelligently to make military preparations, it is necessary first to determine for what is preparation to be made.

C. E. KNOEPEL is an "efficiency engineer", a member of the staff of the *Engineering Magazine*, and the author of a volume recently published under the title "Industrial Preparedness".

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, editorial writer and president of the *New York Evening Post*, author of monographs dealing with the German Imperial Court and Continental life, turned shafts of sarcasm and analysis upon "The Cure-all of Universal Military Service."

DR. MORITZ J. BONN, professor of political economy in the University of Munich, trained observer of social phenomena in many lands, presented most thoughtfully and open-mindedly "Some Economic and Political Aspects of General Training under the German Military System."

DR. ROBERT M. JOHNSTON is a lecturer in the United States War College, Assistant Professor of Modern History in Harvard University, and Editor of the authoritative *Military History and Economist*.

IRVING T. BUSH, president of the Bush Terminal Company and leader in large business enterprises, gave a business man's impressions of military training as an aid to individual effectiveness in the tasks of peace.

NEWTON D. BAKER, the gifted Secretary of War; CHARLES BENNETT SMITH, of Buffalo, N. Y., one of the most able and courageous of Democratic Congressmen; GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN, of Oregon, the hard-working Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; and J. P. MILLER, JR., of the National Security

League's staff of experts, presented varying views as to the measures of army reorganization and military training put in force by the present Administration.

FREDERICK A. KUENZLI, of New Jersey, and DR. THEODORE A. CHRISTEN, of Cincinnati, Ohio, gave graphic and valuable accounts of the Swiss military system and its adaptability to American conditions; MAJOR E. N. JOHNSTON, of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, contributed what is probably the most informing study of the Australian system yet published; ERIC FISHER WOOD, who saw European military systems at work in the earlier stages of the Great War, gave vividly some of his impressions; Captain EWALD HECKER, of the German Army, narrated many of the features of the German system; and Colonel C. DEWITT WILLCOX, of the West Point Military Academy, gave from his ripe military scholarship an illuminating analysis of the French and English systems.

MATTHEW WOLL, one of the most clear-sighted of the leaders of American trades-unionism, and JOHN P. WHITE, the energetic head of the United Mine Workers, discussed universal training from the viewpoint of organized labor; GEORGE CREEL discussed it from the viewpoint of the democratic ideal; President ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN of Amherst College powerfully opposed compulsory military training, from the viewpoint of educational theory and practice; HERBERT QUICK presented some elements of "a new volunteer system"; SAMUEL ROSENTOHN presented legal aspects of the general subject; and Professor MUNROE SMITH dealt with it historically.

President EDMUND JAMES of the University of Illinois outlined what the universities are doing and could do in the training of officers; Adjutant-General LOUIS W. STOTESBURY, of the New York National Guard, stirringly indicated the place of the State Militia in the national defense; Captain HALSTEAD DOREY of the "regular" Army told what the Plattsburg Camps are doing for military training; and Major-General LEONARD WOOD gave a striking narrative of the necessary elements of "National Training for Military Defense."

The foregoing commentary will indicate the diversity of the views and the authoritative character of the utterances which made up this notable symposium. They are published by the Academy solely in the hope that they will be of aid in the development of a reasoned and patriotic public opinion upon one of the most vigorously debated topics of today and tomorrow.

WILLIAM L. RANSOM.

NEW YORK CITY, AUGUST, 1916.

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## PROBLEMS OF THE COMMON DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

DR. ALBERT SHAW

Editor of the American Review of Reviews; Vice-president of the Academy of Political Science

IT has been the good fortune of this Academy, at stated intervals, to have made contributions, at once timely in interest and permanent in fundamental character, to the discussion of pending problems relating to governmental work or public policy. The academic viewpoint tolerates difference of opinion, but demands sincere regard for historical and scientific accuracy, and disinterested devotion to the cause of truth and progress.

For more than a year the people of the United States have been engaged, with evidently increasing interest and attention, in a broad and many-sided discussion of the question of national defense. This American question has arisen almost wholly in consequence of the world-wide disturbances created by the most colossal war of all history—a war in which fourteen nations are now engaged, and in which our immediate neighbor, the Dominion of Canada, occupying half of our continent of North America, is participating at great cost of men and resources. The people of the United States have no standing controversy with those of any other country. There have been incidental injuries and damages to all neutrals, in consequence of the methods and policies adopted by the belligerents in Europe. And we have suffered seriously by reason of the revolutionary chaos in Mexico.

But for none of these things would war on our part afford any conceivable remedy, and we are determined, in so far as lies within our power, to maintain the blessings of peace for ourselves and to promote by our influence the cause of peace and

<sup>1</sup> Introductory address as presiding officer at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

justice throughout the world. We are committed, by many treaties and by countless acts and expressions, to the doctrine of legal rather than forcible adjustment of disputes between nations. We have no warlike party or element in the United States. We have no school of political thought that proposes to create strong armies and navies with a view to an enlargement of the power of this country or a widening of its imperial destinies.

Canada is in point of fact a self-governing American republic, and no one in the United States thinks of the annexation of Canada as a policy either avowed or concealed. A few people have conceived of our influence and authority as extending in the future to the Panama Canal. But nine out of ten of the so-called Interventionists, who do not wish to see our military forces withdrawn from Mexico, have in mind only the establishment of civil order and the restoration of industrial activity. They agree with the leaders of all our parties in not desiring to make conquest of Mexico.

There are, however, certain international obligations upon which we have entered. And there are large and responsible elements of public opinion that are definitely in favor of our having a navy strong enough to guarantee the completion of our work of tutelage in the Philippines, the maintenance of peace and order throughout the Pacific, and the upholding of those guarantees of protection that we have given to Cuba, the republic of Panama, and in general to the West Indies and Central America.

The people of the United States are intelligent and convinced idealists. They have supported the more advanced positions that have been discussed at the successive official conferences of the nations at The Hague. They look forward to a great reduction of navies by international agreement. They look upon the high seas as the domain of peaceful commerce, and regard it as an essential impertinence and nuisance that individual or allied nations should abuse the freedom of the seas by seizing the world's highways as a place for war upon each other and for preying upon the commerce of all mankind. It is the prevailing opinion in the United States that such conditions

must be changed in the near future. There are many Americans who believe that the United States can have more influence in securing these desired reforms by enlarging her own navy, and being able to take her own part without question. There are others who hold a different view as to our practical naval policy.

It is well to remember, however, that the leaders of both views have the same hopes and aims. They wish the United States to promote throughout the world the cause of peace and brotherhood. It is the opinion of many Americans that the best service we can render to Japan is to show ourselves so firm in the protection of all our rights and responsibilities in the Pacific that there could be no danger of conflict. Japan's wisest leaders are as intent upon peace as are all American leaders. But Japan, unlike America, is going through a period of intense unrest, and is struggling somewhat dangerously with imperial ambitions that some of her journalists and public men believe can be best realized by a series of wars. If this element should fully gain the upper hand in Japan, while the naval and military resources of the United States were inferior, a war might ensue when least expected, with results almost unspeakably disastrous to both nations.

There are those of us in the United States who believe in a policy of justice and friendship toward Japan, while maintaining American positions with such a degree of practical preparedness as would make peace a certainty. There are many of us, loving peace supremely, who believe that we owe this much of help to the people of Japan in a period of restlessness and transition.

But the problem that has provoked the most discussion has been that of the training of Americans to take actual part in national defense in case of need. A large navy would not suffice ; for there must be armies as well as ships if war should arise. Furthermore, there can be no large and efficient navy unless there are many thousands of young men of intelligence and patriotism willing to serve the country as seamen if their services be required.

European experience shows that wars are not to be fought

in the future by small and select bodies of professional or mercenary soldiers. Every European country has arrived at the conception of war as an effort upon the part of the entire nation to make its cause prevail. England has at last yielded in point of method and practise, having already yielded in point of principle, to the view that every man must serve the country in accordance with his fitness and ability in time of war, and that it is for the Government to decide whether a man's services are more valuable as a food producer, a coal miner, or a munition-maker, than as a soldier in the ranks.

Unquestionably the early American view was that of universal obligation to military service; and these principles were embodied in the national constitution and were recognized by the individual states. But in point of fact, in our peace-loving country, the idea of general citizen service grew dim, and that of the small army, highly professionalized, came to be accepted. The new discussion has been due to the discovery that we could no longer rely upon the obsolete form of professional army to defend the country even in case of a small war, because the rest of the world is made up of nations that have substituted universal training and the non-military idea of citizen soldiery for the medieval idea of soldiering as a trade. We alone, of all the nations of the world, are now depending mainly upon a hireling army to protect our vast nation of a hundred millions, and are presenting a spectacle of such helplessness and lack of fitness for self-defense that is without parallel in the history of major nations.

The mercenary army fails because it is too small, too expensive, and too unrepresentative. To make it large, the pay would have to be increased to meet competitive industrial demand. What we need is not a large army in ordinary times, but an almost unlimitedly large reserve to meet the call of extraordinary times. This large reserve can only be secured by making it identical with the young manhood of the nation. There cannot be a separate and distinct caste of soldiers. And this must apply in great part to the officers as well as to the privates. So widespread is the opinion that our army in time of need must be made up of the trained young manhood of the country, impelled by patriotism and civic duty, that this point may be re-

garded as no longer under discussion excepting by persons quite ill-informed, or by vague "pacifists," so called, whose views bear no relation to the real cause of peace in the world but are based chiefly upon misapprehension of existing facts.

We may then regard the discussion in this country as having produced the conviction that our young men should not remain helpless and untrained. There is no such body of capable young men in all the world as in the United States. If war should occur, these young men would have to enlist in the army, either as volunteers or as conscripts. If they had lacked all previous training, they would have to be disciplined for a number of months. If, however, the exigencies of war were great, they would have to fight unprepared, with consequent prospects of humiliating defeat and terrible slaughter.

Most men of good judgment, therefore, have come to the conclusion there should be some means of training provided for a great many young men, and that sufficient inducement should be offered to make certain the large use of training facilities. This brings us to the question of volunteer effort as against some form of universal and obligatory training. It is with the full understanding that this discussion must and will be continued for several years to come, that the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York has prepared the program for the sessions this afternoon and evening, and has planned to publish the proceedings for their wider influence upon the public mind.

It will be remembered that President Wilson last summer began to realize that the question of preparedness for defense had become a necessary one for the United States. He was reluctant to have it appear either that we felt apprehensive in this country as to the designs of any of the nations with which we were at peace, or that we should seem to be arming with any aggressive motive. But the Administration could not ignore the facts, as the world war continued and became intensified over broadening areas. Thus Mr. Wilson, with the Secretaries of War and the Navy and the professional heads of the two forces, set about preparing a program. This was outlined in statements and addresses in November, and presented to

Congress by President Wilson in his message of December 7th. Subsequently he made speaking tours in the West, advocating a very strong navy and the plans for an enlarged army laid down by the Secretary of War.

After five months of consideration, the houses of Congress have just now agreed upon a military bill of great importance. It provides for the enlargement of the regular army, contemplates a gradually increasing reserve force, attaches new importance to the state troops known as the National Guard, definitely authorizes summer training-camps for citizens, and gives added recognition to the importance of the military training already made obligatory in the so-called land-grant colleges of the states. In other ways, more or less definite, it contemplates a great extension, through volunteer effort, of the military preparation of the American people for national defense.

One must recognize the great study and effort bestowed upon the problem of our military strength by the Congressional leaders, under Mr. Hay, chairman of the House Committee, and Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Senate Committee. It will take time to know the chief merits and to measure the extent of the defects of the new law. Its prime defect seems to be its too complete permeation with the old idea of the hired standing army. Its plan of seven-year enlistments, three in active service and four in the reserve, promises to be a failure. It contemplates reënlistment, and an army made up of permanent hired men working at the trade of soldiering. Everything is fundamentally wrong in the ordinary barracks life of the regular army regiments, made up of men who stay permanently in the army and are entirely separated from civilian interests. An intensely active period of a single year in the army, with compulsory retirement to the reserve, would produce far better results.

The payment of salaries to National Guard officers must have a tendency to fossilize a service which would be benefited by rapid rotation in all commissioned places except the highest. Congress makes a serious mistake in not utilizing the opportunity of the land-grant colleges, more fully than it proposes to do in the new law, to train many thousands of young reserve

officers, who could thus secure all necessary military instruction and discipline as a part of their education. There is wide advocacy of a system somewhat like that of Switzerland or Australia, where training and military service are universal and obligatory. But we have by no means even faintly begun to test in the United States the possibilities of training, and of the creation of the citizen reserve, by voluntary rather than obligatory processes.

It is plain, then, that the country is only now fairly entering upon its great discussion of this problem of vital significance. The more we know of the experience of other countries, and the more fully we consider the views of authorities upon the various aspects of the question of training our young men for the support of our institutions and the service of the country, the more certainly we shall arrive at wise results.

## UNIVERSAL SERVICE AS THE BASIS OF NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

HENRY B. BRECKINRIDGE

Former Assistant Secretary of War

I DEEM it a fortunate thing that leaders in political thought recognize the fundamental importance of a searching discussion of the subject of universal military service. Of many pressing political questions facing us for solution, the question of the adoption of universal military service is the most vital. The candid mind must admit that the national unity and the national defense demand our primary attention in this troublous day of the world. From the purely military standpoint, none will deny that universal service is the best foundation for national defense. I believe also that it would afford the most powerful agency for effecting the national unity. Therefore, from the twin issues of national unity and national defense comes the great principle of universal service, holding in our decision as to its acceptance or rejection consequences of its inestimable and eternal import of the nation. It is no matter of passing academic interest you have selected for discussion. It is a matter lying at the roots of the nation's life.

My contention here is that universal military service is essential to the safety of America and the integrity of its policies, that it is morally just, and that it impairs not one iota the ideals of Democracy.

First, let us dispel the illusion that the adoption of universal service is a thing to be settled by the desires and tastes of a given people. Pacifist orators berate conscription as an evil thing adopted by the corrupt autocracies of Europe for the enslavement of subject peoples and the general propagation of wars. There is no connection between the frequency of wars and conscription, unless the existence of nations in arms as the

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the evening session of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

result of conscription tends to make wars more infrequent on account of the hesitation of governing authorities to bring on a cataclysm of violence that will draw into the maelstrom all the material and human resources of the state. But what we must see, and see clearly, is that it has not been volition that has driven the world to universal service. It has been necessity. It has been the operation of a universal law. It has been the operation of the law of supply and demand on the field of national defense.

The demand for numbers in war is greater than the voluntary supply. As modern invention increases the facility with which great numbers are transported and disposed, greater and greater armies can be brought to bear, and the principle applies even more fully. Modern transportation systems make possible the nearly immediate concentration of vast numbers. Thus wars come to a critical stage in a very few days or weeks, and the armies therefore must be scientifically organized and trained to meet the shock of war. Thus the demand for numbers in war operates not only in time of war in the prosecution of war, but in time of peace in preparation for war.

Universal military service is no new thing in the world. It is not even the child of modern times. It is as old as recorded history. About 1500 years before the birth of Christ, Moses organized the military power of his people on the foundation of universal service. The Scriptures hath it that "On the first day of the second month, in the second year after they were come out of the land of Egypt," God commanded Moses: "Take ye the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel . . . with the number of their names, every male by their polls; from twenty years old and upward, all that are able to go forth to the war in Israel; thou and Aaron shall number them by their armies." "As the Lord commanded Moses, so he numbered them in the wilderness of Sinai." The fighting men of each tribe numbered, on an average, 50,000. The total force was 603,550. As far as I know, this is the first recorded instance in history of the organization of a nation in arms. And nearly ever since, throughout the life of the human race, each empire that spread abroad its sway to distant dominions,

and each lesser state that maintained its independence, has had to come to the application of the general principle elaborated in the Jewish military system.

Greece was able to stand successfully against the innumerable Persian hordes because every Greek citizen was a soldier. Athens and Sparta were just as much nations in arms as Germany, France and Russia are today.

The Roman army was the greatest army that the world has produced, judged by the extent of its conquests and the long duration of its supremacy. The military history of Rome recounts success and failure in accordance with the degree with which the citizenship of Rome bore its military responsibilities. With the accumulation of riches and luxuries, the citizenship became self-indulgent, soft and unwilling to stand the hardships of military life. Mercenaries were hired to do the fighting that should have been done by Roman citizens. Disasters were suffered, and only under the reforms that revived the system of citizenship service was Rome able to stave off for a time her dissolution.

In the chaos of the dark ages, the Roman system was engulfed, except as it persisted in the Byzantine Empire. The primitive system of tribal levies was resorted to until Charlemagne laid the foundations of the feudal system. Military organization under the feudal system continued also the principle of universal liability for service. Then came a period of professional standing armies which endured until Frederick the Great had to press into service the whole man-power of his people to escape national annihilation in the Seven Years War. As we look back over the records of history down to the Napoleonic era, we see the downfall of nations co-terminous with the decline of military virtue and the abandonment of thorough-going systems of universal service. It may be that, fundamentally, the decline of military virtue was due to civic and private degeneration, but always the first sign of coming dissolution was the effort of the citizen to avoid the rigor of military service.

It is interesting to note in passing that the word "conscription" was born when French democracy was having its pro-

longed and bloody birth times. The word is found for the first time in the French law of the 19th Fructidor, 1798, which imposed upon *les défenseurs conscrits* liability for military service from their twentieth to their twenty-fifth year of age. General Jourdon introduced it into the Council of the Five Hundred and its passage made possible the conquests of Napoleon and imposed upon all of Napoleon's continental enemies the necessity of similar measures. By the Napoleonic wars, it was conclusively established that life and death struggles between nations could not be determined without bringing to bear all the human and material resources of nations.

After Prussia's humiliation and the peace of Tilsit the system of conscription was instituted in Prussia.

Since Napoleon every branch of the white race except the English-speaking has come to the application of the principle of universal training and universal liability for service. The great and expanding Oriental empire of Japan has developed an absolute application of the universal system to the salvation of her national life and the extension of her power and territory, until in the short space of half a century she has emerged from an inconsiderable isolation to a position commanding respect and fear. China is an exception, and every few years witnesses the lopping-off of a slice of her territory and population by some power with a tithe of China's military resources but possessing a greater proportion of organized military strength. How can a patriot advocate national impotence and pacifism in light of China's experience?

Great Britain, the greatest sea-power of history, is driven to compulsion to cut any figure on land in the great world war. Switzerland, Australia, Argentina, Chile—all have bowed to the inevitable. America is the only free nation of any consequence in the world to hold back. America, in the Civil War, the only real test of her life, had to fall in line. America now cannot escape without humiliation or disaster the operation of an absolute and universal law of national life in the present condition of human nature and international morality. If this nation heeds the maudlin preachments of its Fords and Bryans, it will pay for it by billions of levied treasure, by millions of lives

slaughtered in a sacrifice to unpreparedness, and by abject and unprecedented national humiliation, if not extinction. The inescapable logic of history and the contemporary spectacle in Europe demonstrates what happens in modern war to the nation inadequately prepared.

Not only is universal service essential to safety, but it is just. As there is universality of benefit derived from American citizenship, so there is universality of obligation derived from that same citizenship. It is no more the duty of Peter to serve his country than it is the duty of Paul. It is the duty of the state to take both Peter and Paul to train them for the performance of the duty that one day may be required of them. To require them to defend their country on the field of battle without previous training is murder. Upon rich and poor, wise and unwise, rests the equal duty of training for the defense of the nation : to each is given the equal opportunity to advance in military rank, irrespective of wealth or derivation. Each citizen required to render a concrete service to the state that protects him and the state that he in turn should be eager to protect, and no matter from what race stock he may come—Teuton, Slav, Czech, Italian, Celt or Anglo-Saxon—all rubbing elbows in a common service to a common Fatherland—out comes the hyphen—up goes the Stars and Stripes and in a generation the melting pot will have melted. Universal military service will be the elder brother of the public school in fusing this American race.

Not only is universal military service necessary and just. It is also democratic. There is no connection between universal military service and militarism. Militarism is the supremacy of force, is the subordination of law, is the contempt for the rights of individuals, is the aggressive, ruthless and immoral intention and purpose behind either organized or unorganized force, behind great force or medium-sized force or little force.

The mob of the Reign of Terror was militarism. The Oriental despotism where the ruler lops off the head of the subject is militarism, though a modern and well-trained battalion of troops could march without real opposition through his domain. Also, a highly organized modern state may build up a military organization that, if not controlled by the people, may endanger

their liberties. But there is no fundamental connection between the political structure of the government of a given people and the existence of the principle of universal military service as the foundation for the organization of the physical force of the nation essential to the integrity of its policy and its territory.

The most dissimilar governments existing in the world today organize their military forces on the foundation of universal service. Russia, the patriarchal and religious autocracy; Germany, the centralized, imperialistic federation; Austria-Hungary, imperialistic dual monarchy; France, the centralized and democratic republic; Italy and Spain, constitutional monarchies; Switzerland and Australia, including New Zealand, the nearest approach to direct democracies now existing in the world—all these nations, differing as much as nations can differ in their types of government and variety of political aspirations, ideals and standards, have come to the adoption of manhood service. In each of these countries doubtless the organized military forces have a different relationship with the other agencies of government and a different political status, but the relation and status of the military organization in any given country is not dependent so much upon the mechanical structure and foundation of that organization as upon the political character and the political institutions of the people. A big, well-developed physical specimen of manhood may or may not be mean, aggressive, selfish, greedy, ruthless, a bully—usually he is not.

We want no great standing armies to corrupt our ideals or endanger our liberties. At all times must the military power in this nation be subordinated to the civil. In the republic of Switzerland we have our model. There is no trouble about devising a system adequately to develop the strength of the nation without in any wise endangering our liberties.

## FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>

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**I**F the United States is to be prepared and able to carry out its national purposes and maintain its national interests, the first and most important step is to determine what our real national interests and our true national policies are in fact, in the light of present-day world-conditions. Then we shall be able to judge accurately as to the means most suitable for the fulfillment of those fundamental purposes and the resolute maintenance of those broad interests.

Military preparation—and especially the question of the fundamental concept on which shall be recruited, trained, and marshaled into service the second line of defense, the citizenship reserve—is a very important problem in this republic at this hour. If, however, we are to proceed intelligently in the matter of military preparation, we must consider first what it is for which we are to make military preparation. Only in this way can we intelligently determine the character and extent of the military preparation we should make.

To call attention to these elementary considerations, as I have on several occasions undertaken to do, seems only to exasperate the advocates of the greatest army on earth and the greatest navy on the seas; for the naval enthusiasts would frankly have us build the greatest navy; and the adoption of any effective form of universal military training in the United States would give us the essentials of the greatest army the world has ever seen. The military propagandists have appropriated to themselves the word "preparedness," and seek to create the impression that all who do not agree with them are materialists, cowards, for "peace at any price." It is against the untruth-

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

fulness and folly of this assumption that I protest, just as I protest against the assumption that those who favor any increase in our army or navy are "militarists."

Our real problem is to devise and work out national and international policies that will reduce the causes and the occasions of war. The mission of the United States is to demonstrate the stability of representative democracy and its usefulness for promoting the welfare of mankind. We are preparing for national and military defense because we believe this will promote peaceful progress in the United States and in the world.

We should test every suggestion for increasing the army or the navy by its relation to that purpose. It is quite possible that we may wish, and that in a righteous cause we ought to undertake aggressive war; but we should make no preparation expressly for such a contingency. We will be all the more sure that we are really called in righteousness to attack some other nation if we have to pause to get ready for the attack. A defensive army and a defensive navy will furnish all the preparation it is wise or necessary for us to make now.

We do need a defensive navy, and by adding submarines instead of dreadnaughts we can make our navy more powerful for defense and less available for aggression, thus convincing other nations of our determination to preserve our own peace, without threatening theirs. We need a defensive army, and we should get it by confining our standing army—the force with the colors—to the number of soldiers appropriate in times of peace, and by training, through that army, an adequate reserve of officers and men for our first line of defense in the event of war. Men should not be enlisted for long terms of active service; but as soon as they are thoroughly trained they should return to civic life—a citizen soldiery, sufficient in numbers for defense and subject for a period of years to be called to the colors in time of need. By making the conditions of service what they should be anyhow, and by giving a training—military and industrial—that will justify itself to those who take it, we can have all the army we need in the United States. The militia is and will continue to be our second line of reserves, and we shall do well to begin to fit it for this function, instead

of regarding it chiefly as an instrument for preserving order on occasions of industrial unrest, a duty which should be performed by a state constabulary. We cannot expect the intelligent working men of this country to serve in the militia if its chief function is to be the suppression of strikes. There should be some standardization of the militia under general federal control.

It is my strong conviction that we must dismiss at once from practical consideration the suggestion of universal military service, or any form of conscription, as not only unnecessary, but unwise. The agitation for it is a real obstacle to the adoption of wiser and more practicable plans. The theory that military training is essential for the inculcation of civic virtue is not only unsound, but in the light of that peaceful day which will surely succeed the darkness of this hour, most of the advocates of conscription will marvel that they ever could have believed in its civic desirability.

Army organization, in the line of the reserve or second line of defense, on the principle of universal training and service, pre-supposes organization for war, not for peace; for aggression if occasion arises, not merely defense. It cannot be deemed a purely defensive or primarily defensive program. What we should be deciding in the country at large, is not the sort of an army that will be most powerful in war, but what sort of an army will be most effective for securing peace. And that is a question which involves issues of national policy that are not exclusively military—in which, indeed, the military motive is of secondary importance.

We must tell the General Staff—not have them tell us—what it is we want an army to do; what are the purposes for which we wish to use an army. Then and then only can they tell us what kind of an army and navy will be best adapted for our purpose. Otherwise their opinions and estimates must necessarily be based on the assumption that we want a military establishment adequate to defend all our outstanding possessions and obligations, and to maintain all our supposed national policies and interests, and in the event of war, in the language of the recent report of the War College, “to insure a successful termination of the war in the shortest time.”

All this may sound somewhat captious and theoretical, of little practical value, but I am not without knowledge that there exists among military experts—and in our own military service—a recognition of the fact that there is a substantial difference between a defensive and an offensive military policy and that it is not being recognized in the plans which are officially recommended for our military preparation. We are being urged to support a military program which we are assured is intended only for defense; but it is not an exclusively defensive program. I do not intend to impugn in any degree the sincerity of its advocates—I think they believe that they are advocating a defensive policy; but they have not defined nor had defined for them what it is we wish to defend, nor have they abandoned that hoary maxim of military science that a strong offense is the best defense.

We shall make a serious mistake in all that we do toward military preparedness against war and for peace unless we tell our military experts, and tell them in a way that they will understand and accept, that we want a military establishment planned and prepared for defense and not for offense, even though offense may help defense—that we consciously and definitely intend to abandon and to have them abandon whatever military advantage there may be in having an army and a navy prepared to take the aggressive and to seek out and attack in force an enemy away from our own boundaries and waters. Only in this way can we convince the world that our object is pacific, that we are not merely repeating the hollow assurances of other nations that have built great navies and trained great armies in the name of peace only to use them for aggression when the opportunity and the temptation came. Only in this way can we be sure that we shall not yield to temptation when it comes. What is there in our national history to justify the claim that we will not use force to extend our boundaries or our dominion over the lands of weaker nations, no matter how sincerely at this time we intend not to do so? What right have we to thank God that we are not as other men, especially those Prussians? With an army and a navy designed for and substantially limited to the defense of our own lands and shores, we

can with some confidence and effectiveness advocate those principles and agencies of international policy that are best adapted to reduce the chances of war.

The arguments for increased land forces and reserves seem entirely sound. But this does not relieve us—even us laymen—from the necessity of considering what they should be and how they should be obtained. I do not propose to discuss details of military organization. It is important, however, for the public to understand that there are differences of opinion and of interest in the army as to what branches of the service should be increased. I am expressing no opinion, except that there should be complete freedom in the service for the public discussion of the issues. At present such discussion is explicitly prohibited by General Order No. 10, with the result that we are led to believe that there is greater agreement among our military experts than in fact exists.

All the military opinion about which I know anything is agreed that for a defensive policy we need trained officers, trained infantry, trained artillery, adequate equipment, and both an adequate supply of munitions and provision for increasing and maintaining an inadequate supply of the things for which modern war makes such insatiate demands. Does the program of preparedness that has been prepared for us contemplate these things? We are told that our preparation must be a genuine and a serious thing, that at the close of this war some victorious nation or combination of nations may decide to use its trained and veteran troops against us in resentment, or envy or lust of power or hope of loot, and that we must be ready and remain ready, that we must keep our powder dry. We are told that only thorough training and the very best equipment for an army in the leash would avail for our defense. And how is it proposed to secure such an army? Make a small increase in our regular troops and give a citizen soldiery annually a few months' intensive training that will not interfere too seriously with their business and professional occupations. Is there then no serious need for preparing against the possibility of a real invasion?

The truth is that at and for some time time after the close of this war the United States may be in less danger from attack

than at any time in its history. We all hope with differing degrees of confidence that out of the horrors and destruction of this war will come a real advance toward some form of international relations and international arrangements that will reduce the burdens of armament and the probabilities of war. If our hopes were really more than hopes, this nation might well await the outcome without increasing at this time its military establishment—not that we might not then take wise precautions to meet the actual situation that will then be disclosed, but that we could be so much wiser then than we possibly can be now. It is because our hopes are only hopes, and not certainties, that we are urged to prepare now against a possibility that might be so unspeakably disastrous to this country, to its men, and especially to its women and its children, that we are not justified in delaying at least adequate preparation to resist attack. But if we are really to prepare against a real attack, what folly it is to be less than adequately prepared. We should analyze the situation that is at all likely to confront us and meet that situation. What is the situation?

It seems clear that we need anticipate no attack from Great Britain or indeed from any of her allies for some time after this war, no matter what its outcome, unless we ourselves furnish some new and gratuitous occasion for a quarrel. For a hundred years we have settled amicably every issue with Great Britain, and many of the issues have been peculiarly irritating and important to both nations. Our substantive relations were never more sympathetically friendly, and new causes would have to arise to strain them. Our diplomatic relations were never so assured by treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of issues upon which we may disagree. Certainly this is true of Great Britain; and with her friendship and the already increased and growing appreciation of the reality and value of the Anglo-Saxon tie, a war between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations is practically unthinkable. I mention Great Britain because it seems not worth while to discuss the effect of our proximity to Canada in the event of war. Canada is probably a hostage in our reach against war with England; but let us assume that it would be a military asset for Great Britain. No other first-

class power except England has any foothold in North America from which land forces could be drawn or in which they could be landed. Any other formidable enemy would be compelled to transport its invading army across the ocean.

General Francis Vinton Greene has discussed at some length the problems presented to us in the event of such invasion and has advised us of the conclusions of such military students as Freiherr von Edelsheim in the service of the German General Staff. His conclusion is that our initial problem would be to prevent the landing, or to defeat after it landed, a force of 240,000 infantry with the ordinary normal complement of cavalry, artillery, stores, etc., and that this is the largest force that it would be practicable to transport to our shores as a single expedition. The War College now makes a larger estimate. Germany has permitted the public discussion of military problems of this sort. We have refused or restricted it. The weight of available military authority, however, seems agreed that we should have 500,000 trained soldiers to meet an invasion, and that this number of really trained men adequately equipped would successfully repel the invasion. It may be that, considering the disadvantages attending disembarkation, substantially less than this number would suffice for effective defense, provided they are trained soldiers, and not half-trained militia or national guardsmen. I speak in no terms of disrespect of our militia—quite the contrary. I merely insist upon the fact, recognized by the intelligent militia officers themselves, that men in active civil life who give all the time they can to military training can not successfully oppose regular troops. The militia can quickly become an army, but it can not be an army; and what we should need if an invasion threatened us would be an army. Then let us have an army—no larger than we need for the purpose of manning our defenses and repelling an invasion, but a real army of real soldiers adequate for this purpose and a militia adequate to fill the ranks as they need filling. I do not say 500,000 men; I say what number we need for the defensive purpose which we intend to accomplish.

The suggestion of universal military service in this country can be intelligently determined only by considering separately

each of the objects for which it is alleged to be desirable. Its main—its real—purpose is military. If it is not necessary or at least desirable for strictly military purposes, it will never be adopted because of its alleged physical or disciplinary benefits. And for what conceivable purpose of military defense should we train to arms millions of the young men of the United States? From a military point of view this surely would be a senseless waste of time, energy, and money. If we are to have an army, let us have a real army, trained and efficient for its purpose. Let us have no superficial training of millions of schoolboys, no amateurish conscription of the adult manhood of the nation, creating a paper force immensely greater than any possible need for any purpose that we ought to entertain, only to demonstrate its inefficiency if a test of strength should come, to disseminate through the nation a false feeling of security, and to encourage the natural tendency toward brag and bluster to which Brother Jonathan has been unfortunately susceptible.

There is undoubtedly a strong feeling in the United States that, no matter what we do in the way of military preparation, we will be in no danger of imperialistic ambition or that aggressive militarism which precisely the same policy has undoubtedly tended to create elsewhere. There is far greater danger from these sources than our people realize. This false assumption of a superior resisting power of Americans to the allurements of imperialism and national expansion only makes the danger more real. Human nature is essentially the same in Prussia and in the United States.

It is not in Germany alone that the Nietzschean exaltation of the Will to Power stirs the atavistic savage that lingers in most of us and in some of us to an exceptional degree. Few Americans may believe that war is a biological necessity, but many are easily persuaded that it is a necessity on other grounds, and its exhibition of primitive virtues and barbarian vigor distracts attention from its hideous cruelties and its senseless waste. We need to be constantly reminded that mankind is not degenerating because it is finding less use for some superb qualities of the animal and the savage, that evolution is out of the jungle, not back into it.

If German blood or German training makes men more prone to exalt force in international affairs, it will be well for us to remember that in 1910 there were in the United States 8,282,618 people who were born in Germany, or one or both of whose parents were born in that country. This takes no account of more than 2,000,000 of our population similarly derived from Austria.

If the United States is to have increased military forces—and it seems essential that we shall—let us not be blind to the dangers that are inseparable from military training and military strength. Let us endure with patience the taunts of the militant pacifist whose motto is "Speak softly and carry a big stick." I try sometimes to visualize that peace-loving and peace-seeking community in which that motto is carried into practical effect, as its distinguished author illustrates it in his own delightful way. Picture to yourselves the citizens of New York leaving their homes in the morning, each armed with a big stick, suited to his taste—one with beautifully polished knobs on the heavy end of the stick, and one with nails carefully disposed upon its surface, to emphasize the value of the weapon as a deterrent of force and an incentive to peace—each swinging his little pacifier jauntily as he trudges sturdily or saunters leisurely along, speaking softly to those he passes about mollycoddles, cowards, and the Ananias Club. How certain it would be that no thought of violence would disturb the peaceful serenity of such a happy community. It is an excellent motto, but hard to live up to, and we shall do well not to underestimate the difficulty. Nations, like individuals, when they carry big sticks, seem predisposed to raise their voices.

It is said that the disbandment of our armies after the Civil War demonstrates that military training will not create a militaristic sentiment in the United States; but it is not from those who have had actual experience in war, and have gone through the pit of hell, or at least looked into its mouth, that we need fear militaristic sentiment so much as from the man who has merely worn the trappings and studied the manual of arms. It is the little knowledge that is the dangerous thing.

Has consideration been given to the political dangers of an

organized citizen soldiery containing millions of men, who would not regard the military work seriously because war would not really seem imminent?

Has not Scharnhorst shown us our true military policy, when by transferring every man to the reserve as soon as he had been trained, the active army of 42,000 men, to which he was restricted by the Peace of Paris, became the army of 150,000 that contributed so powerfully to the defeat of Napoleon? Why should we not adopt the policy of training our soldiers as intensively as possible and then transfer them, as soon as they are trained, to a reserve receiving proper pay from the government and subject to be called to the colors whenever needed? Would not such a plan give us a vastly superior army to that available in any other way? Would it be any less a citizen soldiery because it had one year's continuous training instead of three months' training for each of four years? Would not the interference with business or professional activity be far less and the cost to the country far less than under the plans proposed?

If some mechanical training accompanied the military training, it might extend the period of active service, but might it not equip the soldier for a more useful citizenship and make enlistment more attractive? The same thought applies to the education of the reserve of trained officers that should be provided.

Universal military service would undoubtedly distribute the military burden, but it would create the burden for the sake of distributing it. It is not "shirking" to oppose the imposition on our people of a burden which it is both unnecessary and unwise for them to assume. By making service in the army and in the militia of real value to those who enlist, as well as to the nation, we should create a military system that would justify itself, and that would secure forces amply sufficient for our defense. There should be no illusion as to the effect—if not the purpose—of doing more than this. Our sons, once trained, would be available for war beyond our borders, and even statutory declarations against using them there would not remove the consequences of their availability.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On January 4, 1916, the Associated Press sent out from Washington a dispatch  
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It may well be questioned whether the agitation for universal military training or any other form of conscription does not tend to discredit and to prevent a degree of actual military preparation which might otherwise receive popular support.

It is said that what we lack in the United States is discipline, and that military discipline will supply the need. We do want civic discipline, the conscious and willing subordination of immediate individual freedom of action to concerted and co-operative control for the good of the community, a control in determining the extent and character and purpose of which the disciplined shall have a voice. Shall we get this from a training that consists chiefly if not wholly in obedience to orders? No military discipline in or out of the schools can be made much more than this for the great mass under the practical limitations that must prevail. Few, indeed, will be the individuals who will be trained to direct others, and these few will learn chiefly to direct the others in a routine essentially arbitrary and mechanical.

Theirs not to reason why,  
Theirs but to do and die,

is the ideal of military discipline, the quality we are called upon to praise and admire in the soldier. It is an admirable ideal for military purposes, but not so good for civic purposes, and what we are now discussing is the alleged civic advantage of military discipline upon the young manhood of the country.

As to the suggestion that military drill in the public schools would be justified on the ground of physical development, President Lowell, of Harvard, says that his experience on the Boston School Board convinced him that military drill in the public schools is a mistake; that the boys tired of drill, and were disinclined later to join the militia. He thinks other kinds

for which it claimed exceptionally reliable information, stating that: "a navy equal in strength to those of any two world powers except Great Britain, and an army prepared to fight for the integrity of the Pan-American idea anywhere in Pan-America is the ultimate aim of the plans of military experts."

On January 6, 1916, Secretary Garrison said before the Military Committee of the House of Representatives: "We have determined and announced that the sovereignty of the other republics of this hemisphere shall remain inviolable and must therefore at all times stand ready to make good our position in this connection."

of physical training are better, and that while his objection does not apply to colleges, drill should be a very small part of military training.

Former President Eliot says :

I feel strongly another objection to military drill in secondary schools, namely, that it gives no preparation whatever for the real work of a soldier. In the Boston High Schools military drill includes nothing but the manual of arms, company movements on even surfaces, and a few very simple battalion movements, mostly those of parade. The real work of a soldier is to dig in the ground with pick and shovel ; to carry a burden of about fifty pounds on long marches ; to run very short distances carrying a similar burden ; and to shoot accurately with a rifle ; throw hand grenades ; and use rapidly and well machine guns and artillery. Military drill in schools has no tendency to prepare boys to do the real work of a soldier. The Swiss do not begin to train their young men for their army until they are about twenty years of age, except that they encourage voluntary rifle clubs for practice in shooting.

Assuming, however, that there would be both physical and disciplinary advantages in military training, it would not follow that we should obtain these advantages by compulsory military service. The development of many of the principles of compulsory education into a system of universal civic training and civic service may offer many advantages including those physical and disciplinary results which are the chief military results to be expected from any system of universal military training practicable in a country of the character and size of the United States.

It is said that military training would increase respect for law and order, and the proof of this is said to be the comparative statistics of crimes of violence in Switzerland and the United States. How about the comparative respect for law in England and in the United States, although England has not adopted universal military training? How about the comparative statistics of crimes of violence in Germany and England? The comparison (claimed to be derived from official reports) given in an appendix to *The Soul of Germany* by Thomas F. A. Smith, (Late English Lecturer in the University of Erlangen) is appallingly unfavorable to Germany.

If we were situated as is Switzerland, where any war or serious threat of war is certain to require the military service of every able-bodied citizen, and where, even then, every unit in the small population must have the very highest military efficiency practicable, we might justify universal military training in and out of the schools. We may be sure that any attempt with us to train a citizen soldiery under the Swiss system would almost certainly be perfunctory, because it would not be taken seriously. We must never forget that the discipline which Germany has given her citizens is a discipline which is not confined to their service in the army. The German people are trained to regard the state as the instrumentality through and by which they—each of them individually and all of them collectively—can best advance their interests—can best secure for themselves the necessities and the pleasures of life. Behind even the “*verboten*” is a larger consciousness of the advantages of communal action, a larger practical realization of those advantages, than obtains in any other great nation to-day.

Germany's industrial and social progress has been attained in spite of, and not because of, her system of enforced military training and service. Undoubtedly the conviction which has existed in Germany that war was a real and constantly impending probability has had an influence, perhaps a determining influence, in securing the adoption of certain policies, such as the government ownership and operation of railroads, and the development of waterways in connection with the railroads as a “*coördinated*” and interdependent transportation system. The same conviction of the imminence of war has perhaps had its influence in securing some of the social and industrial legislation which sound views of public policy justify and demand without the slightest regard to their military value. There is no evidence, however, that these social and industrial results in Germany were due to the military training of German citizens.

No ; German social and industrial progress is not due to military training, but, as Paul Rohrbach says, to German industry, and to the fact that Germany has made more progress toward having her government perform the true functions of government in its internal and peaceful relations to its citizens

than has been made by other governments, especially our own. Unless our preparation is not only planned for defense, and is, as far as practicable, unadapted for aggression, the preparation itself will add to the possibilities of war, because we shall be less afraid of the consequences of mistake and less on our guard against those who from ignorance or self-interest seek to persuade us to maintain unsound national ideals or purposes.

Other nations may, of course, make the same sort of mistake; may permit themselves to assert against us interests that are not their true interests or that they have no right to assert. We may have to defend ourselves against aggression born of their mistakes, but so far as actual war is concerned we are in far less danger from the selfishness or muddled thinking of other nations than we are from the selfishness or muddled thinking of our own people. We are defended, not only by our geographical separation from Europe and Asia, but by the character of our country itself, its extent and physical conformation, and more than all this, by the conflicting interests of our possible enemies. The balance of power in Europe has always been more of a defense to us than even our isolation. The conquest of the United States has been impossible—the attempt unthinkable—except by land and naval forces too large to be spared from Europe. It was largely because of this condition that we succeeded in the war of the Revolution, and got off with a little humiliation in 1812. Only the creation in Europe as a result of this war of new conditions in which one or other of the contending parties is left so completely crushed as to destroy all fear from that nation in the mind of the victor or victors can possibly threaten us, and then the victor must have some motive, must see some advantage, in making war upon us.

No European nation can have any real motive to attack the United States except to prevent us from asserting claims or exercising rights in other countries which are not in accordance with its interests. There can be no motive of conquest, and it is equally unthinkable that any European nation would make war on us to impose discriminatory commercial or political conditions upon us, or merely to punish us or to loot us or force from us a money payment as the price of peace. Theor-

etically, any of these things might happen; practically they can be dismissed from serious consideration.

If the United States becomes seriously involved in war it will be because it asserts some right or claims, some privilege outside of its own territory, the assertion of which right or privilege runs counter to the interest of some foreign power, or it will be because some foreign power asserts a similar right or privilege against us. We can not of ourselves control the motives or the actions of other powers except by international agreement, backed by force or by measures short of force which may be equally effective for the purpose. Our first concern, however, is with our own attitude toward these matters. What are the rights or privileges we claim or wish to claim outside of our own territory? Are we claiming or are we likely to claim any rights or privileges that are likely to be challenged by other nations? What are the foundations for such claims? Are they sound in principle and in law? How important to us is their assertion if challenged? Are they important enough to fight for? Are there other remedies than war available to us if they are challenged? What are they? Is our claim similar in character to that of other nations, and should we take steps to unite all nations who are interested in the same essential claim for its defense against a possible aggressor? Should we unite North and South America in the defense of our common interests, and if this seems desirable, why should we draw an artificial line excluding agreements with European nations in matters where our common interests are as clear as, or clearer than, our Pan-American interests?

To reach right answers to these questions we must above all clear our minds of the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can be promoted by force. Undoubtedly temporary advantages can be secured by the exploitation of other nations, especially—perhaps exclusively—undeveloped peoples and undeveloped lands; but in the long run the commercial interests of the world are mutual. Our prosperity is dependent upon prosperity elsewhere. Every nation obtains materials or goods from others and sells to others its own surplus of materials or goods. Every nation has most to gain by helping to advance

the trade of the world, to make all nations prosperous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent with sound economic laws. So far as the happiness of the mass of mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned the adjustment of world commerce to the natural laws of commerce wholly overbalances the temporary advantages of exploitation. Otherwise it would be to the economic interest of this nation to encourage the continuation of the war in Europe so that we might continue our artificial trade in munitions. We owe much to Norman Angell for his convincing presentation in effective popular form of the economic fallacy that world commerce follows national lines and that imperialism is commercially profitable.

The imperialistic theory is built upon the history of the British Empire and upon a misunderstanding of that history, especially upon a failure to comprehend that economic conditions are now so radically and irrevocably different that the British Empire itself is commercially and politically revolutionized. The history of England can not be repeated any more than can the history of Rome, and wise men would not desire to repeat either if they could. We can not ignore the process by which the world has been convinced that the welfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national success. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy; and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social, and intellectual ideal of civilization even more than as a political ideal. This will be clearer to mankind after this war, and we may suspect that it is becoming clearer and clearer during the war. Right now in the trenches no power can keep the soldier from thinking and thinking about the state and his relation to it. Even if he is led to magnify the value of organization and efficiency, he intends to ask for organization and efficiency in *his* interests and not in the interests of privilege or class.

The very first thing that we Americans should consider to-day is the relation which we wish our government to assume toward us as individuals and toward other nations. Our whole attitude toward this war and its results depends upon our conception of the function of the state. What are our ideals of the

individual life and of community life? Do we conceive that the most desirable life for ourselves—for individual men—is the life in which there is the least possible restraint upon individual freedom of action, not only the action of each man in those things that concern him alone—if, indeed, there are any such things—but also in those things that affect others, leaving the result of the conflict between individuals to be decided by the relative strength or cunning of the individual? There are those who, consciously or otherwise, really desire a world in which the strong, the astute, the intellectually and physically superior are to have the fullest freedom to enjoy every advantage which they can obtain over their inferiors. If they are shrewder, if more far-seeing, if they are stronger, more vigorous physically and intellectually, they contend that it is their right to anticipate those who are less alert, less far-seeing, less cunning, in seizing the things or the positions that are available, and that having seized them, it is their vested right to hold them, even when it becomes clear that these things and these points of vantage are essential to the community as a whole and to the general mass of mankind. Men who hold this view regard it as a merit, as a demonstration of worth, that they foresaw what some day the community would need, some natural resource, some particular piece of property, the potential value of which was not generally appreciated at the time, and that they acquired it so that in the day of need they could profit from the needs of their fellows. We shall have to get rid of this idea in our individual and national life if we are to get rid of the most prolific source of war in the field of international relations.

We know now that success in war depends, after the first shock, on social and industrial solidarity far more than upon the number of trained soldiers that can be placed in the field. It is easier to enlist men and to train them if the front can be held for a time—in our case if the first invading expedition can be held off or seriously crippled—than it is to organize the national, economic and industrial forces to support the troops if they are to be successful under the conditions of modern warfare. In his annual message of December 7, President Wilson emphasized our duty in this regard:

While we speak of the preparation of the nation to make sure of her security and her effective power we must not fall into the patent error of supposing that her real strength comes from armaments and mere safeguards of written law. It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their success in their undertakings, their free opportunity to use the natural resources of our great homeland and of the lands outside our continental borders which look to us for protection, for encouragement, and for assistance in their development, from the organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life.

The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress are more vital to the nation in this its time of test than at any other time. We can not adequately make ready for any trial of our strength unless we wisely and promptly direct the force of our laws into these all-important fields of action.

He then proceeds to select one pressing economic problem to which to direct particular attention. He says:

In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation problem is an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from time to time of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much longer be able to cope with it successfully as at present equipped and coordinated. I suggest that it would be wise to provide for a commission of inquiry to ascertain by a thorough canvass of the whole question whether our laws as at present framed and administered are as serviceable as they might be in the solution of the problem. It is obviously a problem that lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people. Such an inquiry ought to draw out every circumstance and opinion worth considering, and we need to know all sides of the matter if we mean to do anything in the field of federal legislation.

The issue thus raised will be found to go far deeper than mere changes in "the process of regulation." No lesson of the war has been more clearly taught than that efficient transportation is of the very essence of military efficiency and strength. It is equally true, as President Wilson says, that the transportation problem in peace "lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people." Our present method of dealing with it is increasingly unsatisfactory to the private interests involved, and it is not satisfactory to the public. We have secured many improvements by adopting public regulation, but as this regula-

tion proceeds it becomes more and more apparent that the transportation system of the country is essentially one inter-related and interdependent whole. There may always be a rivalry in economy and efficiency of service, but competition for traffic is moderated by a division of territory, or a gentlemen's agreement, while competition in rates has almost disappeared.

Governmental regulation has served to bring out clearly the essentially monopolistic character of our railroad system as a whole and the necessity of that "coordination" to which President Wilson refers. The question is whether coordination in the public service can be obtained so long as our railroads do not have a common financial interest as among themselves, but only a common financial interest as against the public. Can a public service which is essentially monopolistic be satisfactorily performed as a competitive enterprise? Are we not losing the benefits of competition without obtaining the advantages of regulated monopoly? We are certainly irritating and discouraging private enterprise based on competitive profits. So unsatisfactory is the result that some of our leading railroad officials regard public ownership as the only escape from what they consider destructive regulation. The question is whether "coordination" can be obtained without public ownership.

Germany has owned and operated her railroads, from the point of view of public service, in peace and in war, not from the point of view of profits, although the profits have been large. The probabilities seem to be that after the close of this war every railroad in Europe will be nationalized. Military reasons may be the determining factors in this result, but it may be well questioned whether any satisfactory solution of the transportation problem can be reached in any other way. Whether our government should take over our railroads and when and upon what conditions may raise many questions of expediency; but if we are to treat the issue with open mind it is important that we should understand that if, in the public interest, the government should do so, it will not be invading the domain of private enterprise, but will merely be taking back to itself a function of government which, for what seemed sufficient reasons of expediency, it had previously delegated to private agencies.

I take it we shall all agree that if there is something which it is the true function of government to perform, that thing will never be performed as it should be until the government performs it. We may disagree about what is the true function of government, but once it is determined that on principle the performance of a particular service is a function of government, that means, if it means anything, that under right conditions of government it will be better performed by the government than if left to private enterprise. If a government is not performing all of the functions of government it is to that extent a failure as a government. The results must continue to be less satisfactory and less efficient than they should be and can be if the government is performing all of its functions, is qualified to perform them, and is performing them properly. Now, nothing is more clearly settled in the law of this country and in the principles upon which that law is based than that railroads as common carriers are performing a function of government. The Supreme Court of the United States and many other courts have so held.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the construction and control of the public highway is historically and on principle one of the first of the functions of government, and a railroad is a public highway. My purpose in discussing this matter has been to indicate how deep the issues of industrial mobilization go. In England it already involves the relations of the trade unions to the government.

It is insisted by some that the abolition of war or even its substantial diminution is an idle dream; that we may be reasonably certain that for one reason or another this country will be involved in war within a comparatively short time. Very well. It is now clear that industrial mobilization is as essential to modern war as is military mobilization, and such mobilization can not be effectively made after hostilities occur unless the government already has the powers and is exercising the activities essential to effective mobilization. It is even more difficult to agree upon the principles and to create the machinery for

<sup>1</sup> See *United States v. Joint Tariff Association*, 171 U. S., 505, 570; *Talcott v. Pine Grove*, 23 Federal Cases 652, etc.

industrial mobilization than for military mobilization, and lack of actual experience in applying the principles and operating the machinery may be disastrous in the one case as in the other. Do the prophets of war propose to face now the problems of economic and industrial mobilization? If they do, it will be necessary to abandon some dogmatic assumptions which have heretofore formed and still form so large a part of our political thinking.

The very first and most essential of all our preparation must be to make our government—local, state, and national—what it should be. This is the service for which we need universal training and a patriotism that is nobler and more useful than all the patriotism of war.

It is suggested that we already respond to the civic appeal more easily than to the appeal for military sacrifice, but Hiram Maxim says,

I wonder why it is that we are not as enthusiastic in this social service work as we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and more that appeals to the martial imagination in attacking war and warriors than there is in the prosaic, tame, and glamorless enterprise of simply saving human life in peaceful pursuits for the mere sake of saving it?

Senator Root has recently made an eloquent appeal for military preparation, in which he said:

Do not let us deceive ourselves. Adequate preparation for the preservation of our liberty means a vast expenditure, but it means more than that; it means a willingness for self-sacrifice, a spirit among our people, the length and breadth of the land, among the rich and poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of the common school, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers—a national spirit among the people of the land, and a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic and to make a sacrifice of means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, of life, in the cause.

To every word of this we should subscribe. But I wish the Senator had gone on to demonstrate—as he could do so well—

that the patriotism and self-sacrifices of peace are of more transcendent importance, even as a preparation for war, than any present resolution of willingness to sacrifice "means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, of life," upon the field of battle. I am not detracting in the least from the importance of making defensive military preparations; but a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic, and to make some sacrifice of means and convenience and comfort in the piping times of peace will be our best preparation for war and our most likely insurance against it.

Do not let us deceive ourselves. The United States of America, as a nation, is worth preserving, is entitled to our loyalty and devotion, only to the extent that it is an agency to promote the moral, intellectual, and physical well-being of its people, not some of its people, but all of its people—only to the extent that, in very truth, in the realities of the everyday life of the men, the women, and the children who inhabit it, its conscious ideal is the greatest good to the greatest number. To carry out that ideal means a vast expenditure, willingly and intelligently made; it means a preparedness for self-sacrifice in times of peace quite as much as in times of war—nay, a greater self-sacrifice, because the progress of civilization is measured by the extent to which peace supersedes and supplants war. It means a spirit among our people the length and breadth of the land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of the common school and those to whom fortune unhappily has given no schooling at all, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers—a national spirit determined to make the American Republic an agency of liberty and justice at home and abroad. By all means let us have an army and navy adequate for the defense of such a nation, but let us realize that far more important than armies and navies are our national purposes and policies.

## COMPULSORY TRAINING AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS<sup>1</sup>

C. E. KNOEPPPEL

Of C. E. Knoeppel & Co. New York

**C**OMPULSORY service ceases to be compulsory when there is a willingness to serve. Our problem is, therefore, to determine how to induce this willingness.

In attempting to solve this problem, let me place before you the statement of the Hollander who, in September, 1915, said in one of the Amsterdam papers:

Here lies Germany's strength—not in her howitzers, not in her submarines, not in new chemical discoveries, not in the organization of production and distribution. All these are but manifestations, only instruments of use because of the tremendous force back of them—the marvellous energetic power of the soul of the German people.

Keeping this thought in mind, we should give the words of Senator Hitchcock careful consideration:

For more than a year, the world has seen England call for fit men and has watched a far-flung program of military preparedness shattered by strikes, refusals and sullen indifference. Sacred promises of aid and protection have crumbled, while officers sweated in training camps trying to make soldiers out of poverty-stunted weaklings. During the same period, Germany has flooded the continent with singing millions capable of all endurance. It is not a question that has to do with sympathy but a cold-blooded comparison of two methods of preparedness. Germany is doing the thing which England has not been able to do because Germany, more than any other nation, has made the welfare of the individual citizen the concern of the State, manifesting protective and continuous interest in his life, health, education and future. Government in Germany is not a sovereign power, detached and magisterial, but a working partnership with the people for the promotion of prosperity.

<sup>1</sup> Read at the evening session of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

The question with which we should be most concerned is: Is there a partnership between our government and the people for the promotion of prosperity—a very necessary factor before we can have true preparedness?

In answering this question, let me place before you some of our present-day conditions which will indicate the pronounced room for improvement.

In a recent address before the Rubber Club of America, Edward N. Hurley, vice-chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, said:

(1) Leaving out of consideration the banking, railroad and public utility corporations and referring only to those that have to do with trade and industry, we find that there are about 250,000 corporations in the country. The astonishing fact is that over 100,000 of these report no net income whatever. In addition, 90,000 make less than \$5000 a year while only the 60,000 remaining, the more successful ones, make \$5000 a year more.

(2) According to the report of the Industrial Relations Commission, 35,000 workers are killed and 700,000 injured yearly, and each one of the 30,000,000 workers in this country lose on an average, nine days a year through sickness, costing them a loss of about \$700,000,000 yearly.

(3) Carrie Chapman Catt says that of the millions of pupils attending our grade schools yearly, one-half of them never finish the course, only 5% enter high school, only  $\frac{1}{8}$  of 1% go to technical schools and about  $\frac{1}{3}$  of 1% get a college training.

(4) It is reported that three-fourth of the male wage-earners in the United States earn less than \$600 per year, and that of the 8,000,000 women workers, two-thirds earn less than \$8.00 per week and one-half less than \$6.00 per week. On the other hand, there are 1600 American fortunes yielding \$100,000 or more, and forty-four yielding \$100,000,000 or more yearly.

(5) Our average unemployment is 14% as against 6% in Great Britain and 2% in Germany.

(6) According to Frank P. Walsh, there are 5,000,000 men in this country whose labor is so casual that it borders on vagrancy.

(7) According to Dr. Rupert Blue, Surgeon-General of the U. S. Public Health Service, 600,000 people die annually in the United States from preventable diseases, and of the 300,000 infants that perish

annually, one-half could be saved by measures within the reach of every community.

(8) We have 2,500,000 farmers striving for a bare existence on farms of less than 50 acres, while four-fifths of the 50,000 owners of large areas hold their land out of active service.

(9) According to Koester, who devoted 422 pages to the discussion, we are wasting annually in this country ten billion dollars.

(10) Consider the following :

*United States*

Wealthy class (2% of people)	. . .	60% of wealth
Middle class (33% of people)	. . .	35% of wealth
Poor class (65% of people)	. . .	5% of wealth

(11) Of the 41,168 applicants desiring to join the U. S. Marine Corps in 1915, only 9.3% were accepted, the balance being reported as physically unfit. New York City had the lowest acceptance, 2.9%.

(12) Mrs. Charles O'Hara Craigie, in an address before the National Democratic Women of America, stated that the United States is twenty-five years behind other nations with which we are in open competition, in the training afforded by the vocational schools which turn out skilled industrial workers.

These are ugly pictures, damning evidence of the existence in this country of a "mutual admiration society" which has either failed or refused to consider the seriousness of some of the conditions in our midst. And yet we talk of military preparedness as glibly as we do spending \$50,000,000 in "pork" items.

Mr. Edison well says: "After the European war, preparedness agitation here will die out, and then war with us will be a walk-over for some nation."

At this point I want to ask this question: What would have happened to Germany if its well-organized war staff, having absolute control of all the factors with which warfare is concerned, had been forced to depend upon a disorganized and individualistic industrial system? She would have been beaten before she even started. On the other hand, what would have happened to Germany if England, France and Russia had been as well prepared industrially as Germany was? The same

answer applies to this question—Germany would have been beaten before she even started.

It is, therefore, obvious that the basis of the military efficiency is industrial efficiency. It should also be obvious that there can be no military or industrial efficiency unless there is efficiency, loyalty and support on the part of the individual. Therefore, *true preparedness rests with the individual, aided by organization and control.*

How many appreciate the fact that there will be a gigantic awakening in Europe when the fifteen or twenty million serious-minded, bitter and determined men who have been through all the horrors of hell return to civil and industrial life, with new conceptions gained through daily, intimate contact with superior organization, efficient control and stern discipline?

How many here realize that the stern necessities of war have forced England, France, Russia, and even Germany to a kind of industrial efficiency never before dreamed of, to undertaking and accomplishing things which were thought impossible of attainment before the war, and which will be carried on after it is over?

If you will seriously consider these two questions, the logical conclusion is that we must immediately take steps to "put our house in order," especially if we keep in mind the following from *After the War*, by Thomas O. Marvin, president of the Home Market Club of Boston:

The United States will be the fruitful garden toward which the eager eyes of Europe will be turned. Here will be the goal that the wasted treasuries of Europe will most earnestly seek. The economic problems which will arise will require the wisest statesmanship that the country can furnish. In the face of the nation's need, economic theories purely Utopian in character must be abandoned, and industrial defense must be provided in the same patriotic spirit that prompts the steps that are being taken to secure military preparedness.

In the *Metropolitan Magazine*, Mr. Roosevelt made this statement:

In contrast to England is Germany. Germany founded her military

efficiency on industrial organization. Her industrial organization, however, is founded upon military principles. Our job is to secure the German result of unity and efficiency but to secure that result in line with American traditions and American ideas, to secure it as the result of cooperating free men, and to secure it without producing the psychology which in Germany has been a source of such terrible world evil.

Let us study carefully what she has done and adapt to our needs the schemes which she has found successful, supplementing them with whatever additional measures our own experience may indicate as advisable.

A close study of German military and industrial accomplishments indicates quite clearly that the principles upon which she based her work were organization, control, standardization and incentive, using as her ideals the following:

(1) Consider the reasons for political disturbances and in dealing with the people give them wise and economic administration under expert guidance.

(2) Abolish pauperism; keep workmen employed, and provide for old age, sickness and accident.

(3) Take part in industrial combinations that undertake to regulate prices and the production of any industry.

(4) Prepare growing generations for advancement in industrial pursuits.

Is there anything about these four items to which the American worker or the American manufacturer cannot subscribe?

The results of this study with reference to the lesson we can learn in effecting this partnership between the government and the people, are:

- (1) Organization of a superior order;
- (2) Control of the most efficient kind;
- (3) Cohesion and unity of purpose;
- (4) Co-operation which really co-operates;
- (5) The staff idea as applied to military, naval and industrial matters;
- (6) Intelligent direction through expert guidance in all important matters;

(7) The elimination of politics from things involving the welfare of the people ;

(8) Foresight and planning ahead ;

(9) Proper and adequate industrial education ;

(10) Social insurance covering accidents, sickness and old age ;

(11) Freedom from costly industrial disputes ;

(12) Adequate employment ;

(13) A reasonable distribution of wealth ;

(14) Proper protection and encouragement of big business ;

(15) Government control of the important factors which serve industry and the people.

But this situation confronts us: Can we get the support, the loyalty and the hearty co-operation from that proportion of our people on whom industrial and military efficiency depends until we have in some manner made it worth their while? Have we ever made it worth their while? If anyone thinks we have, let him go back and mentally review the twelve conditions outlined in the introduction. In other words, this conclusion is forced upon us—if we are to get from the rank and file of our people the willingness to serve and to do the things so necessary in a comprehensive plan of preparedness, we must begin consideration of the matter of incentive now, not twenty-five years hence, when it will be too late.

In providing incentive, we should adopt the following:

(1) Give the people steady employment,

(2) Protect them from loss due to sickness, accident and old age,

(3) Reduce industrial disputes,

(4) Give them sufficient income.

As regards the first: Our employment problem can easily be solved if the work is under the control of the government and in the hands of experts.

As regards social insurance: I believe we all agree that provision should be made for those dependent upon workers killed and that compensation laws and accident insurance should be made to take care of those injured. Sickness insurance is by all means the most important, as accidents only cause one-

seventh and unemployment only one-fifteen as much destitution as sickness. Imagine, if you will, what the loss to this country is in productive effort alone each year through the waste of 270,000,000 man-days per year due to sickness. There should also be provision for old-age disability.

Industrial disputes should be made the subject of the most careful study and laws enacted and courts created to enable both capital and labor to get together and settle their disputes, along the lines of industrial courts in Germany. What sense is there in having costly industrial disputes when over a period of fifteen years, 44% of the strikes have been won and 44% lost?

With reference to the fourth point (income), I am not a Socialist advocating an equal distribution of wealth, but I do say that if we consider German military and industrial attainments on the one hand and her better distribution of wealth on the other, only one conclusion is possible—we must bring about readjustment, through income and inheritance taxes, as a factor in insuring rewards to the 65% of the people upon whom industrial attainment depends and to whom we would have to look as workers or soldiers in case of war.

With reference to standardization, by which I mean the doing of things thoroughly, we must at once take steps to provide the right kind of industrial education, as well as the best methods of physical training.

Dr. P. P. Claxton, United States Commissioner of Education, declares:

The children of today will have to face a fiercer democracy when they become the men and women of tomorrow, and unless they are fitted by comprehensive national vocational training to meet the great complexities of life which are bound to face them when they leave our schools, our educational system will have failed in its purpose.

In *Collier's Magazine*, Frederick Palmer recently wrote as follows:

Universal service has meant the physical regeneration of Europe. British battalions of clerks and factory hands whom I saw at Aldershot with sunken chests and round shoulders in August, 1914, I saw eight

months later at the British front with square shoulders and deep chests. As one British officer stated, what a pity that many of these men must be killed. If the war stopped here it would mean that England has been regenerated. Go over to the east side of New York and watch the crowds. Go into an American town and see the loafers hanging around the street corners, and think what a year's training regardless of drilling with a rifle for its own sake would do for them? It would give them physical efficiency, definiteness of thought, pride and a sense of discipline.

But it means two years wasted out of a man's life, someone argues. They argued that way in England before the war but they do not now. Germany gave her man two years' training and within the small space of her European empire she managed to fit and clothe nearly 70,000,000 people. France has gone back to three years' training and yet the French people were probably the wealthiest per capita in the world before the war.

If the United States had universal service, universal physical training and say a year's military training for every young man, it would mean that we would be 20% more productive twenty years hence. For an example of the results of disciplined physical training at home see the callow candidates for West Point before they enter and after they are graduated. Freshmen and seniors in no other college offer any such contrast. But universal service does not make for democracy, you say. What about France? The English young army men ought to know and they are for it, these million of men who did not know the manual of arms and enlisted at the call of danger.

As regards organization and control, let me read you the following, concerning the German military sock:

A German officer who was visiting America spoke of the way in which his people addressed themselves to war problems in times of peace. Here is an excellent example, he said, and lifting his foot, took off his shoe. From about his foot he then took not the ordinary sock that men wear elsewhere but a sort of napkin or handkerchief which was carefully folded about it. This, he said, is the German military sock. It is the result of years of study and experiment by the very best minds not only in the German army but in German science and medicine. There are about thirty different ways of folding the sock about the foot. he said, and during his three years in the army the soldier is taught to become expert in using them all. Each manner of folding has a differ-

ent purpose. One will relieve a soreness of the heel, another a weariness of the instep, a third will protect an irritated corn, and a fourth will relieve the inflamed ball of the foot. At the same time the soldier is taught these different methods of wrapping the sock, he also learns the anatomy of the foot and just why the different wrappings relieve the different foot-ailments.

Professor Potter of Harvard University, in a lecture before the Forsythe Dental Infirmary, said :

The teeth of the English soldiers in the trenches are in poorer condition than the men of any other power. The French rank much higher as regards mouth-hygiene efficiency, with the Germans heading the list, almost 100% perfect.

The German soldier perhaps through the foresighted and long-preparing German nation, is faring the best of any, especially as regards his teeth. For more than fifteen years Germany has been caring for the teeth of its subjects, establishing clinics in the public schools, dental infirmaries in the smaller towns and villages as well as in the cities, and on the whole making sure that no child, especially a boy, is allowed to get his teeth into that state of decay which would cause his rejection at the time of a call to his colors.

We must provide incentives for our people. We must arrange for standardization, by which I mean the right industrial and vocational training, as well as physical training.

With reference to organization and control as applied to this country, I think we are all agreed that if a corporation managed its business in the way the business of the nation is handled, it would soon be outdistanced by its competitors, which leads to this conclusion: The nation must get out of politics and get into business.

The business of a corporation is managed by one man or a group of men. With reference to the country, however, we have a condition that is virtually the same as doing business in forty-eight different countries—certainly an absurd and inefficient way of doing things.

Imagine, if you will, what would happen if the German army or the British navy were organized as is this nation.

If we profit by the lessons which Germany can teach us along

lines of organization and control, then what this country needs, and promptly too, is not state but national organization and control for efficiency, economy and uniformity as to the following:

- (1) Incorporations;
- (2) Accident-prevention measures;
- (3) Industrial education;
- (4) Workmen's compensation laws;
- (5) Inheritance and income taxes;
- (6) Social insurance;
- (7) The tariff;
- (8) Management and labor;
- (9) Transportation and water ways;
- (10) Merchant marine;
- (11) Sanitation and health;
- (12) Employment;
- (13) Military and naval affairs;
- (14) Industrial disputes.

We are a free people; we have wonderful resources in money, men and material. We believe in "Union there is Strength." We are an unusually prosperous nation, which as a people is now contemplating preparedness.

Will our people, believing as they do in unity, take these resources and through the proper application of organization and control, based on standardization and incentive, prepare industrially as well as in a military sense to lead the world? Or will it take a great war to shake us from individualism and force us, as it is forcing England, to learn the great lesson that the power behind the most efficient civilization is organization?

## THE CURE-ALL OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE <sup>1</sup>

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

*President of the New York Evening Post*

**I**N the years to come, none of the many amazing phenomena of 1916 will, I am sure, cause greater wonderment than our recent discovery that universal military service is the cure-all for every one of our American ills. Do we wish to defend our country? We have but to adopt the system of training every boy to be a soldier, and the problem is solved. Do we wish to become industrially efficient? Then let us forget all about vocational training, but give every American a year under arms, and presto! we shall outdo Germany in scientific efficiency and management. Is our youth lawless and undisciplined? Universal compulsory service will end that once for all. Is our democracy halting? It is the tonic of a democratic army that we need in which all men shall pay for the privileges of citizenship by a year of preparation for poison gas and of learning how to murder other human beings. Our melting-pot is a failure? Then let us pour into it the iron of militarism, and it will fuse every element at once. Finally, if we need an American soul—and the war has suddenly taught us that this glorious country lacks a soul—it is the remedy of universal military service that is to supply our spiritual needs and give us the ability to feel as one, to think as one, so steer towards our destiny as of one mind, imperialistically.

It is so alluring and so entrancingly easy, the wonder is that we have never thought of it before. We saw it going on in France and Germany and Russia, but it seemed altogether repulsive in its forms. Americans to be conscripted? Heaven forbid. There rose before us the unutterable cruelties of non-

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

commissioned officers and some of the officers—visions of the thousands of men coming to our shores with hands mutilated to avoid the barracks with their open immoralities, their bitter hardships, the loss of three years of so many working lives. The "Red Rosa," Rosa Luxembourg, with her 10,000 authenticated instances of cruelties to German soldiers, inflicted by their own countrymen behind the screen of official authority, explained to us why so many young Germans emigrated before becoming of military age. In speaking of the case of one soldier horribly abused at Metz, the "Red Rosa" declared: "It is certainly one of those dramas which are enacted day in and day out in German barracks, although the groans of the actors never reach our ears." At once the German army sought to prosecute her when it was announced that she would call 1,030 eye-witnesses to grievous abuses of military authority in Germany's "democratic" army.

In Germany, of course, universal service is not in the least democratic, save that all must serve. Upon that we can surely all agree. The autocracy rules the army, and the aristocracy is fortified by it. More than one debate in the Reichstag has been enlivened by the bitter attacks by bourgeois orators against the favoritism shown to the Imperial Guards and to other fashionable regiments. There is even a caste within a caste, for men who pass through the gymnasia need serve but one year. Those whose fathers are too poor to educate them thus must give two years of their lives to carrying arms. The spirit of arrogance and aristocracy which the military life, with its dueling, its mediaeval code of honor, fosters, is about as anti-democratic as anything in the world. When men, merely by reason of the coat they wear, deem themselves sacrosanct and especially privileged, even to the extent of running through civilians by whom they fancy themselves insulted, or by preparing to turn their machine-guns upon their civilian fellow-townsmen, as in Zabern, it is obviously absurd to contend that the system of which they are the products smacks, save in the remotest, of anything democratic.

And never, save in Russia, was there a better illustration of the truth of our own James Madison's saying that "large armies

and heavy taxes are the best-known instruments for bringing the many under the dominion of the few." General von Falkenhayn, the present Chief of Staff and War Minister, was not altogether far from the truth when he said that but for the army "not a stone of the Reichstag building would remain in place," provided we assume that he meant to typify by the Reichstag building the present form of government in Berlin. No one need look further than the Russian system of universal service for a complete reason for the failure of the Russian revolution that all enlightened men wished well. The truth is that men of noble spirit are in every land crushed by the whole system of compulsory military labor precisely as compulsory servitude deadens men's souls everywhere.

And those Americans who see in the French army a perfect model for ourselves would do well to forget neither the shocking revelations of graft which have come to light before and since the war, nor the depths of infamy sounded by the military in the Dreyfus case, nor the fact that General Boulanger came within an ace of upsetting the Republic he had taken oath to preserve. But, we are told, Australia is democratic, quite like ourselves, and Australia has dedicated its youth to a training in arms with much resultant good in the present campaign. Why should we not be like Australia? Surely, there is no militarism there. And look at Switzerland! Does it not point the way? Well, so far as the latter is concerned, it does not. There is no comparison whatever between a little homogeneous country of about four millions—homogeneous despite the use of three languages—with a small and extremely mountainous country to defend, and our own vast continent.

But in one respect, the Swiss system does set an admirable example to the United States: It allows no general to exist save after the declaration of war. Its highest officer is a colonel. No major-generals parade the country urging "preparedness"; no brigadiers bewail the terrible fate that will overtake Switzerland if her standing force is not doubled at once. Yet even in Switzerland, if report be true, there is an anti-army party, people who complain that their military business has become ominous ever since so many of the younger officers have been serving in

the German army and become imbued with the spirit of the Prussian General Staff, just as, according to a prominent Australian, speaking in a public meeting in London a few months ago, the feeling against the conscription of boys was so intense in Australia that the law compelling this servitude would have been repealed had not the war come just when it did. Perhaps the fact that in fifteen years some 22,000 Australian boys have been punished for refusal to perform military service, or for minor infractions of discipline, a large proportion by jail sentences, may have had something to do with the growing feeling against it. As to its merits, there is the same difference of military opinion in regard to its work, as is to be found in regard to the value of our own military forces.

But let us grant for the sake of argument that there is solid worth in the Australian and Swiss systems and less militaristic danger than under any other. Would the same hold true with us? Australia is but a colony, unable to make war by itself, controlled and protected by the power of the mother country's fleet. Switzerland, by her geographical and ethnic situation and the scarcity of her numbers, cannot dream of wars of conquest. She is not a world power. She has no colonies, or oversea entanglements, or foreign alliances. How different is our situation! We have powerful military cliques, great aggregations of capital seeking outlet abroad and engineered by the same groups of privileged citizens who have been behind the Six-Power Chinese loan, who desire to exploit the Philippines for our own benefit, who have set up in Nicaragua a government upheld to-day only by American bayonets, who desire commercially to conquer the remainder of the hemisphere. We have seen outbursts of jingo passion in 1849 and 1898 marked by the stealing of other people's lands. The universal arming of the nation—what would it not mean in another such period of excitement under the rule of conscienceless and time-serving legislators, or administrators, or by generals gone into politics, with eyes keen only for a nation's aggrandizement and viewing every question from the standpoint of a soldier!

History shows us clearly what it all might mean. Leaving aside the fate of the ancient republics, should we not recall

what happened to the new-born French Republic? The nation rushed to arms, and out of the hurly-burly emerged the imperial figure which became the scourge of Europe. Such was the sudden transformation of a nation that but a few years before was imbued with the spirit of liberty, fraternity, and equality, whose doctrine did permeate all Europe to its very lasting betterment. But this tide of good-will, this spirit of universal brotherhood, was conquered by the militaristic spirit and militarism until it became, not the great leavening, leveling influence it should have become, but a menace for all the world against which all the nations of Europe were compelled to unite. Now we Americans, of course, think that nothing of the kind can happen to us—that we merely seek peace and to defend our own. Is it utterly without significance that our most distinguished Rear-Admiral goes up and down the country preaching that the American flag shall be carried at once to Cape Horn; that every republic to the south of us shall be conquered? Does it mean nothing that the Navy League demands that we shall take what they call “our rightful share of over-sea trade” and seize upon land which has not already been preëmpted by other strong nations for colonies for the United States? Is it not true that we are already extending our government over the Caribbean by force of bayonets?

We have one hundred millions of people; we have neighbors on our borders whom we could easily crush if we chose. To the south of us a score of republics fear every military move we make. It is an historic fact that even before the war in Europe the menace of our rapidly growing fleet was urged in the Reichstag, in the British and Japanese Parliaments, as the reason for further increase of their naval armaments. Any introduction of universal military servitude in the Western world would send a chill over the entire American continent and be viewed with alarm by the rest of the world.

Assuming that we are going to think of nobody else, and to blind our eyes to the obvious effects abroad of our arming—what does universal service mean? If it is to be for one year, fully seven hundred thousand young men will be annually withdrawn from productive labor; if it is to be for two years, and on

the German model, our standing army would be at least a million four hundred thousand, or nearly double that of Germany, in 1914. It would mean so vast a machinery of control and discipline that no other department could compare with it in expense or in the multitude of its permanent employees. Has any one in America who is advocating universal service yet computed the cost, direct or indirect, to the nation? If so, I have not seen it. Even on the dilettante Swiss and Australian basis, it would be stupendous. If carried out under federal supervision, it would enormously increase our most favored class of citizens—our military and naval servants—and their pension rolls. Abroad the conscripts receive only a few cents a day for their service, which is practically unpaid (in Turkey, even in war time, the soldier gets but twenty-five cents a month). Would our American youth stand for this when our National Guard has just now, by skilful political influence, succeeded in getting itself on the federal pay-roll—the first time that men have been so paid, yet remained important political factors in civil life? But we need have less concern with the financial cost and the creation of a dangerous military caste and the terrible burden of taxation than with the indirect results.

For what those do not see who know that universal service is what we need make patriots by the million is that the spirit of universal servitude, whether Australian, German, or Swiss, makes directly against the American ideal, for it inculcates blind obedience to the will of others, subordination to those who are masters, not necessarily because of superior wisdom or fitness, but largely because of accident. Heretofore we have always valued the American's self-assertiveness—yes, his refusal to recognize masters, his independence of thought and action, his mental alertness, particularly the happy-go-lucky Yankee initiative and individuality, as some of his best characteristics. We hated the servile obedience of the foreigner. Indeed, our whole American experiment was founded as a protest against certain tendencies abroad akin to those we are now asked to make dominant by means of universal service. The manhood of our western pioneers, the daring spirit of those who conquered the wildernesses were our admiration. They might verge on the

lawless at times, but militarism gave them nothing and could add nothing to their virile courage and their ability to take care of themselves. Now we are to prefer all men cast in one mould, drilled into one way of thinking, and taught blind obedience to those set above them. Formerly, we deemed it most worth while that all men should have their own opinions, express them freely, and if their consciences dictated, differ with those rulers if they saw fit. The principle of voluntary military service is directly connected with the principle of freedom of conscience which led to the foundation of Massachusetts and of Pennsylvania. Universal conscription, however disguised, by whatever foreign name it is characterized, makes against freedom of conscience and drives into intellectual slavery men whose souls revolt at the whole accursed system of teaching men to prepare to kill others.

Take the education of our boys. Recently, at a joint meeting of two schoolmasters' associations, there were divided views on some issues, but none apparently as to the utter lawlessness of our American youth and the complete failure of our private schools to reduce them to subordination by means of mental and moral discipline. And so there were many who grasped with joy at the universal military-drill idea to retrieve for them the ground lost by their own failure to do the fundamental thing they pledged themselves to accomplish. Of course, they knew little or nothing about universal service; perhaps it was the unexplored mystery of it that appealed. Many Americans are quite sure that the latest untried remedy, be it some law, or the initiative and referendum, or the recall of judicial decisions, or some other panacea, is, by reason of its very newness, just the medicine for a given ill they have been looking for. So with these school-teachers. Ignoring the fact that our private military schools have been anything but popular, and only in exceptional cases of high standing, they turn to military drill as to a last straw. But some of them do not even stop there; they want everybody subjected to military service. They forget that to some of their boys enforced military training may be as poison, and do not inquire whether they are not suddenly exalting the physical above the intellectual. The only thing that

stands out about it is that they, too, confessing themselves and their judgment failures heretofore, are now ready to take a leap into the dark.

Advocates of military preparedness are fond of likening their policies to the insurance policy upon our edifices. But there is a point beyond which no man would increase his premiums upon any given premises; he would tear them down to get a lower rate on a more modern structure, or he would build a concrete structure and do away with insurance altogether. So the price of universal military servitude is far too great a price to pay for insuring peace by any free peoples. Its dangers, its contaminating effects, the terrible weapon it forges for rulers, its reducing men to a dead level, far offset the alleged advantages which are physical betterment, greater practical efficiency and energy, and a sense of responsibility to the nation. For all of these things the price of compulsory service is too heavy. For it does not train the unfit or build up the weak, and it is not meant or intended to increase efficiency in civil life. Its primary purpose is to turn out killers, not workers. It often destroys those it would benefit—no less than ten thousand three hundred German conscripts have committed suicide in the last thirty years, or at the rate of one a day. There was a time when the price of social order was that human beings should go armed all the time, when they lived and ate and slept with their weapons by their sides. Humanity was deemed to have advanced itself from this stage until the present time has seen a return to it in the conscript armies of Europe. Surely, if the price of each man's carrying arms against another was too great to pay, the social cost of arming every man in a nation against all the men of other nations is wholly beyond reason in the present age. The answer to the world's difficulties is not the old destructive reactionary policy of arming to the teeth, but of so building our national edifices and so relating them one to the other that we can at once by mutual organization of nations reduce the premiums to a minimum or wipe them out altogether by building a concrete fireproof structure of internationalism—equipped with such lightning rods as world courts and international parliaments, and, if needs must be, an international police force of volunteers.

What today—what single thing—would most quickly win for Germany anew the confidence of the world and make possible the immediate coming of peace abroad? What else but an announcement by Germany that hereafter she would forever abandon universal military service? The chief menace of her militarism, against which all the world is roused, would disappear over-night.

No, to lead the world aright, the United States ought not to be debating to-day whether it prefers the voluntary military system or universal conscription, but how rapidly it can induce the other nations by precept, by example, by enlightened leadership, to limit all armaments to the dimensions of police forces. Fortunately, the European struggle bids fair to prove the futility of war as it has never been proved before. Fortunately, there is evidence in every land that the world is to be a different place when the soldiers return from the trenches. The reaction when it comes will have its echoes here, and will, it is to be hoped, find men marveling how any Americans could possibly have espoused that which is the chief prop of kings, czars and kaisers and their militarists, and have even for a moment turned their backs upon the voluntary system which breeds enthusiastic followers of the flag, where conscription produces deserters, bounty-jumpers and mock-patriots.

## SOME ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF GENERAL TRAINING UNDER THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM<sup>1</sup>

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IT goes without saying, that the men comprising the army of any country are not available for economic pursuits, whilst following their military occupation. In that respect, any army must constitute an economic loss. The amount of that loss is decided partly by the size of the army, and partly by the system of army organization. In a country whose available labor forces are not sufficient to tackle all business propositions, the size of the army can affect economic life in a very serious way; when the creation of a Canadian navy was contemplated a few years ago, one of the chief arguments against it was the necessity of Canada using all her labor for purposes of development. Even in older countries such connections exist. The strength of the German army for the year 1914 (non-commissioned officers and privates) was 656,000 men; if that army had not existed it is quite possible that Germany could have done without the influx of part at least of the 767,000 foreign laborers, who helped her agriculture and her industry.

† The size of the army is not the only important item which affects economic life. It does make a difference indeed whether the army is composed of  $1\frac{1}{2}\%$  of the total population, as it is in France, or of 1% only, as it is in Germany. But a great deal of importance is due to the military system which a nation has adopted. The well-known juxtaposition—voluntary service or compulsory service—may be sufficient from a purely legal point of view; it does not explain the important aspects affecting an economic argument.

<sup>1</sup> Discussion at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

The old armies of the European continent were compulsory armies, in so far as the privates were forced to enlist; they did not embrace the entire nation. The modern compulsory army is, in principle at least, a *national* army, inasmuch as the principle of conscription is applied to all citizens. A voluntary army, on the other hand, may be an army of volunteers like the army Abraham Lincoln called at the outbreak of the Civil War, or it may mean an army of regular soldiers recruited by volunteer enlistment, as is the regular army in England and in the United States. The characteristics of such an army are not so much that it is composed of volunteers, but that it is a *professional* army. As far as the officers are concerned, they are professional in both types of armies. But in the national army, officers and non-commissioned officers only form a professional and quasi-permanent element; in the professional army, at least in an old country, the mass of the privates, too, follow a purely military career. In a national army, the private soldier returns to civil life after two, and at the utmost three, years of military service; the private in the professional army remains a soldier very often for the best part of his active life.

The two systems must affect economic life in a different way. A professional army withdraws a certain number of young men from civil life; it keeps them apart from civil occupations just at that time of their lives when they would have to specialize in some profession. It has to compete with those professions or rather with the rewards they offer, and it must offer in its turn sufficiently high monetary considerations and all sorts of amenities to attract the number of men wanted. In good times, the professional army is rather short of recruits; when there is a scarcity of employment, the gaps are easily filled. Man per man, a professional army must be far more expensive than a national army. In normal times it attracts chiefly those people who are not fond of modern business conditions; it gathers to itself, so to speak, all men of a roving spirit. It prevents them from losing that spirit whilst they serve, and when they leave service it has always been a very severe problem, at least in an old country, how to provide for them in a decent way. The majority of them are an economic loss to their country whilst they serve and after they have left the army.

The effects of a national service system are different. No doubt in times gone by when conscription was dreaded, compulsory service helped to swell the ranks of the emigrant movement. Self-mutilation was and is by no means infrequent in some countries. As far as Germany is concerned, emigration of that sort has ceased and with it the loss by emigration. Some of the recruits, no doubt, do not enjoy their years with the colors; some highly skilled workmen may lose part of their skill whilst they are serving. Broadly speaking the individual loses two years of his life, but his efficiency is increased and not diminished.

A large percentage of German recruits come from agricultural districts. Many of them are the sons of peasants or of agricultural laborers. Military service makes them conversant with town life. Discipline breaks down their obstinate spirit, for which the German peasant is well known; it teaches him the value of co-operation, in place of an individualism which sometimes is almost anarchistic. Their minds are quickened and brightened by coming in touch with people from other surroundings. They acquire a good deal of practical and theoretical information, which neither the primary schools nor life on the farm could have taught them. There are drawbacks no doubt connected with their being drafted into the town. Life in the barracks is not always ennobling. The impression of city life upon them during their years of service has often been blamed for the rural exodus. But the same rural exodus has taken place in England on a much larger scale, though there was no compulsory service to account for it. Taking it all around, the average German peasant who has served his term is a brighter and better man than he would have been without it.

The effect on the industrial classes is different. In their case, no doubt, some individual skill may be lost for the time being. They are withdrawn from the labor market at a time when they are best fitted for work. That no doubt is a disadvantage, but it relieves the whole labor market of the competition of the men between twenty and twenty-three. The more Germany is being industrialized, the more all labor is being specialized. There is danger that the specialized callings may affect the health of the

worker unfavorably. He has neither the time nor the money to counterbalance the effect of industrial life by holidays spent in the open air. He is put into the army at a time when this influence on his body is yet very slight. He receives two years of the most systematic physical training; he is not pampered or fed on a different plan from the one he is accustomed to—that would be too expensive to the taxpayers; but he is well fed according to his standard, and kept busy, physically and mentally. Not only does he receive physical training, but he gets an all-around education in all sorts of practical things, which counterbalances his one-sided special bringing-up. The capacity for co-ordination which modern military service imparts to him stands him in good stead when he enters the industrial service of some big concern. Though cases of ill treatment in the barracks have occurred which have affected the health and happiness of individuals, the mass of German recruits intellectually and physically improve by the service; they do not look upon it with horror. I wonder whether the percentage of ill-treatment in the army is higher than of similar cases in big labor camps.

The direct physical and intellectual effects of military service are not its only result. If they were, the question might be asked whether the values lost by two years' service are amply compensated by the increased efficiency the trained men have gained by this service?

Notwithstanding national service, a large percentage of the population never serve in the army, as the number of available recruits is far greater than the strength of the army as authorized by parliament. Of 572,000 men inspected in 1912, 309,000 enlisted; 35,000 were morally or physically unfit; 200,000 were rejected, partly because they were not very fit, partly because they were not wanted. That has been the case every year for many years. From the ranks of these supernumeraries, came the huge army of volunteers, which enlisted during the first weeks of the present war. They are not directly affected by military service, quite as little as are the women. They are two years ahead of their colleagues who joined the army, as far as their careers are concerned, but they miss the training. They

are physically less fit than those who joined the army and this original difference of actual physique is increased to their disadvantage, when the others return to civil life. They too profit from the national service system, in an indirect way.

In centuries past, Germany was an aristocratic country. The influence of the land-owning classes was quite as visible as it was in England; today she is an industrialized country which captains of industry try to rule. As is but natural in every country, powerful classes look to their own interest; they are convinced that the state is best served if their own private objects can be obtained. In times gone by these aristocratic classes have tried to keep the people in subjection and in ignorance. It is no accident that England, the most aristocratic of all countries, did not have compulsory education before 1872. In Germany it was different. Though the national military service was not the cause of compulsory education, it has been a mighty instrument in bringing about its perfection. A national army must be inefficient if its members do not possess a good general education. The more scientific modern warfare becomes, the more essential are knowledge and intelligence. The need for ever-increasing numbers of recruits must lead again and again to a testing of the educational system and to a never-ceasing organized demand for its improvement. As the privilege of serving but one year in the army and of qualifying as an officer afterwards, is based on an educational test, the existing military system provides a strong stimulus for higher education. Of 309,000 men drafted into the army in 1912, over 18,000 had passed this test. Some other thousands who were rejected had passed it also.

A government whose army is based on national service is interested in the health of the people at large, and on the social conditions on which it must depend. As the Prussian army was recruited originally from the farmers, the maintaining of a strong peasantry was one of the objects of the old Prussian policy. Long before ideas of social justice influenced the world, the Prussian kings tried to protect the peasants against their lords. They succeeded in that endeavor to a moderate degree. Later on when modern economic ideas began to in-

fluence mankind, the economists' plea for peasant proprietors was strongly supported in Germany from a military point of view, notwithstanding countervailing aristocratic influences. It was not heeded in England where the aristocratic land system prevails today, after it has driven the mass of the old small landholders into the town and into the colonies.

Today Germany is a highly industrialized country. Ever-increasing percentages of the army must be drawn from the industrial population. For the last ten years the question has been discussed in a very thorough way, whether industrialization was not dangerous to the safety of the nation, as it must lead to the deterioration of the health of the people. To avoid that, social reform is essential not only from a humanitarian and a political point of view, it is necessary as one of the chief measures of the nation's defense. Army men recognized that very early in the last century, when the question of child labor and of factory legislation was advocated from the soldiers' point of view, to prevent physical deterioration of future recruits. The great system of social legislation in Germany is not the outcome of military considerations, but it has been greatly facilitated by the support gained from such considerations. If the social reformers in Germany had neither influence nor intelligence, if the German people still believed in the system of non-intervention, even then the most brutal capitalists and the most short-sighted government would have to realize that a nation like Germany, whose security depends on a national army, cannot afford the luxury of slums. She cannot permit the physical deterioration and the moral degradation of her own people.

Though these facts have been acknowledged widely, the question is asked over and over again: Does not the element of compulsion which has been introduced by national service destroy the spirit of manly liberty upon which the modern world is based? No doubt in the past compulsory service raised objections of some weight. In Prussia, it is true the introduction of compulsory service was hailed as a weapon which was to bring freedom from Napoleonic tyranny, and as a great step towards modern liberal reform. But it was super-imposed

from above. The people did not vote for it, as they had no votes. As long as the obligation to serve is not accompanied by the right to vote, people can object to it by similar arguments as they did to "taxation without representation." All that has been changed in modern Germany, where all adult men have an equal vote. All imperial laws are passed by a parliament elected on manhood suffrage. The obligation to serve is based on laws passed in this parliament. The strength of the army is settled by parliament; no man can be enlisted and no gun can be bought without a parliamentary vote. Compulsory service today is a national obligation based on the legislation of a national parliament in the same way as compulsory taxation. No doubt it would be an ideal thing if all citizens paid their due proportion of taxes without compulsion. It cannot be done if a fair amount of justice and equality of burdens is to be achieved. The same holds good of military service: without compulsion neither justice nor equality can be guaranteed. In that respect, compulsory service is an enemy of privilege and a friend of democracy. It is, moreover, the strongest argument for the maintenance of the democratic voting system. Whenever it has been attacked, the answer has been that the citizens' duties must be balanced by the citizens' rights.

At this point the argument is apt to take another turn. Granted that compulsory service based on the acts of Parliament cannot be called despotism, does it not back up despotism and retard political progress in Germany by strengthening the the government against the people : is not compulsory service the cause of "militarism"?

"Militarism" is a word which was used in Germany long before it was known in England, to describe efforts on the part of the professional soldier to control the functions of the civil administration and to curtail the rights of the citizen. In a country like Germany, where the advice of the expert is valued highly in all departments, the advice of the military expert is of great weight, not only on technical questions, but on political questions too. No sane foreign policy is possible without due regard to the military means available for its enforcement.

And no policy of preparedness can be conceived which is

not affected by possible and probable political contingencies. The advice of experts on such questions must be listened to respectfully in a country like Germany, whose historical position and whose geographical conditions force her to provide for certain issues. The influence of the military expert in Germany in that respect has been about as great as the influence of the admiralty expert in England. Both groups were entrusted with technical provision for the nation's safety.

As the military career in times gone by was the career of the privileged classes, a great deal of social influence was exercised by them in nearly all countries. This influence is not due to compulsory service. It is due to a survival of certain aristocratic social prejudices. Compulsory service does not strengthen it. It was introduced against the wish of the privileged classes; it breaks down their assumption that military service is the only honorable occupation; for under compulsion all classes are drawn into the army; recruits who can qualify can become officers. Prejudice no doubt is still strong in many ways. It is not restricted to countries with compulsory service like Germany; it is at least as strong in England, where there was a much greater field in the army for aristocratic dilettantism than there was in Germany, with her highly complicated army machinery based on scientific plans. The worst instance of militarism that ever happened in the modern world was the revolt of the British officers in Ireland against their government and their parliament in the summer of 1914.

The system of compulsory service subjects, no doubt, a large portion of the nation to temporary military discipline. Does it really strengthen despotism? In every country the army is the last resort in civil disturbances. Whether the army be national or professional, its discipline is nearly always strict enough to insure government action when needed. But it is far more dangerous to subject a national army to such a strain than a professional army which forms a class apart. Professional armies have often supported governments against the people, and have turned out governments in the interest of the military leaders. A national army is scarcely fit for such a purpose. The growth of the socialistic movement in Germany—over four

and one quarter million votes were cast for it at the last election—has often frightened German reactionaries, because they know that an ever-increasing number of recruits must be socialists. They have realized that an army containing a large percentage of socialists would no doubt do its duty at the front, but it could never be used for the suppression of the civil liberties of the people. Though all this may be granted one question remains: Does not the subjection of every man to two years of strict discipline kill self-reliance and initiative in the individual citizen?

Americans are very fond of praising German efficiency. In doing so they compare it to the clockwork of some dead piece of machinery. They loudly proclaim that the spirit of the pioneer which made America cannot exist side by side with it. They are quite right in pointing out that the spirit of the western pioneer does not flourish in Germany; it did flourish in the olden days when German colonists settled the Slavic East under circumstances not unlike those which accomplished the opening of the West. There is no room today for the pioneer spirit in the crowded lands of central Europe. To breed it would be to breed people fit for emigration only. But the spirit of the West is not the only form of resourcefulness and initiative. To build up big modern industries in a crowded land, to push commerce into foreign countries ruled by foreign governments, are tasks which demand a large share of initiative, when it has to be done against the competition of old established rivals. It is not denied that the Germans have done this. It is openly acknowledged that German push and German adaptability are responsible for it. Where did they come from if military discipline deprived the Germans of the capacity for individual action? Where does that intellectual acerbity "come from which no doubt makes German life much" less pleasant than the life of competing nations? And how can it be accounted for that the German socialistic party, many members of which have been in the army, has been the pioneer all over the world, in radically constructive socialism? It has truly been said that it owes part of its discipline to the military training of its members. That training did not stifle their intellectual ac-

tivity ; it did not prevent them from reasoning and acting in a very individualistic way.

Discipline does teach people the capacity for co-ordination ; it does not deprive them of the gift for individual action provided they ever possessed it. And modern military training no longer tries to stifle individual effort for the sake of standardized action. Modern warfare depends on the combined action of masses composed of highly trained individuals, many of whom must be capable of individual initiative, whenever there is an opportunity for such. If discipline alone was decisive, an uneducated mob of men would have the greatest chances of victory. For they can be most easily organized in a machine-like way. The armies employing the greatest percentage of African savages would be best fitted for victory. Such assumptions are purely fanciful. The objects of modern organization must be achieved by the combination of standardization and individualization. The nation which produces the greatest number of individuals and can teach them the the elements of well-thought-out co-ordinations will be victorious on the battlefield as well as in the markets of the world. The present war has shown that the German people possess this gift to a considerable degree. It is not the outcome of their military system only ; it is the result of their national genius, of their history, of their civil and military training. Their system is adapted to their qualities and to their wants. It is good for them and for them only ; if it were blindly imitated by other nations, it might produce very different results.

## SPECIAL TRAINING AS A FACTOR IN SCIENTIFIC PREPARATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

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**A**MERICAN civilization is an improvisation; and to that method we are wedded. So do we expect to create an army. But I do not believe that improvised armies will force a decision in the present and even less in future wars. However loudly the statesmen and pressmen may shout the contrary, an immense disproportion of power between trained, semi-trained, and untrained armies, is one of the outstanding features of the present conflict. And training tells in geometrical ratio as we climb the ranks from soldier and corporal, to sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and upwards. The greatest asset of a brigade is one trained brigadier-general; of a division, one trained divisional general. And this is the lowest rank officer who actually handles problems in combined tactics. Above him, special training becomes enormously difficult and valuable.

Columbus found out how to stand an egg on end; von Moltke perceived the equally patent fact that it was far more important, and much more difficult, to train generals than sub-lieutenants. But we, knowing little of von Moltke, still cherish the notion that generals are produced at West Point; as if one could grow elm-trees under earthenware pots!

At bottom, what it all comes to is that military success is not achieved in the field. It is attained by a long, arduous, and scientific preparation for war during peace time. Whatever emergency measures we may adopt as passing expedients, whatever may be in immediate store for us, whether of good luck or bad fortune, we must sooner or later get down to the scien-

<sup>1</sup> Read at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

tific study of and, following that, to the scientific preparation for war.

Every national problem of defense is composed of factors so various that for one country to copy another argues insufficient knowledge and skill. Switzerland and especially Russia, whose cases present most military analogies with that of this country, would yet be futile models to set up for imitation. The threats that face us, the densities of our population districts, the distribution of our economic areas, the power of our railroad systems—all these are among the factors that govern in the most immediate sense the solution of the problem of defense. Hard work, hard study, of the details of the problem, are necessary before correct solutions can be found.

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## THE BUSINESS MAN AND UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

IRVING T. BUSH

President Bush Terminal Company, and Trustee Academy of Political Science

I HAVE been asked to speak briefly from the standpoint of a business man on the question of universal military training. I shall not talk "preparedness" along the lines that discussion usually takes, but I shall endeavor to give you a few concrete, perhaps homely, thoughts concerning the effect of military training upon the youth of this country, in their preparation for the battles of peace—the battles of life. I am not talking about fitting our boys to do their part in war, if war should come; I want to visualize for you some things which military training does for peace.

I was a boy who was fortunate, I think, in going to a military school; and I remember, in the fall of the year when the boys assembled from all over the country, they gathered in groups about the campus and about the school. Some of them were dressed in well-cut clothes which showed them scions of wealthy parents; some wore lurid neckties and ill-cut clothes from the country tailor. Soon the military tailor appeared upon the scene, and in a few weeks we were all clad in the same clothes, and you couldn't tell, as far as appearances went, the rich boy from the poor boy.

Then the military instructor began his work, and started the setting-up exercises and the rudimentary drills. Some of the boys, when they came in the fall, were slouchy and slovenly, but as the year went by and as we finally gathered for the last dress-parade on the campus and marched with our eyes straight ahead and with the most precise bearing we could muster, those boys had all been whipped into shape during the year. They

<sup>1</sup> Address as presiding officer at a meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

were erect, and they had learned neatness, punctuality, and many other things they could not get out of books. While not all of us have carried through life all that we learned in the military drills at that school—for advancing years beget easy-chairs and slippers—yet I am very sure all of us have carried through life some of the things we got in that course at the military school; and we were better prepared—not for war, as I am not talking of preparedness from that standpoint—for the battles of life and the battles of business, the battles of peace. We were better prepared for any contingency and any call of duty, by the things which we learned in that course, than we would or could have been without it.

I shall give you one other illustration. Thirty years ago and perhaps even more, the police force we then had will be remembered by some of you. If policemen met in the middle of the street, traffic was blocked, and they usually had their coats fastened by one button in warm weather, if it wasn't entirely open. With their helmets on the backs of their heads, they walked up the street with the swinging club and always with a glad eye for the pusher of the perambulator! Of course not all of them were fat. Some of them were thin and some of them were of other degrees of stature, but they were all slovenly. They all looked inefficient. Then we acquired a police commissioner who had a training at West Point in our regular army, and gradually out of that mass of inefficient and slovenly-looking police officers we have achieved our force today; and now, when I advance the throttle of my old Ford, I have a profound respect for even the sprinting capacity of the foot policeman; and as we stand on Fifth Avenue and watch "the finest" on their annual parade, we see that we have an alert, attentive and efficient body of police. They haven't lost any self-respect; they have gained self-respect. They are not only better men and better policemen, but better public servants because of the military atmosphere and the military training which had been introduced into our police force.

Just one other illustration. I am endeavoring to tell you my little story of what it seems to me military training means to the preparation of the young men for the ordinary walks of life.

We all remember abroad, in the countries where they have universal training, the guards on the railroads, even the conductors and motor-drivers on the tramway-cars—how alert they are, with their coats buttoned up, and how clean and prompt and punctilious and polite. Just contrast that mental picture with the mental picture of, we will say, the London bus-driver, or even our own trolley-car drivers and conductors here. In one case, they have gone through a school or course of military training which has given them a command of themselves, a desire to be neat; and they are more efficient and more punctual as public servants in their walks of life than are the same class of men that we see in this country and in England, where they have volunteer military service. You need not consider the great belligerent countries, but consider the same things in Holland or Switzerland.

It seems to me that the great good of a universal military training is the good that will come to young men in the preparation for life, and if we could dismiss from our minds the thought that we are perhaps building up a great military machine which might be a danger in the future, we would all want our boys, as I am sure I want my boy, to have some element of military training as a start in life. It would be an advantage to the sons of the well-to-do and to the sons of the the poor to start them each with that advantage. The only danger from that form of military training, if it has the advantages which it seems to have, might be the danger of building up a great military machine. But stop and think for a moment where that has occurred. Has it ever occurred in a republic? Has it occurred in France? Has it occurred in Switzerland, or has it occurred in any country where there is a form of government which at all approaches a republican form? Has it not only occurred in the country where there was already a dominant military aristocracy, ambitious for its own future and for the power and prestige and military future of their country? It seems to me we may well dismiss from our minds the possibility of any serious danger of this sort here in this country.

## THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE NATION IN PREPARATION FOR WAR

NEWTON D. BAKER

Secretary of War

**I**T is appropriate that we should confer upon what may be called the most prominent manifestation of America's response to the stimulus of the world's war. Prior to the breaking-out of the war, we had concerned ourselves for a great many years with purely economic and industrial questions. A nation-wide referendum would probably have shown nine out of ten of all our people living in a convinced optimism as to the impossibility of a world war. We had uneasy questionings about the recall of judges; there was much agitation about the initiative and referendum: we were quite sure that our financial system needed readjustment; we are awakening to a realization that the sources of our national strength were being sapped by our inattention to the depressing effects of modern industry unrestrained by wise laws and regulations. But to these things we gave thought only as matters to which we should attend. Our prevailing state of mind was that in America there was a spontaneous, upward tendency; that the wheels creaked, but we got forward; that we were teaching our acres how to yield larger crops, our factories how to make a larger output, and gradually elevating and educating the whole plane of our life. We knew that we were growing rich, and we were not selfish about it. We saw that our friends across the sea were rivals in commerce and in industry who summoned the best in us to competition.

And then the war came, taking away the foundations of all our thinking, substituting horror and dread where complacency had once been. We began asking ourselves: Is there any fortification against this disaster? When nations have reached the very pinnacle of human achievement in philosophy, invention, industrial organization, and in the arts and graces of life,

are they still on the verge of this precipice? When we asked it of others, we came to ask it of ourselves, and there grew up in America, when the first shock was over and our ability to think was restored, the question: Are we prepared should our turn come to whirl in this fearful vortex? I do not mean to engage in the present European war, but I mean that questions arose in the minds of thoughtful men everywhere as to whether America was prepared.

At first, this question revolved around mere military preparation in the narrowest sense—the number, weight and armament of our ships, the length of the guns of our coast defenses, the amount of ammunition of various kinds in store, the number of trained men to officer impromptu armies. But, as the war developed in Europe, we learned that these things are but a part of preparation, and a relatively useless part, unless they are based upon other things very much more difficult to secure; things which must be secured long in advance of a crisis or else be then obtainable only with peril and fearful unnecessary loss. We have witnessed the nations of Europe preparing as they fought and have come to realize that, perhaps, the most important kind of preparedness is a kind which is equally available and useful in times of peace, and which, if secured, will not only render our military preparation more effective but will steady and strengthen and inspire the nation when engaged in peaceful pursuits.

Three-fold mobilization is necessary in any country for war, and of these three elements, two are as valuable and as vital in times of peace as in times of conflict.

In the first place, there must be, of course, arms and soldiers, ships and sailors, and these must be modern and adequate. The art of war has both developed and changed. A fourth and fifth arm, air-craft and the submarine, have been added. No nation can with justice summon embattled farmers with the rude firearms which were adequate a few decades ago. Regimentation, discipline and knowledge are more important than they used to be. The masses and the maneuvers are on a more intricate and difficult scale. On this subject, however, I need say but little. Congress is at present legislating upon it, and

whatever be the outcome of its deliberations, the executive branch of the government will act in sympathetic coöperation, using what is given with a view to making it the best, and I may incidentally say that throughout the whole country there is an inspiring response to the country's military needs. Young men in college, young men in business, at the bench and in the professions are associating themselves for training in a fine democratic and enthusiastic way, making sure that should the need come there will be in the country a reserve body ready to respond and able to bring more than mere bodies for bullets, by reason of the fact that they have learned in camp and armory to act in concert and under command to defend the country.

The second mobilization necessary is that of our industries and commerce. The war in Europe had been under way more than a year before some of the countries were able to equip the men who volunteered for their armies. With all the zeal which their governments could display, the mobilization of their industries yet lagged, not from unwillingness but from lack of forethought. Perhaps, no other lesson of the war in Europe is so impressive as its universality. In the warring countries this war and its demands sit at the table of every family from that of the King to that of the peasant. Each is contributing his share, each is suffering his loss. The farmer is no longer growing grain merely to sell, but for the national welfare. The railroads are no longer carrying passengers or freight merely for hire, but for national defense. The soldier is no longer a tradesman in war, but is a part of that large regiment which includes his entire country, and in which each man is assigned a necessary part. So in America, if the test ever comes, the army in the field will be merely the advance guard resting on a mobilized, patriotic, industrial coördination. Back of it will be every factory and every workshop, every bank and every farm, and this industrial coördination is as valuable to us in peace as it is in war. We now have the impulse and the opportunity to give to our daily life a national purpose. Every occupation in America now takes on a patriotic aspect. It is not merely a means of gaining a livelihood, but a contribution to the common interest. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that we

should know what our reliance is, that careful, continuous, scientific studies should be made of our industrial and commercial capacity and adaptation, that we should card-index our industrial strength, so that we can know it and summon it into instant coöperation when needed. And very much more than that, we must gain this knowledge and arrange for this coöperation in such a fashion as to take away from it all profit in war.

If the hour of trial should ever come, there must be no war stocks, no "war brides", no war fortunes made out of the national danger. Nor must there be built up in America any interest which could even be suspected of preparing to profit by the creation of a national emergency. And this is not difficult to do. Business in America is patriotic. There is already inbred into it a desire to set America's name before the world as a symbol of success and fair-dealing, and I have not the least doubt that every manufacturing plant in this country could be so related to a central bureau of the government that its special usefulness in time of need would be known in advance, its wheels all ready to turn in response to the nation's need, and its proprietors willing to forgo any speculative or war profits while they made their contribution in common with the rest of the people in the country towards the preservation of the nation. Already men of large affairs are devoting their time without compensation to an analysis of the country's industrial situation and its adaptation to such a mobilization as would be necessary in time of danger. Intricate, scientific and valuable studies are being made, and their continuance by the government in an authorized, consecutive and complete way is all that needs to be done.

The third mobilization that is necessary is spiritual. In order to make sacrifices for America, we must be sure that our stake in the country justifies it. Our institutions must be so just, our arrangements so fair that every man in this nation will realize how completely his opportunity and that of those who come after him rests upon the continuing prosperity of the nation as a whole. It may well be that many of our economic problems have to be worked out by an attrition of interests, that we can-

not substitute any flash of enlightenment for the slower processes of an orderly working-out of interests among us. But our duty is to see that all of this is done with a due regard to the interest of the weakest among us. That the strong be not over-strong and the weak not too weak. That when the hour of trial really comes, the banker who has gold to protect, the captain of industry who has great mills in danger, will be joined by the workmen from the factory and the farmer from the field, with all lesser interests abated and all minor conflicts forgotten, with one sentiment animating them all, that the civilization, the liberty and the hope of America must be preserved and that the sacrifice of each in his order, in his place and according to his strength is justified by his stake in the country, wherever it may be.

The military mobilization will take place easily and need not be upon a magnificent scale in advance. The industrial and spiritual mobilization ought to be constant and as wide as the country. Both are useful—nay, indispensable—in peace as well as in war. Both add to our efficiency as a nation and both make for the progress which we attain as we grow older and wiser in our democratic experiment.

## ARMY REORGANIZATION IN THE SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

CHARLES BENNETT SMITH

Member of Congress, Forty-first District, New York

IN taking up the subject of national defense, the present Congress was confronted by a new and extraordinary situation. In former years, little public interest was manifested in the size or composition of the regular army, and the major part of the home influence exerted on the House and Senate was in favor of small appropriations. The conceded helplessness of the United States in a military way was made evident by the lessons of the European war, and was emphasized by the spectacle presented on the Mexican border, when the President was obliged to appeal to Congress for an emergency increase of 20,000 regulars to repel an invasion of Mexican bandits.

A propaganda, part of which, unquestionably, was instituted by patriotic and sincere men, and part of which was brought about by not altogether disinterested or unselfish individuals, flooded Congress with letters, telegrams, petitions and resolutions demanding a larger regular army and a reserve force capable of meeting every demand for national defense. The committee on military affairs of the House held hearings for several weeks, listening patiently and intently to members of the General Staff, officers from the War College, representatives of the National Guard, and citizen experts who volunteered information as to the composition of an American army adequate to our present needs. In reporting a bill, the Committee recommended a standing army of 140,000 men, with a plan for federalizing the state militia so that the state troops would automatically join the United States forces on the call of the

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

President. It may be explained that the army, at the time the expeditionary force went to Mexico, was distributed as follows: Panama Canal Zone, 7300 men; Philippine Islands, 13,000; Hawaii, 9000; Porto Rico, 800; China and Alaska, about 800 men, which total, deducted from the total force of 86,500 troops, left in all, in the United States, approximately 55,000 men. Among the reasons given by the Committee for refusing to favor a larger army were these:

General Scott, Chief of Staff, gave testimony to the Committee that in time of peace a regular force of 135,000 men would be adequate to our requirements. That does not mean that General Scott favored a maximum of 135,000 men. His statement, however, was used as an argument for a small army.

The contention was further made that a regular army must of necessity be a mere nucleus to a war footing, and that the important feature of our national defense must be in our reserve force.

The committee rejected the recommendation of Secretary Garrison for a volunteer or "continental army," which would be recruited under the direction of the war department and would be trained in summer camps by officers of the regular army. Those who favored the Continental plan were of the opinion that a competent reserve force of 400,000 to 500,000 men could be trained in a brief period and at a comparatively small expense, and that the men so recruited as reserves would belong to the best class of our American citizens. They would come from industrial and commercial life and from the professions, and the enlistments would be solely for the highest and most patriotic of reasons.

The committee, however, took the position that the number of volunteers would be numerous and the plan undoubtedly successful in times of national excitement like that now prevailing, as an effect of the European war or because of our present or prospective differences in Mexico. It was the belief, however, that in ordinary times and in the absence of this unusual state of mind, interest in military activities would pall and the continental force would dwindle to nothingness.

Further objection was made to an army of more than 140,-

ooo men by citing the attitude of former presidents of the United States. James Madison for example, speaking on the constitution said: "As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the states, it is necessary to guard against it by sufficient powers to the common government; and, as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good militia."

President Washington spoke as follows, in his farewell address: "We will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."

In 1812 John Adams expressed himself as to the policies of the United States as follows: "The danger of our government is that the General will be a man of more popularity than the President and the army possess more powers than Congress. The people should be apprised of this and guard themselves against it. Nothing is more essential than to hold the civil authority decidedly superior to the military power."

In 1835, Andrew Jackson referred to the subject in this language:

A large standing military force is not consonant to the spirit of our institutions nor to the feelings of our countrymen, and the lessons of former days and those also of our own times show the danger as well as the enormous expense of these permanent and extensive military organizations.

Other executives referred to the subject, but most of them in recent years dwelt on the importance of strengthening the militia rather than on the desirability of increasing or diminishing the regular army.

The argument was reiterated that the policy of the country had been consistently against a great military establishment, and that grave danger would arise from any change in this traditional national principle.

When the bill came before the House, the ranking republican member of the military committee, Mr. Kahn of California, offered an amendment to increase the size of the standing army

from 140,000 to 220,000 men. This amendment was defeated by a meager majority and the bill itself was adopted with the provision for 140,000 men as the peace basis of the regular army.

It is interesting to analyze the vote on the Kahn amendment, because it illustrated the difference in sentiment in various sections of the country and explains a phase of the preparedness fight in Congress which cannot be understood fully by those unfamiliar with the sectional viewpoint. The delegations from Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont voted solidly in favor of the Kahn amendment providing for an army of 220,000 men. Only two members from New York State against the amendment, those being the Socialist, Mr. London of New York City, and Mr. Fitzgerald of Brooklyn. Five members from Pennsylvania voted against the Kahn amendment.

Among the states whose delegations voted against the Kahn amendment were these: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, nine out thirteen in Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

The vote was not divided on party lines but the tendency was evident on the democratic side to support the committee and a smaller army.

Democrats from the New England states, however, voted solidly against the Committee and for a larger army, while the sentiment of members in the south and the central western states was, generally speaking, against any large preparedness program. It is probably true that members from these sections actually represented the sentiment of their districts in voting against the Kahn proposition. To use their own expressions, they refused to be stampeded into revolutionizing an American policy because a few persons on the Atlantic coast were afraid that a hostile fleet would arrive some morning and destroy property and lives along the eastern border. They pretended to believe that the demand for preparedness was promoted and accelerated by the munitions manufacturers.

In the Senate, the Chamberlain bill was under consideration

after the Hay bill had been disposed of in the House. The demand for a larger army and for a more definite plan for a reserve force had reached the interior, and this influence was felt in the final vote on the Senate bill. The House had voted down a provision for 220,000 men, yet the Senate inserted by a substantial majority a provision for 250,000. The Senate also included a provision, known as Section No. 56, providing for a volunteer army on a plan somewhat similar to that which was recommended by Secretary Garrison and which was responsible for the separation of Mr. Garrison from the present administration.

The most radical difference between the Senate and the House bills was in the number of regular troops and in the plan for a volunteer army instead of the federalization of the state militia. The Senate also included an appropriation for a nitrate plant, on the theory that we would be helpless for ammunition in the event of war if our navy were destroyed and we were unable to import nitrate for munition purposes.

A provision which was almost identical in the Senate and House bills, and which did not attract the attention it deserved, was one which Mr. Gard of Ohio presented. It provides an extensive and comprehensive plan for the training of college students to become army officers. The provision was adopted by the Senate and House conferees. The Gard provision was prepared after much intelligent and arduous labor. The plan involves the assignment of army instructors to colleges where at least one hundred students will agree to train, with a view to becoming officers. The War department will provide a sufficient quota of instructors to meet every demand and it is estimated, on the assurance of college and army authorities that at the end of ten years not less than 50,000 well-trained men, capable of acting as officers of the army, will be turned out by these colleges.

An allowance will be made to the students themselves for certain work they perform, and while the allowance is not large, it will be an additional inducement to students to place themselves under the direction of army instructors. As the training continues, the number of students will increase, and while the plan may not meet fully the expectations of those who projected

it, and may fall short of meeting the country's requirements for officers in the event of war, it cannot fail to be of the greatest importance as a plan for reserve officers, an arm of the service which is now greatly lacking in actual and reserve efficiency.

When the Senate and the House bills were passed, the conferees of the two Houses could not agree and returned to their respective bodies.

The conferees had difficulty in agreeing on a bill but finally adopted a compromise plan, providing for an army of a strength outlined in this language:

The total enlisted force of the line of the regular army, excluding the Philippine scouts and the enlisted men of the quartermaster corps, of the medical corps, and of the signal corps, and the unassigned recruits, shall not at any one time, except in the event of actual or threatened war or similar emergency in which the public safety demands it, exceed 175,000 men.

The proposed army is to be raised in five annual increments and will not reach a maximum strength until the end of five years. It is estimated that about 12,000 men will be added annually to the regular establishment, so that this country will have at the end of one year approximately 120,000 men. The increase does not involve a change in the traditional policy for a small standing army, and, considering the enormous increase in population, the demand for the assignment of soldiers to Panama, the Philippines, and elsewhere, it may be truthfully said that the provision for the standing army is as conservative as any ever enacted into law since the Union of States organized a central government.

It may be argued that when the five years have elapsed and the army is up to its full strength, we will have a force of acknowledged and for the United States of unprecedented numbers.

Permit me, while we are considering the figures as to the Hay-Chamberlain bill, to draw attention to the recommendation of the War College as to the men actually and urgently needed to safeguard the country against attack. The War College recommendation is incidental to an investigation con-

ducted at the request of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff and was submitted in September, 1915. I quote from the official report of the War College division as to the country's requirements:

#### WAR COLLEGE ESTIMATES

Combining all previous estimates of Coast Artillery and mobile troops required for service in over-sea garrisons and at home, the following tabular statement of the required strength of the Regular Army in units appropriate to each arm, results, viz:

Localities	Infantry regiments	Cavalry regiments	Field Artillery regiments	Coast Artillery com- panies	Engineer battalions	Signal <sup>1</sup> Corps battalions
Philippines <sup>2</sup> .....	9	3	3	26	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
Oahu .....	9	1	2	14	2	1
Canal Zone .....	9	1	1	21	2	1
Alaska .....	1					
Porto Rico .....	1					
Puget Sound area.....	9	3	3 $\frac{1}{2}$		2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
California .....	9	4	3 $\frac{1}{2}$		2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
North Atlantic States...	9	4	3 $\frac{1}{2}$		2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Middle West.....	9	3	3 $\frac{1}{2}$		2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mexican border .....		6	1		1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
United States.....				228		
Total required.....	65	25	21	289	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Includes aero squadrons.

<sup>2</sup> Nine regiments Infantry, 2 regiments Field Artillery, 2 battalions Engineers. Filipinos to be added, 21,000 officers and men.

<sup>3</sup> This estimate can only be verified by an inspection of all the harbors in question, for which inspection there has not been sufficient time since this estimate was received.

These figures may be summarized as follows:

#### Oversea:

Mobile (combatant) .....	74,500	
Coast Artillery Corps .....	7,500	
		82,000

#### In United States:

Mobile (combatant) .....	121,000	
Coast Artillery Corps .....	27,000	
		148,000

#### Total:

Mobile (combatant) .....	195,500	
Coast Artillery Corps .....	34,500	
		230,000

To this total should be added officers and men for the Sanitary, Quartermaster, Ordnance Departments, etc., appropriate to a force of this strength, amounting approximately to 30,000 officers and men. Including Philippine Scouts, 21,000, the grand total becomes 281,000.

The wide discrepancy between the regular army as provided for in the bill and the recommendation of the War College, furnishes its own comment as to whether the needs of national defense are met in the military program as adopted by Congress.

The contention is made that wars are not fought by the regular army but by the reserve forces. The provisions of the compromise bill in this direction are therefore of vital importance. The volunteer or continental army plan was rejected by the House after it had been adopted by the Senate. The main reliance, in the final draft, is placed on the National Guard. The Guard is federalized, and compensation for officers and men is provided so that encouragement to enlistment and for energetic effort on the part of the officers is not lacking. It is estimated that the membership of the Guard is now about 150,000 men.

The advocates of the plan to use the state militia as the auxiliary or emergency army expect an increase in membership until 400,000 to 500,000 men will be enlisted and trained, ready to join in the patriotic duty of protecting the country in time of stress. I have no means of knowing whether the expectations of these optimists will be realized or whether the federalization of the state militia will work a magic influence in inducing young men to join the Guard. That is a situation which must wait upon the experiment.

In the meantime, however, it will have to be acknowledged that the reserve of the nation will be virtually *nil* and that our chief dependence in any present controversy must be on moral suasion, unless the offending or contending power shall have the courtesy to consent to await our convenience in training an adequate army.

The National Guard has been assigned a great honor and a tremendous responsibility. Constant and rigid training will be required to reach the standard of the new reserve regulations. Time alone will decide the wisdom of treating the state militia as an arm of the federal force instead of a state organization with state duties and obligations.

The statement is frequently heard that the country will de-

velop a large reserve force under the plan of enlistment provided in the army bill. The enlistment contemplates a service of three years with the colors and four years in the reserve. The fact cannot be overlooked in this connection that with the meager standing army maintained by the United States and the recurring expiration of reserve enlistments the reserve will never reach a size or importance worthy of great national dependence in case of war.

In conclusion I desire to express myself emphatically against any plan or principle which would develop a military atmosphere in the United States. More dangerous, however, than this undoubted evil is the policy of a truly great nation trying to retain governmental standards for 100,000,000 persons solely because these standards and policies, through a kind Providence, met the demands of a group of States with 3,000,000 souls.

This country is not yet aroused to its urgent requirements. Congress is awaiting the word from "back home" as to how much preparedness is actually desired. We have a form of government necessarily unwieldy, where one section cannot dominate the sentiment of another. To my mind, we are inviting calamity by delaying the plan of genuine preparedness. And yet, according to the viewpoint of many intelligent and patriotic members of Congress, I am influenced in my judgment by the "hysteria" which has visited a part of the country but has left a large part distractingly calm and unmoved.

The work of education must go forward until the whole nation shall realize that our security should not be left to uncertainty or chance. Our liberty must be safeguarded beyond a question of doubt in the minds of our own people and with convincing definiteness among those nations who may be envious of our freedom or covetous of our possessions.

## UNIVERSAL TRAINING AND AN ADEQUATE ARMY RESERVE

GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN

Chairman U. S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs

**T**HERE is only one way to create a sufficient and a thoroughly efficient reserve, to be utilized in case our country becomes involved in war with any first-class military power. It can only be done through universal military training, and here it is proper to differentiate between universal military training and universal military service. To compel the young men of the country to learn how to care for themselves in time of the emergency of war does not mean that when war comes they shall be compelled to serve. Service may depend upon subsequent legislation, but universal military training can be put into effect now, and every young man in the country between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one can be instructed fully in the duties of a soldier.

It is the most democratic way to create a reserve to be utilized in case of emergency. It would compel the rich and poor alike, the employer and the employee, to understand that they owe a duty to their country as a consideration for the privileges which are accorded to them as citizens and the protection afforded life and property by the laws of the land. We must eventually come to universal military training, if we would have a reserve which can be called upon to volunteer, or if need be compelled, to serve when danger is threatened from without. To this system Switzerland is indebted for the maintenance of its integrity as a republic surrounded by warring nations. To this system Australia looks for protection against the world. To it America must look for the perpetuity of its institutions and for the enforcement of just demands against predatory nations who listen to these demands only when they are backed by sufficient force.

Universal military training does not involve militarism; it does not encourage it. On the contrary it is an antidote for militarism, in that it cultivates the patriotic spirit, develops physical and mental qualities of the young men, inculcates discipline, and in a democracy creates a protection against the armed forces of the world.

Conflicting statements have from time to time appeared in the press in reference to the army reorganization bill which has just passed Congress. This was inevitable, in view of the fact that the bill is very lengthy and covers a multitude of subjects.

In order that the country might have from entirely disinterested sources a statement as to this great measure which has been enacted by the present Congress as a step toward the proper defense of the country, a request was submitted by me to the Secretary of War for an analysis of the bill and the objects which it accomplishes, as well as the number of organizations and men it provides for in time of peace or in time of actual or threatened hostilities. He has just submitted to me as Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs a lengthy but complete analysis of every section of the bill in question and a memorandum in addition stating how the bill as passed compares with the recommendations of the General Staff of the Army.

In his letter the Secretary says:

The comparison and analysis were made by a member of the General Staff, and the memoranda embodying the results of that comparison and analysis are enclosed for your information. I fully endorse the statement made in one of the memoranda that the bill recently agreed to is the most comprehensive measure looking to military preparedness that has ever been passed by Congress.

Assurances are given by the Secretary that the bill is very satisfactory to him and that the untiring efforts of the Senate and House to afford the people of this country adequate military protection are deeply appreciated.

The communication of the Secretary and the comparison and analysis of which he speaks and which are a part of his communication will be printed as a public document and will be

available for persons who desire to look further into the subject of army reorganization.

Very briefly the bill may be summarized as follows: Four classes are provided for, the regular army, the National Guard, the enlisted reserve corps, all to be raised in time of peace, and the volunteer army raised in time of war only. The regular army is made up of a combatant force consisting of 65 regiments of infantry, 25 regiments of cavalry, 21 regiments of field artillery, 7 regiments of engineers and 2 battalions of mounted engineers, a coast artillery corps of 263 companies, and the non-combatant force made up of enlisted men in the quartermaster corps, signal corps, medical department, and the unassigned recruits. The increases over the present organizations are 34½ regiments of infantry, 10 regiments of cavalry, 15 regiments of field artillery, 93 companies of coast artillery, 5 regiments of engineers, 2 battalions of mounted engineers, and the necessary number of auxiliary or non-combatant troops in the medical department, quartermaster corps, signal corps, and the unassigned recruits. The number of officers and enlisted men in the combatant force is 6954 and 165,323 respectively, in time of peace. The number of enlisted men in the combatant force may be increased in the discretion of the President in time of peace to 175,000 men. The number of officers in the non-combatant force and staff corps and departments is 4373 in time of peace, and the number of enlisted men will be as the President prescribes to meet the needs of the service, but limited in the medical department to 5 per cent of the authorized strength of the army and to 7 per cent for unassigned recruits. The minimum strength of the enlisted force of the combatant branches of the army, 165,323, as shown hereinbefore, shall, under the terms of the bill, be maintained at all times.

The war strength of the combatant force is 6954 officers and 226,649 enlisted men. The non-combatant force in time of war will be as the President prescribes to meet the needs of the service.

The increases in the regular army, including the organizations, the officers and the enlisted men, will be made in five annual increments, beginning July 1, 1916.

The National Guard will, under the terms of the bill fixing a maximum number of 800 for each senator and representative in Congress, probably give a total of about 17,000 officers and 440,000 enlisted men. Qualifications for National Guard officers are to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and they must take an oath to obey the orders of the President and the Governor of the State. Enlisted men also must take a similar oath. The period of enlistment in the National Guard is six years, three years in active service, and three years in the National Guard Reserve.

The number of men that will enlist in the enlisted reserve corps can not be estimated. It will consist of men whose daily occupation in civil life specially fits them for duty in the engineer, signal and quartermaster corps and in the ordnance and medical departments, such as railway operatives, chauffeurs, hospital attendants, nurses, telegraphers, aviators, etc.

The infantry and cavalry regiments have been changed by the addition of a headquarters company, a supply company and a machine gun company, and the infantry company has been increased from 65 to 100 men as a minimum. The field artillery regiment has been changed by the addition of a headquarters and a supply company. Heretofore the duties have been performed by the personnel for these companies in the infantry, cavalry and field artillery from enlisted men detailed from the fighting strength of the organizations.

Hereafter all officers appointed as second lieutenants in the army will be given provisional appointments for two years, during which they must demonstrate their fitness and ability.

An extra number of officers is provided for the regular army to instruct the National Guard, and for duty at colleges where military instruction is given. This list of 1,022 extra officers will also be used for recruiting purposes and for assignment as military attaches. There will then be with the organizations enough officers to train the men and make efficient organizations. Heretofore on account of the assignment of officers away from their regiments the efficiency of the army was materially reduced.

The period of enlistment in the regular army under the new

bill is seven years, three years in active service and four years in the reserve, but an important change has been made in that any enlisted man within the continental limits of the United States may be discharged at the end of one year's service if he has become proficient in that time. Enlisted men while in the reserve are to be paid \$24 a year. Postmasters may be utilized to obtain recruits for the army.

A new and important provision is for the establishment of an officers' reserve corps, which authorizes the commissioning of civilians up to and including the grade of major in the various branches of the army. These officers trained in time of peace will be immediately available in time of necessity at the outbreak of war.

A reserve officers' training corps is authorized to be established at schools and colleges where an officer of the army is detailed for the purpose of giving military instruction and training. The Secretary of War is to prescribe the courses of military training at such schools and colleges.

All expenses of those who attend the training camps established by the War Department, such as the Plattsburg camp, will in the future be paid by the United States. Heretofore individuals attending such camps were compelled to pay their own transportation, purchase a uniform, and pay for food, clothing, etc., which averaged for each member about \$65.

To encourage target practice, the Secretary of War is authorized to establish ranges and to supply rifles, ammunition and instructors for rifle clubs in various parts of the country.

The President in time of war is authorized to compel manufacturing plants to give right of way for government orders for ammunition, arms, and other munitions of war. A board of mobilization of industries essential for military preparedness is authorized to investigate all privately owned plants in the country suitable for the manufacture of munitions of war, and the preparation of special tools necessary in the manufacture of munitions of war is also authorized.

A plant for the production of nitrates for the use of the government is authorized and an appropriation of \$20,000,000 is made.

A further provision prohibits the wearing of the uniform of the army, navy, or marine corps by unauthorized persons.

The age for enlistment in the regular army has been reduced to 18 years, and provision is made for an opportunity to be given to soldiers to receive instruction upon educational lines of such character as to increase their military efficiency and enable them to return to civil life better equipped for industrial, commercial, and general business occupations. Civilian teachers are authorized to be employed to assist the army officers, and part of the instruction may consist of vocational education either in agriculture or the mechanic arts.

For the first time in our history, Congress has placed upon the statute books a complete and comprehensive measure for the reorganization of the army. It goes without saying that it does not suit those who insist upon a large standing army, nor is it satisfactory to those who believe that we ought not to maintain any army, but it meets the demands of the present and forms a basis for a larger army when occasion requires.

## INADEQUACY OF THE HAY-CHAMBERLAIN BILL AS A FORWARD STEP IN ORGANIZING THE NATION FOR MILITARY SERVICE

J. P. MILLER, JR.

Staff of National Security League

**T**HE Act of Congress providing for the reorganization of the army which, by the signature of the President on June 2nd, has become a law, is inadequate in its provisions for national defense, and in it may be found the possibility of a sinister purpose to force upon the country certain views with reference to restriction of the defensive power of the federal government.

All military authorities agree that a foreign power invading this country could, unless we had a navy powerful enough to absolutely check it on the high seas, land 500,000 on our coast within thirty days.

To meet this condition the General Staff of the United States Army declares that we need for a first line of land defense, a regular army of 500,000, and a National Guard of 300,000.

What the new law provides is a regular army (in five years) of about 178,000 and a National Guard which may be increased, in this period to 450,000.

By presenting the National Guard in the light of being an element of the regular army, the pretense is made of supplying the deficiency of the regular force. But if this can lawfully be done it eliminates the National Guard entirely as the state arm of national defense, leaving a void and weakening the national defense to that extent. The bill provides that on call of the President, the National Guard shall enlist in the federal service and shall, for the duration of such service, cease to be the National Guard. It also provides that states shall have no other military organization than the National Guard, except that they may have a police or constabulary force.

Instead of having two strong arms of national defense as

recommended by the General Staff, we are given one, of uncertain effectiveness on account of the doubtful character of its amalgamation.

The Judge Advocate General, in response to a resolution of the Senate, rendered an opinion holding that the provision attempting to "federalize" the National Guard is unconstitutional. If this view of the act should be sustained by the courts, the government would be deprived of that organization as an adjunct to the regular service, and at the same time would be deprived by the law as it stands, of any other source from which the regular army might be augmented beyond the war strength of 206,000.

The new law makes it the duty of the President and Secretary of War to arm, equip and support the National Guard and to provide regulations for their organization and training; and the efficiency of the organizations is to be determined by periodical federal inspection.

But no authority is vested in the federal government to maintain the several units of the Guard in any state or to enforce upon any state the observance of its obligation under this law to maintain any National Guard organization. It is doubtful whether a law could be enacted by Congress giving such authority, that would not violate the constitution.

The only penalty upon a state for not complying with the provisions of this law is that, for non-compliance, it shall be deprived of participation in the enjoyment of the moneys appropriated for the purpose of carrying out its provisions. The penalty for not maintaining the units of the National Guard of a state at the proper standard is that the reports of Federal inspections

shall serve as a basis for deciding as to the issue to and the retention by the National Guard of the military property provided for by this act, and to determine what organizations and individuals shall be considered as constituting parts of the National Guard within the meaning of this act.

The penalty in time of peace for not performing the obligations of service is merely that they shall be deprived of the right

to give the service which they have already refused to give, and shall not receive pay for service not performed. The entire National Guard of the state, with little loss except of self-respect, could, after having enjoyed the privileges and emoluments provided in this law, disqualify itself for federal service on the approach of a call to arms for national defense. It is conceivable that international conditions might arise under which political and racial considerations might lead to the employment of this recourse as a means of restraining the Executive of the Nation in the enforcement of demands upon a foreign power.

The formal oath prescribed by the Act is one of obedience to "orders of the President of the United States and of the Governor of the State."

Little doubt can be entertained that had such a military system been in vogue in 1861, it would have resulted in the disruption of the Union.

The difference between this provision of the new law and the Senate volunteer reserve provision which was stricken out in conference is that the Senate provided for a volunteer force which should be wholly under federal authority and could be controlled and maintained in time of peace so as to be prepared for service in time of war.

The law as it stands does not guarantee that the militia force trained and supported by the federal government in time of peace, may be depended upon for service to its full capacity in time of war.

By the enumeration of the National Guard as the force upon which the President may call for national defense, the unorganized militia, which at this time numbers about 20,000,000 men subject to military service, as against 130,000 in the National Guard, are relieved from liability of service except as they may in time of war be drafted to the limited number necessary to fill the ranks of the National Guard, the utmost limit of which would be 450,000 men.

The limit of federal authority over a volunteer force which it can control in time of peace to prepare for war, is found in the provision for a volunteer officer reserve and an enlisted

volunteer reserve for the technical service of the engineers, the signal and the quartermasters corps, and the ordnance and medical departments, in which citizens who have volunteered and passed a physical and mental examination may be given a certain amount of training in camps. The training of all citizens not members of the National Guard is limited to this and to that provided for in schools maintaining a military branch.

This legislation consoles public sentiment with a promise of security which it does not provide.

It increases the expenses of the military establishment without rendering it effective. It increases the number of lives to be risked in the event of an invasion, without making the number strong enough for defense. It overlaps inefficiency upon inefficiency, binding a reed to a straw as a staff for the nation to lean on. It does not provide an adequate force for the regular army.

It limits the authority of the federal government to raise an army for defense. It conceals the weakness of the nation's defense by claiming to "federalize" the National Guard, though the Judge Advocate General has given the opinion that such "federalization" is unconstitutional. It infringes the right of citizens to bear arms, by designating a special class which may exercise that right.

It limits the military resources of the nation, over which it inaugurates a state protectorate, and insinuates into our system a politico-military class, limited in number, from which other equally qualified citizens are excluded by reason of the numerical limitation and titular designation.

It encroaches upon the constitutional federal prerogative in international relations by curtailing the national resources for self-defense. A limitation of the federal power to enforce its sovereign rights against the encroachment by another nation—such as may be discovered in this Act—would appear to the eyes the world as the designation of a qualified sovereignty, and would be an invitation to encroachments and provocative of war. It may be that our military system has become so involved and entangled with the forty-eight state units as to make our international relations subject to state referendum.

## THE SWISS SYSTEM AND WHAT IT SUGGESTS AS TO AN AMERICAN SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL TRAIN- ING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE <sup>1</sup>

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**A**T the time the New York legislature was considering the Welsh-Slater physical instruction and military training bills, which have opened the way in this state for adoption of the Swiss system, opponents of the measures were repeatedly heard to offer these objections:

*First*: That any formidable military preparedness is repugnant to the ideals of a republic;

*Second*: That military training is harmful to good citizenship;

*Third*: That the greater the preparedness of a nation, the greater the likelihood that it will engage in war.

All three objections were answered then as they could be answered now, in one word: Switzerland.

No purer type of republican ideals, no more fixed and devoted adherence to those ideals, can be found in all the world than in Switzerland. Nor are the democratic principles of the Swiss people the mushroom growth of any sudden revolution; they have upheld and maintained their ideals through six centuries and, far from being repugnant to them, the military establishment of the Swiss has been the one means by which those ideals have been able to triumph over and withstand the assaults of tyrants and oppressors who have sought to crush democracy.

Again, the Swiss citizen is the living refutation of the charge that military training hurts good citizenship. I speak without the least exaggeration when I say that nowhere on earth are the two qualities of a highly efficient soldier and public-spirited citizen so united and blended as they are in the Swiss. Trained from youth, I doubt if, man for man, he has a peer in any army

<sup>1</sup> Read at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

of Europe. Yet no one, claiming any knowledge of Swiss life and political conditions, fails to agree that the Swiss is a model of good citizenship, and that the civil government of the republic is on a par with its army in efficiency.

It is almost wasting time to reply to the argument that adequate preparedness brings the danger of war. But here again the proof of falsity is furnished by Switzerland. Hemmed in among the four great belligerents—Germany, Austria, France and Italy—offering a convenient path by which either side could move to strike the other, Switzerland is at peace today, her neutrality respected and her territory unviolated, for no other reason than that, within forty-eight hours after war was declared, she had her splendid army of 425,000 mobilized on her four borders, serving notice on all the Powers that she would not submit to the fate that subsequently overtook Belgium, defenseless Luxembourg and helpless Greece.

The federal constitution adopted in 1848 by a popular vote of 170,000 against 70,000 and with 15½ cantons in the affirmative, provided that: "Every Swiss is bound to do military service," making Switzerland the first nation to introduce compulsory service in modern times.

The federal government assumed the business of instructing the engineer corps, the artillery and the cavalry and the training of the instructors of the infantry and the higher officers, while the instruction of the infantry itself was left to the various cantons.

By still another revision of the constitution in 1874, military administration was further centralized. By these last provisions, the army of the republic was made to consist of the contingents from the cantons. The enrollment of the contingents, their care, and the appointment and promotion of the officers remained with the cantons, controlled by general rules laid down by the federal government. The latter, however, took over all instruction, training, arming (free of charge), and right to enact military legislation.

The highest rank in the Swiss army, when on a peace footing, is that of colonel. In time of mobilization a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives elects a general as

the chief of the entire army. But only three Swiss have ever held this honor. They were Henry Dufour in 1857, when Switzerland mobilized against Prussia; Hans Herzog in 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, and the present chief, Ulrich Wille.

Within twelve years from the defeat of the proposed revision of the military article in 1895 a great change in sentiment took place. The certainty was brought home to the Swiss people that only by a strong and efficient army could the independence of the republic be upheld. November 5, 1907, was a red-letter day for the Alpine citizenry. By an immense majority the military article of the constitution was amended as the officers of the army had desired. Some of the salient features of the organization as it stands today are:

Provision for six divisions of the first line. The organization of divisions takes cognition of the language spoken in the cantons.

The first division is French-speaking, and derives its contingents from the cantons of Geneva, Valais, and Vaud: the second division is French-speaking, from Neuchatel, Fribourg, and Jura Bernois. Divisions 3, 4, and 5 recruit their men from the German-speaking cantons of Berne, Luzern, Solothurn, Basel, Aargau, St. Gallen, Zürich, and Schaffhausen. The sixth division, speaking both the German and Italian languages, embraces the cantons of Ticino, Graubünden, and parts of St. Gallen and Appenzell. As each division contains three brigades, the federation has eighteen infantry brigades of the first line. In four of the divisions the third brigade is a mountain brigade of infantry. Each regiment of infantry has attached to it one company with twelve machine guns.

The organization provides for:

#### FIRST LINE.

*Infantry:* Thirty-six regiments, a regiment three battalions, a battalion twenty-five officers and eight hundred and eighty-one soldiers. Four companies of five officers and two hundred and nine soldiers each form a battalion.

*Artillery:* Seventy-two batteries of field artillery assembled

in twelve regiments. The battery, four or five officers, one veterinary, twenty-one non-commissioned officers, one hundred and eighteen men, one hundred and twenty-two horses, four pieces. Six batteries of howitzers for each division, also twelve companies (four guns each) of foot artillery and twenty-four batteries of mountain artillery.

*Cavalry:* Eight regiments of three squadrons each, forming four brigades, also twelve companies of guides, forming six groups. The squadron, four officers, seventeen non-commissioned officers, one hundred and seven troopers, one hundred and twenty-three saddle horses, eight draft horses.

*Engineers:* Twenty-four companies of sappers.

*Signal Corps:* Six.

*Bridge Trains:* Six.

*Telegraph Companies:* Six.

*Medical Corps:* Each division: one division hospital, five companies sanitary troops, one mountain hospital, two sanitary companies.

*Ammunition Trains:* Each division: two companies artillery ammunition, one company infantry ammunition, two pack trains.

#### SECOND LINE OR LANDWEHR.

*Infantry:* Two hundred and twelve companies of one hundred and seventy men each assembled in fifty-six battalions which form sixteen regiments, two regiments to a brigade.

*Artillery:* Forty-three companies and eight battalions of mountain artillery.

*Cavalry:* Twenty-four squadrons.

#### THIRD LINE OR LANDSTURM.

*Infantry:* Eighty-three battalions.

*Artillery:* Foot and fortification artillery, thirty-nine companies.

*Cavalry:* Thirteen companies.

The approximate number of men available for the firing line is:

First line, men up to their 32nd year . . .	225,000
Landwehr, men up to their 40th year . . .	110,000
Landsturm, men up to their 48th year . . .	80,000
	<hr/>
	415,000

Besides this number there is a force of 250,000 Landsturm men, 90% of which are at least good shots.

Every male Swiss at his nineteenth year must undergo a mental and physical examination. The mental test includes reading, arithmetic, geography, history and composition. The rating for each test is entered in his personal service book. For physical examination, he performs various gymnastic exercises on apparatus. The minimum height is 5 feet  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches (Plattsburg Camp minimum is 5 feet 4 inches); chest measurement, half of height, but not less than  $31\frac{1}{2}$  inches.

There is great rivalry among the cantons for the best percentage in the recruiting examinations, as they are published all through Switzerland. Some cantons compel the boys from seventeen to nineteen to go to night school for sixty-four hours during the winter, to prepare for the examination.

When accepted in his twentieth year, the infantry recruit enters the recruiting school of his division territory, or if he is to become an artilleryman or cavalryman he joins his respective school, of which there are two each for both branches.

The length of time devoted to the first year's training of the recruit is as follows: <sup>1</sup>

Sanitary troops, supply trains, commissary . . . . .	62 days
Infantry and engineers . . . . .	67 days
Artillery and garrison troops . . . . .	77 days
Cavalry . . . . .	92 days

At the time the recruit reports for service he is given a complete equipment and a regulation rifle, which he takes to his home after finishing the course. For yearly inspection and active duty he must turn out with his equipment spick and span. He is punished for neglecting any detail or losing articles.

The recruiting school course is hard work, as each day means eight strenuous hours, with night work such as firing, intrenching and manœuvres, probably twice a week.

On completing the school course, the recruit is promoted to

<sup>1</sup> Day of entrance and day of discharge included.

be a full-fledged soldier, assigned to a battalion in his home district which is a unit of the division of which his canton is a territorial part. As a member of a battalion he serves thirteen days each year until he is twenty-eight. He belongs to the first line for four years longer, until he is thirty-two, but in those four years he is not bound to do any yearly service.

From thirty-two to forty he belongs to the second line, or *Landwehr*. In this capacity he serves for one week every second year. For eight years, until he is forty-eight, he serves in the *Landsturm*, and is called to the colors twice for a period of one week. In addition, every *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* soldier presents himself for annual inspection, at which time he must account for the care of his uniform and arms.

A private of infantry therefore serves from his twentieth year to his forty-eighth, 200 days, an average of seven days of active service per year for twenty-eight years.

The *Landsturm* has two classes, the armed and unarmed. The armed class is organized into companies, troops and regiments. The unarmed class has special duties in war time.

To be handy with shooting mechanism, be it the crossbow of Wilhelm Tell or the modern 7 mm. army rifle, the Swiss through six centuries from early boyhood until old age has practised to hit the mark. Rifle shooting is the sport of old and young, even in the smallest village. Every community is compelled by the federal government to build and maintain a rifle range in the open fields. In civil life every Swiss soldier is compelled to be a member of a rifle club, under the supervision of which he must undergo yearly a rifle shooting test, consisting of 6x6, or 36 shots, with a minimum of 75% hits and 60% points for each exercise. The last day of each year for filing the returns of this annual test is July 15th. To insure a good return, one can practise on the shooting range whenever he chooses from early spring until such time as he feels himself prepared for the compulsory test. The federal government refunds the cost of the ammunition used to all those who pass, and pays to each rifle club the sum of two francs (thirty-nine cents) for each man coming up to the required mark. Woe to the chap that fails in this rigid test. He is looked

down upon by all of his companions, and in November or December he is compelled to again don his uniform, shoulder his rifle, and go to the nearest recruiting place, where he must practise shooting under the eyes of special instructors until he passes the mark required for thirty-six shots.

There are in Switzerland at the present time 4,000 rifle clubs with an aggregate membership of 400,000 men. Two million francs is the cost to the government of the approximate number each Swiss fires in target practise every year. This persistent rifle practise makes every Swiss soldier a crack shot, and is primarily responsible for the high state of efficiency in marksmanship of the army. That the proficiency in shooting grows from year to year is evident from the following facts: Federal "Schuetzenfeste" are held every three years, and the highest awards in those events is the title of "Meisterschuetze," given to those who make seventy-five hits out of one-hundred shots within an eight-inch circle, in kneeling position, at a distance of 330 yards. In 1900 at Luzerne four Meisterschuetzen were proclaimed; thirteen were proclaimed at St. Gall in 1904; twenty-seven at Zürich in 1907, and one hundred and twenty-eight at Berne in 1910. Undoubtedly there are hundreds, if not thousands, of Swiss who could make this mark, but every Swiss has not the money to spend to take part in a federal Schuetzenfest.

The extent of interest in these Schuetzenfeste can be imagined from the fact that in Berne, in 1910, 300 gallery stands were erected and in use. At every stand there were from thirty to forty men waiting for their turns, some of them waiting for ten to twelve hours. The same year the Rheinische Schuetzenfest took place in Germany, at Karlsruhe, and for a district five times the size of Switzerland, there were only fifty stands in use, and rarely more than three men at a time were waiting for their turns to shoot.

During the year 1910, a total of 44,000,000 shots were fired in rifle practise in Switzerland with its 4,000,000 population. In Germany (population 67,000,000) only 30,000,000 practise shots were fired, and in France (population 40,000,000) 20,000,000. It will be remembered that at the international

shoot in Camp Perry, Ohio, September, 1913, Switzerland came out ahead of all competing nations. The official returns were:

Switzerland . . . . .	4,959
France . . . . .	4,767
United States . . . . .	4,578
Sweden . . . . .	4,577
Peru . . . . .	3,892
Canada . . . . .	3,760

Up to this year Switzerland has carried first honors in seventeen out of eighteen international shoots.

So much for rifle practise. Now turn to the training of the army officers. Any Swiss that has the ambition and the intelligence can become an officer in the army. After completing the course of sixty-seven days in the recruiting school, if his conduct during that time warrants a recommendation from his superiors, he gets a call to attend a school for non-commissioned officers, lasting three weeks, after which he receives the rank of corporal. As such he attends another recruiting school a year later, and the corporal with a good record and the ambition to become an officer enters the school for officers for a period of eighty days. There he is taught all that a second lieutenant and first lieutenant need to fill their positions. For practical and training purposes a school for non-commissioned officers is connected with the school for officers.

After serving eighty days the second lieutenant goes through a thirteen days' regular first-line course with his battalion, and the following year spends sixty-seven days at the school for recruits as a second lieutenant. So after serving 315 days, he is a full-fledged second lieutenant.

For four years the second lieutenant must serve thirteen days a year and then may become a first lieutenant. To advance to the rank of captain a first lieutenant must take a forty-five days' course in Central School No. 1.

Officers above the rank of captain devote a considerable part of their time to special courses of tactics and information. The higher the rank, the greater the duty and preparation

therefor. Commanders of divisions and army corps commanders are taken from the corps of professional officers.

Switzerland spends on her army eleven francs (\$2.20) per head of the population, and twenty-three francs (\$4.60) on public education.

Those Swiss who are physically unfit to serve in the army must pay an annual tax of exemption. Every Swiss citizen living in other lands must pay this tax which amounts to a ground tax of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., and a personal property tax of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per thousand.

The equipment, other than fire or side arms—with the exception of underwear, shoes, and stockings—is furnished by the cantons. The cost of this equipment is from 185 francs (\$37) for the infantry to 225 francs (\$45) for the cavalry. Half of this expense, however, it is borne by the federal government, and is paid out of the military taxes.

The yearly federal military budget in peace time is 45,000,000 francs (\$9,000,000) out of which is paid the cost of:

1. Half of the equipment to the cantons.
2. The whole of the armament of all military branches.
3. The maintenance of the army in instruction and training courses.
4. Fortification of strategically important points.
5. The rent of military barracks of which the cantons are owners.

The cost of a soldier to federation and canton is:

	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Cavalry</i>
	Francs	Francs
Equipment . . . . .	185	225
Arms . . . . .	110	120
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total . . . . .	295	345
Share of cantons . . . . .	95	115
Share of federation . . . . .	200	230

The population of Switzerland is less than 4,000,000. On August 1, 1914, at the outbreak of the present war, mobilization

was ordered to protect the Swiss borders. At 9 o'clock on the morning of August 3rd, forty-eight hours after the mobilization order was issued, the Swiss army of 425,000 was ready for action. America has a population of nearly 100,000,000. How long did it take to put our little army in shape to take up pursuit of the bandit Villa following the raid at Columbus?

Long before the 20-year-old Swiss dons the uniform of his country for the first time and marches to his initial service with the colors, he has developed into a physically fit, well-drilled unit, requiring only the finishing touches of a little practical experience in the field to make him the soldier *par excellence*.

At the age of eight, every Swiss schoolboy begins his program of physical training. The course consists of the practise of exercises, selected after long experience and applied in keeping with their value as regards a systematic, harmonious training of the body and development of its organs.

It progresses from easy performances for the boy of eight to difficult problems for the boy of fifteen in setting-up exercises, calisthenics, work on horizontal bars, parallel bars, rings and horse, jumping, vaulting, climbing and all other applied gymnastics. This work gradually takes up more and more of the boy's time. The boy of eight begins with two hours a week, while he of fifteen devotes one hour every day to such practise. The exercises and drills are conducted out-of-doors when possible. Every school yard has stationary horizontal bars, parallel bars, climbing apparatus, and side horses. The execution of exercises by classes or teams, so that the work is performed simultaneously, with snap and vigor, is considered a great factor in discipline and is, therefore, extensively practised.

Physical training is the only subject in Swiss schools under the supervision of the federal government. The whole system is uniform and there is only one primer for all the instruction. The most important factor in every lesson of physical training is the military training without arms in absolute accordance with the army regulations. About one fourth of every period of instruction is occupied by exercises, such as position of attention, the rests, facings, steps and marchings, school of squads, alignments, taking distances and intervals, oblique march, turn-

ing on moving and fixed pivots, open and closed formation in squads, platoons and companies.

All this federal physical instruction is given by male teachers of the Swiss public school. The school-teacher is the primary military instructor of every Swiss boy, and to make him proficient to teach in this subject he takes, while at the teachers' college, a very rigid course of four years' study in the branch of physical training along with other lines of study. The examination as to his fitness to instruct, after completing his course, is held by government inspectors. Every year a rigid inspection and examination of all boys' classes and grades is undertaken by the federal examiners.

Systematic physical training is the national sport in Switzerland, and the boys and young men of the Alpine republic band together in athletic clubs which encourage rivalry among the teams in performing exercises requiring exactness, gracefulness, strength and will power.

"Turnfeste" or meets of physical training clubs are held for districts of counties, cantons (states) and the federation, and on such occasions one realizes the wonderful achievements of the Swiss system of school training. At Basel in 1910, 15,000 young Swiss simultaneously executed gymnastic exercises. The promptness and the snap with which the movements were performed was a most inspiring sight.

Hand in hand with the obligatory physical training of the Swiss boy at school, goes the voluntary work in the cadet corps, where the lad undergoes all of the exercises from the "school of the soldier" to those of the "school of battalion," and here he receives his first training in rifle and target practise. The military training with arms of the Swiss boys under the supervision of army officers has nothing to do directly with curriculum of the Swiss schools, and is not connected with the local school systems.

The rifle used in the cadet corps is a miniature model of the army regulation rifle. The practice time for the cadet amounts to about one hundred and twenty hours per year. The instruction periods vary from two and one half hours a day, to several consecutive days for occasional manoeuvres with other cadet corps of the whole canton.

For boys out of school from their sixteenth to their twentieth year, military preparatory courses are held. The course consists of military exercises, light tactical problems and extensive rifle shooting practised on summer week-day evenings and Sunday mornings. So great is the benefit of the physical training, including military training without arms in schools, the military training in cadet corps and preparatory courses, that fully seventy per cent. of the young men entering recruiting schools are not only physically fit and well drilled, but competent marksmen as well. It should always be borne in mind that the cadet corps for schoolboys and the preparatory courses for boys between the ages of sixteen and twenty have no connection with the school system and are not compulsory.

Three shining truths are taught us by Switzerland today:

1. Switzerland's policy of preparedness has always been to the end of keeping peace and preventing war.
2. By keeping her powerful military strength always in readiness Switzerland frustrates the ambition any neighboring power might have to attack her or to violate her neutrality, by misuse of her territory in the present war.
3. Preparedness founded on the training of the youth does not foster militarism or a desire for military aggression, but it is a wonderful contribution to the vigor and vitality of the nation.

Unfortunately, the feature of the Swiss system that has been most generally dwelt upon in the past is that compelling military service from every male adult who is physically and mentally fit, and exacting a tax of exemption from the unfit.

Many people are attracted to the Swiss system because the obligatory military service is extremely short, when contrasted with that of the great European powers, and yet the military efficiency of the Swiss is as great or greater than that of the soldier of Germany or France, where three consecutive years must be spent in the army.

But these same superficial advocates of the Swiss system miss the real point; the vital, underlying cause of Swiss efficiency escapes them when they do not realize it depends not on the short periods of compulsory service in the army, but on the

foundation that every Swiss boy receives in the physical training courses in the public schools.

If we are convinced that a system similar to the Swiss system would be a great addition to our national defense, then let us begin with the foundation of the building, not with the roof. Is there anything more logical, more valuable than a methodical system of physical training for our school boys?

Unfortunately, most of our educational systems do not appreciate the value of physical education in school. We should not forget that a sound mind can only be developed in its maturity in a sound body, and that therefore the education of body and mind should be mutual, and one not neglected at the cost of the other. A great many of our citizens are of the opinion that athletic sports and games have the same scope and accomplish the same purpose without bringing a militaristic spirit to the schools, as the proposed military training would.

A system of physical training in our schools would not only be of great benefit to the health of the boy, but would form an honest and efficient factor of preparedness for the Stars and Stripes, for which he holds up his right hand every morning and swears: "I pledge allegiance to my flag and to the republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

Ask the "rookies" who go to the military camps to train for officers in the reserve army how they would have appreciated military training in their school days. How much time could they have saved for the military instruction necessary to become an officer if they were not forced to devote most of their time to the exercises which they should have learned in the school?

Why are we so timid about having our boys taught how to stand at attention, how to march, to run, to align, to form squads, to drill in closed and open formations? Why are we so laughingly, childishly afraid to teach our boys how to handle a rifle, if they volunteer to learn it? How many are there among us who, when a boy, did not spend hours every week playing soldier? Then why not utilize this spirit of our youth to the good of our country? Why not lead the enthusiasm fo

charge and self-defense, for shooting arrows, brandishing wooden swords, shooting off wooden rifles, into channels of systematic training under expert supervision and with real weapons?

There was a time when the American boy learned how to handle a rifle; it came from father to son as an absolute necessity. In those times war with another powerful nation was more remote than it will be in our future.

The next step to the obligatory physical training and military training without arms for the school boys from their twelfth year on is the membership in cadet corps. For the cadet corps of public schools, let us say the boys of the sixth, seventh and eighth grades, the training should not be obligatory.

If the support of the national government, the state or community to such corps would be a generous one, so that the expenses for the boys would be nominal and the training at the same time attractive, we would get a great percentage of the eligible boys to join the corps voluntarily.

Figuring that one out of every four boys would join a cadet corps, we would add 300,000 lads per year, equipped with the fundamentals of a soldier training for our national defense. That thousands upon thousands of cadets, and especially students who are members of high school and college corps, would be fine material for officers of minor military commands, should an emergency prompt the President to call for volunteers, is evident.

Cadet corps are the real things for many reasons. All the boys like a uniform, because of its attractiveness, and to a certain extent, its democracy. The cadet, like the soldier, wants to be seen; therefore he does not confine his activity to gallery ranges and gymnasiums, but marches through the streets behind the martial drum. He wants his exercise in the field, his target practice and sham battles, and the cadet of the near future will want to dig trenches. The cadet will attract the boy standing on the curb, watching others like himself marching to the strains of patriotic music, garbed in natty uniforms and with shouldered guns, and will be straightway filled with the desire to join a cadet corps.

I am happy to say that recently my efforts toward inducing

the public officials to adopt a modified form of the Swiss system have been meeting with marked success. A few weeks ago I had the honor to be called into conference by Mayor Griffin of Hoboken, who was desirous of placing his city in the forefront of those contributing toward national preparedness. I had several conferences with the Mayor, Board of Education, City Commissioners and representative citizens. Results were speedy. Within three weeks the plan outlined was adopted in full by the city. The Board of Education decided to establish compulsory physical training and military training without arms, with male public school teachers as instructors under the Swiss system. This addition to the curriculum will be inaugurated at the opening of the school year in September, 1916. The voluntary cadet corps, with two officers of the National Guard of New Jersey as paid instructors, has already been organized with 500 boys volunteering for enlistments. The city has appropriated \$5,000 to pay for the first year's instruction and for rifles and uniforms, bids for which have already been received. I consider that voluntary cadet corps complement a system of compulsory physical training.

We should not build something in haste and in our excitement that would very probably result in an extravagant but misfit suit for Uncle Sam. By all means let us adopt that part of the Swiss system that fits our conditions and which will never be out of date or prove a hardship to our citizens, viz.: the obligatory physical training and military training without arms of school boys from their eighth year; cadet corps training, provided free of charge for boys who volunteer for it from their twelfth year on; and free preparatory courses for boys volunteering from their sixteenth to twentieth years. Such training would be of untold benefit to the body and mind of the future citizen, even if he should never be called upon to give an account of the soldier's part of his training.

## THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL TRAINING FOR PURPOSES OF MILITARY DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

E. N. JOHNSTON

Major Corps of Engineers U. S. Army

THE continent of Australia lies between longitude 113 degrees 9 minutes east and 153 degrees 39 minutes east, and between the parallels of latitude 10 degrees 41 minutes south and 39 degrees 8 minutes south. The area of the commonwealth, including the island of Tasmania, is 2,974,581 square miles; this area is about 420 square miles larger than the area of the United States. About two-fifths of the continent is within the tropical zone and the remaining three-fifths within the temperate zone. The density of its population ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  persons per square mile) is very much less than that of the United States (29.3 persons per square mile). The population is about four and one-half millions. Because of the climatic conditions in the interior of the continent, a very large proportion of this population is to be found adjacent to the eastern, southern and western shores. About one-third of the total population is to be found in the state capitals, in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth.

In a speech delivered by the Minister of Defense in 1911, he stated:

Australians are a peaceful business people who do not want war; but can we get others to think the same? There are nations not decadent who have defeated some of the so-called great powers of the world. History teaches that every country that becomes a conqueror grows land-hungry and ambitious, and so Australia must prepare. Having decided this, we must have the best system of defense, the best training it is possible to get. . . . As regards the cost of the scheme, this system of national insurance is but a mere bagatelle compared with the loss that would be caused by an aggressive cruiser coming to these shores. And further, the horrors of war cannot be counted in

<sup>1</sup> This paper was written in January, 1915, and read by title at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

pounds, shillings and pence. If we are going to have a defense scheme worth having, we must have the best, and be prepared to pay for it. . . . Organization in business, or in any other sphere of human activity, is the secret of success. In this defense scheme we have a means of organizing the nation.

In view of recent events, the following remarks made by the Quartermaster-General of the Australian forces in 1911 seem singularly prophetic :

At present there are no clouds on the country's horizon, but, on the other hand, there are many, and not fools either, who do believe war likely. Whether war is likely or not is not the question, however ; it is whether war is possible, and what war, and what might be the result to Australia. . . . Nations apparently fight very often for but small excuses, but there are underlying reasons always that are not so apparent. The desire of larger territory, of increased trade, . . . even the barefaced desires of the strong to impose his will upon the weak ; these and many others decide the rulers of a nation to undertake a war. The superficial cause, after the secret decision is taken, may be so trivial a matter as the arrest of a fellow-citizen in the threatened country, an extravagant and impossible demand for a humiliating indemnity, the consequent refusal, and an act of war. . . . That is why we want an army. We do not want war, and keeping an army fit for defense is the best preventive.

*The Defense Act 1903-12.*

The Australian system is governed according to the provisions of laws enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament in 1903, 1904, 1909, 1910, 1911 and 1912, these laws being known as "Defense Acts." Prior to 1910 the Acts prescribed compulsory training only for those less than twenty years of age. In that year Lord Kitchener visited Australia to investigate the system of defense, and advised that the universal training should be extended to the twenty-sixth year. The Parliament afterwards adopted this suggestion.

The Defense force is both naval and military and is divided into two branches, called the Permanent Forces and the Citizen Forces. Members of the former serve continuously for a stated term. The permanent forces are limited to staff corps, army

service, medical, veterinary, and ordnance corps, garrison, artillery, fortress engineers, and submarine mining engineers.

The citizen forces are active forces and reserve forces. The former include militia forces, volunteer forces, those undergoing compulsory training, and officers on the unattached list.

The reserve forces include those on the reserve of officers' list, members of rifle clubs, and those male inhabitants of Australia between the ages of eighteen and sixty years, who are British subjects, residents in Australia for six months, and not included in the active forces.

The Governor-General of the Commonwealth was empowered to constitute a Council of Defense and a Board of Administration called the Military Board. He is also empowered to call out of the citizen forces for active service in time of war, *but the members of the forces are not liable to serve beyond the limits of the commonwealth unless they voluntarily agree to do so.*

In time of war, all males between the ages of eighteen and sixty are liable for service in the citizen forces, and the Governor-General, by proclamation, can call upon such persons to enlist and serve. Exemptions from this liability for service include persons physically unfit, members and officers of the Parliaments, judges of courts, etc., ministers of religion, persons employed in the police or prison services, in lighthouses, etc. The following are exempt from duties of a combatant nature: Persons employed as doctors or nurses in public hospitals, those not substantially of European origin or descent, and those whose religious beliefs do not allow them to bear arms.

#### *Numbers to be trained.*

In 1911 there were in Australia about 188,000 males between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, and 295,000 between eighteen and twenty-five years, the ages first mentioned corresponding to those of the senior cadets, and the ages last mentioned corresponding to those of the citizen soldiers. Deducting from the numbers available those probably physically unfit and those living in districts too thinly populated<sup>1</sup> to admit of efficient

<sup>1</sup> The training is at first to be limited to centers having a population of at least two thousand.

training without excessive expenditure, it was estimated that there will be in training when the scheme is in full operation 100,000 senior cadets; 112,000 citizen soldiers.

If the system of training in the United States was organized on the same basis, there would be constantly in training between four and five million young men.

The system of universal training became effective on January 1, 1911. Under this system the number in training increases each year until the system is in full operation. The previously existing twenty-four infantry battalions will become ninety-three, the eighteen light horse regiments twenty-eight, and the eighteen field batteries fifty-six.

#### *Universal Obligation.*

All male inhabitants of Australia, except as hereinafter mentioned, who have resided therein for six months, and who are British subjects, are liable to training as follows: from 12 to 14 years of age, in the junior cadets; from 14 to 18 years of age, in the senior cadets; from 18 to 26 years of age, in the citizen forces.

Exemption from training is given to members of the permanent naval and military forces, to those found physically unfit, and to school teachers who have qualified as instructors or officers of the junior or senior cadets, and, so far as concerns combatant duties, to those not substantially of European origin or descent. Those forbidden by their religion to bear arms are exempt from duty of a combatant nature, and are assigned to services of a non-combatant nature. Students at a theological college may be exempted from training. Any man living five miles or more from the nearest training place may be also exempted if attendance would create hardship.

No person is permitted to serve in the defense forces who has been convicted of any disgraceful or infamous crime, or who is of notoriously bad character.

Those liable for service are required to register themselves, or be registered by a parent or guardian, during the months of January and February of the year in which they will reach the age of fourteen. Parents or guardians are responsible for

the registration of those under age. Registration papers may be obtained at post offices, and, when filled in, forwarded to the area officer or to the postmaster. The penalty for wilfully failing to comply with the regulations with respect to registration is a fine not exceeding ten pounds. Anyone who without lawful excuse evades the personal service required, is liable to a penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds.

The law states that "No employer shall prevent, or attempt to prevent, any employee who is serving or liable to serve in the cadets or citizen forces, and no parent or guardian shall prevent any son or ward who is so serving or liable to serve, from rendering the personal service required of him . . . and no employer shall in any way penalize or prejudice in his employment . . . any employee for rendering or being liable to render such personal service, . . . either by reducing his wages or dismissing him from his employment or in any other manner; provided that this section shall not be construed to require an employer to pay an employee for any time when he is absent from employment for the purpose of training. Penalty: one hundred pounds." The law further places upon the employer the burden of proving that any employee dismissed or penalized was not so treated because of rendering or being liable to render military service.

#### *Organization.*

The Australian military forces are organized on a territorial basis, each area into which the country is divided furnishing a definite proportion of fighting units. The portion of Australia in which the military system has been put into effect is divided into six military districts, and these are subdivided into brigade areas. Each brigade area includes four battalion areas. The battalion areas are also each divided into two or three training areas.

The number of battalion areas is ninety-three. Each furnishes for training in the infantry battalion about 922 adults, from 18 to 25 years of age, and about 75 for the engineers, army service corps, and army medical corps; that is, a total of about

one thousand. In some cases the battalion area also furnishes light horse units and fortress troops.

In every training area there will probably be an average of 250 to 500 trained soldiers; 70 to 120 recruits for citizen forces and 300 to 500 senior cadets.

Considerable importance is given to the territorial basis of organization. In addition to designating the units by the name of the arm and serial number, as in the United States army, each unit is given also a name pertaining to the locality of the area in which the unit is raised, thus, 31st Light Horse—Riverina Regiment; 25th Infantry—Sydney Battalion; 13th A. S. C. (Army Service Corps)—South Melbourne Company.

Each divisional area (to be subsequently formed) will furnish three brigades of infantry, three field artillery brigades, and three other divisions of troops, as well as three portions of light horse brigades. Each brigade area supplies four battalions of infantry, four battalions of senior cadets, certain divisional troops and reserves. Each battalion area supplies one battalion of infantry, one battalion of senior cadets, reserves, and a proportion of other units.

In the assignment of recruits, an effort is made to distribute them to such organizations as will profit most by the special business training which the men may have received. Each commanding officer is accordingly authorized in asking for recruits to specify the proportion of men of special trades or occupations desired, and the number required who should be able to ride. Preference is given to those with suitable horses at their disposal who are willing to serve with light horse organizations, and commanding officers of other branches are expected to assist those who desire to transfer to the light horse. Those whose religious beliefs forbid the bearing of arms are assigned to the army medical corps, or to the infantry for training as stretcher-bearers. In assignment to arms of the service, the wishes of recruits are complied with as far as possible. It is explained to recruits that those allotted to the artillery and engineers, are required to train twenty-five days per annum, instead of eighteen, and that only picked men can be allotted to such arms.

*Training Areas and Area Officers.*

Each subdivision of a battalion area, called a training area, is in charge of an officer not above the rank of captain, detached from his unit, and called an area officer. It is intended that eventually all of these area officers will be graduates of the Australian Royal Military College.

The duties of an area officer include the following:

- (a) Supervision of the registration, organization, training of the senior cadets.
- (b) Inspection of junior cadet training in the schools.
- (c) Administration of troops provided by his area, including equipment, clothing, pay.
- (d) Supervision of training of all recruits within his area.
- (e) Duty with troops; such as adjutant of some military unit organized in the vicinity.
- (f) Duties at schools of instruction and camps of continuous training.
- (g) Supervision of the subordinate members of the instructional staff attached to his area.
- (h) The obtaining of a thorough knowledge of the population, industries, etc., of his area.

## CITIZEN FORCES

*Duration of Training*

The trainees of the citizen forces (those between 18 and 26 years of age) are required to train each year for the equivalent of sixteen whole-day drills, of which not less than eight shall be in camps of continuous training. Although this is the general rule, those allotted to the naval forces, and to the artillery and engineers of the military forces, are required to train twenty-five whole days annually, or their equivalent, of which not less than seventeen shall be in camps of continuous training.

For these forces the lengths of the various drills are: Whole-day drills—not less than six hours; half-day drill—not less than three hours; night drill—not less than one and one-half hours; whole-day drills in camps include the whole of the twenty-four hours.

*Extra-Territorial Units*

This term is applied to units organized and trained at universities and other educational institutions. They do not form part of the organization for war, but the members thereof on leaving the institution, or in time of war, are allotted to units of the areas in which they reside.

*Efficiency*

At the end of the year's training, each trainee is classed as "efficient" or "non-efficient." Those classed as "non-efficient," either for failure to attend during the prescribed period, or because of not having attained a sufficient standard, are required to attend an equivalent additional training for each year in which they are classed as "non-efficient." No member is classed as "efficient" unless he has attended the statutory exercises required or such other equivalents as are prescribed.

In order to assist those desiring to prepare for promotion as well as to give an opportunity to those absent to make up for the absence, "voluntary parades" are frequently held. If a member attends two voluntary parades of equal duration to that which he may have missed, he will prevent himself from being classed, because of that absence, as "non-efficient." After the trainee reaches the age of twenty-six years, he ordinarily passes into the reserve and is excused from regular training. However, those who have been classed as "non-efficient" are required to spend in training as many additional years as there are "non-efficient" records against them. Certain exceptions from the rules above referred to are made in the case of absence on account of sickness or for other good and sufficient cause.

In addition to the penalties prescribed for being classed as "non-efficient," the trainee who fails to render the services required by the law is liable to a fine of from five pounds to one hundred pounds, and, in addition, to confinement in custody of a prescribed authority for the time which would be taken up in rendering the services required. During such confinement the trainee is subject to training and discipline. The periods of confinement are regulated so as not to interfere with the

regular occupation of the trainee. An additional penalty for evading military service, is that a person who so evades is ineligible for employment of any kind in the public service of the commonwealth.

#### *Medical Examinations.*

Those liable for training in the citizen forces are examined physically before commencing this training. In addition to the usual physical tests, examination is made of racial characteristics, with a view to assuring that the examinee is substantially of European origin or descent, those of other origin not being eligible for service. It is understood that this requirement is especially designed to eliminate from training those of Asiatic or African origin.

#### *Transfers.*

Trainees removing from one area to another are transferred to another unit, preferably of the arm in which the trainee has been trained. Upon transfer, the trainee retains the rank held in the organization from which transferred and is a supernumerary in his new organization. However, if he is transferred to another arm of the service, he must qualify for his rank within a year or revert to the ranks.

#### *Appointment and Promotion of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.*

Promotions are made from those who have served in the ranks of the citizen forces. All appointments and promotions are made as a result of competitive examinations open to those of the next lower grade. Competitive examinations are held annually towards the end of the military year, and to assist candidates in preparing for examination, the necessary books are furnished free of charge. The examination for promotion to the grade of non-commissioned officer, warrant officer, lieutenant or captain, is entirely practical, and, as far as possible, oral. For promotion to the rank of major and higher, two-thirds of the marks at least are allotted to practical tests in such work as would have to be performed in time of war. It is recognized

that, having their other professions to attend to, but few of the trainees can become proficient in all details of army administration except as concerns their own units, and the principal efforts are directed towards increasing their proficiency in the actual leading of troops and command in the field. For purposes of promotion, the lieutenants and captains are each arranged in two grades according to length of service. Only lieutenants having at least two and one-half years commissioned service are eligible to take the examination for promotion to the grade of captain; and for a captain to take the examination for promotion to the grade of major, it is necessary that he should have served one and one-half years as a captain.

As a rule, promotion is given to those serving within the unit in which the vacancy occurs. For this purpose the following units are recognized:

A regiment of light horse; a brigade of field artillery and its ammunition column; a battery of heavy artillery and its ammunition column; The garrison artillery of a fortress or defended port; each branch of the engineers in any military district; a battalion of infantry; the army service corps in any military district; the Australian intelligence corps in any military district; the army medical corps in any military district; each departmental corps in any military district.

The maximum term during which officers are permitted to serve in each rank is as follows: Lieutenants, five years; Captains, four years; Majors, three years; Lieutenant, three years.

Officers who complete the maximum term without promotion are transferred to the unattached list with their existing rank, but with a step of rank if qualified for promotion. Officers on this unattached list may be assigned to reserve units or to instruction of senior cadets, and are required to attend annual periods of continuous training, schools of instruction, staff tours, etc.

This feature of the system is a valuable one and results in the partial education as officers of a considerable number of young men.

*Pay and Allowances*

For each of the sixteen whole days training required per annum, the officers receive pay at rates of from 15 shillings (\$3.60) per day for a lieutenant, two pounds 5 shillings (\$10.80) for a colonel or brigadier. The men of other ranks receive pay at the rate of from 3 shillings (72 cents) per day for recruits, to 12 shillings (\$2.88) per day for brigade sergeant major, etc.

For married men additional payments are made for the period spent in camp as follows:

	<i>8 day camp</i>	<i>17 day camp</i>
(a) For wife living at home.	10s.	20s.
(b) For each child living at home	5s.	10s.

Certain specialists of the field artillery and garrison artillery are paid an additional one pound per annum.

*Clothing.*

Articles of uniform and equipment are issued free of cost to members of the forces, including officers and others. The articles so issued include the following: bag, kit, universal; boots; breeches; cap; greatcoat (mounted or dismounted pattern); hat, with band, numeral, and strap; leggings (for mounted service); puttees, (for dismounted service only); military woolen shirt.

Officers are supplied with: aiguillettes; boots, pairs; breeches, cord; cap, forage; cap, field service; great-coat; hat, with band, numeral and straps; jacket; leggings, pairs; puttees, pairs; sash, with web belt; shirt, military, woolen; trousers.

Officers and noncommissioned officers are authorized to supply themselves privately with the authorized clothing, and reimbursement of the cost, within prescribed limits, is authorized.

*Discipline.*

An attempt is made to enforce discipline with as little punishment as possible and to induce in all ranks a feeling of patriotic devotion to duty.

It is a military offense for any member of the citizen forces

while on duty to use blasphemous language, to speak or act indecently, or to engage in immoral conversation, and for this purpose they are considered as always on duty when in uniform. No intoxicating liquors are allowed to be sold or supplied at any place during such time as training is proceeding. No cigarettes or materials for making them are allowed to be sold in any camp, and no member of the citizen forces is permitted to have such articles in his possession when on duty.

### *Competitions.*

In order to foster a healthy spirit of emulation, annual military competitions are held. These competitions are between teams representing the various organizations. The teams are composed of one officer and from eighteen to forty-three men of other ranks. The teams compete in all branches of military training. Badges and medals are given as prizes.

#### UNITS MAINTAINED DURING THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914

Six light horse brigades, including 23 regiments of light horse (each of three squadrons) : Total, 503 officers, 8,637 other ranks. In addition to the light horse regiments there were assigned to these light horse brigades : four batteries of field artillery ; six companies engineers (signal troops) ; six companies army service corps ; six light horse field ambulances.

Five field artillery brigades, including 22 batteries : Total, 125 officers, 2,589 other ranks.

Thirteen companies garrison artillery : Total, 62 officers, 1,063 other ranks.

Engineers : Four field companies and five half companies ; 39 officers, 741 other ranks. Six signal troops : 6 officers, 174 other ranks. Five division signal companies and three brigade sections : 35 officers, 575 other ranks. Total engineers : 80 officers, 1,490 other ranks.

Twelve infantry brigades of four battalions each, and two extra-territorial units (Sydney University scouts and Melbourne University scouts) : Total, 50 battalions, 1,495 officers, 33,910 other ranks.

Australian intelligence corps : 74 officers.

Army service corps : Six companies attached to light horse brigades ; 14 other companies. Total, 80 officers, 910 other ranks.

Army medical corps : Six light horse brigade field ambulances ;

fourteen field ambulances; two companies and two half companies army medical corps; one hundred and twenty-five medical officers attached to the district staffs, forts, etc. Total, 231 officers, 1,564 other ranks.

Two army veterinary corps: 45 officers.

*Total Units to be Raised Later.*

Two brigades, light horse; two squadrons divisional light horse; headquarters, nine field artillery brigades; twenty-two batteries, field artillery (divisional); five batteries field artillery (light horse); five batteries field artillery (howitzer); six companies engineers (field companies); two troops engineers (signal troops); two companies engineers (signal companies); one company engineers (electric company); two companies engineers (wireless companies); headquarters, eleven infantry brigades; forty-two battalions of infantry; six companies, A. S. C. (headquarters companies); two companies, A. S. C. (light horse companies); nine companies, A. S. C.; two light-horse field ambulances, A. M. C.: Nine field ambulances, A. M. C.; nineteen companies, A. M. C.

DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION FOR YEAR 1913-14.

*A Light Horse Brigade:* Headquarters, including one colonel, one ordnance officer, one brigade major, three light-horse regiments, one field artillery battery, and a light-horse ammunition column, one signal troop, one light-horse brigade train, one light-horse field ambulance.

*A Light Horse Regiment:* Headquarters, including one lieutenant colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one medical officer, one veterinary officer. Machine-gun section, three squadrons. Total: 24 officers, 380 other ranks.

*A Machine Gun Section:* one subaltern, 18 other ranks. Two machine guns.

*A Squadron of Light Horse:* one major, one captain, four subalterns, 110 other ranks divided into four troops.

*A Field Artillery Brigade:* Headquarters, including one lieutenant colonel, one adjutant, one ordnance officer, one medical officer, one veterinary officer. Three batteries.

*A Field Artillery Battery:* one major, one captain, three subalterns, 115 other ranks, four guns and limbers, four ammunition wagons, with limbers.

*Garrison Artillery:* 15 majors, 14 captains, 33 subalterns, 13 cos. of 51 to 142 other ranks, each.

*Engineers*: A field company, one major, one captain, four subalterns, 114 other ranks.

*A Signal Troop*: One captain or subaltern, 29 other ranks.

*A Divisional Signal Company*: One major or captain, one captain or subaltern, four subalterns, 100 other ranks.

*An Infantry Brigade*: Headquarters, including one colonel, one orderly officer, one brigade major. Four battalions (4 to 8 companies each).

*An Infantry Battalion*: Headquarters, including one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one transport officer, one signal officer, one medical officer, one machine-gun section. Four to eight companies.

*A Company of Infantry*:<sup>1</sup> One major or captain, two subalterns, other ranks temporarily variable.

*Australian Intelligence Corps*: Four lieutenant-colonels, fourteen majors, fifty captains or lieutenants, six staffs; total, 74 officers.

*An Army Service Corps Company*: One major, one captain, two subalterns, 75 other ranks.

*A Light Horse Field Ambulance*: One lieutenant-colonel, one major, two captains, 53 other ranks.

*A Field Ambulance*: One lieutenant-colonel, one major, four captains, 85 other ranks.

#### WAR ESTABLISHMENTS

The war establishment of a light-horse brigade is given in the preceding page.

*A Light Horse Regiment*: Headquarters, three squadrons, machine gun section; total, 25 officers, 511 other ranks.

*A Machine Gun Section for Light Horse Regiment*: One subaltern, 26 other ranks.

*A Squadron of Light Horse*: Four troops, one major, one captain, four subalterns, 148 other ranks.

*A Field Artillery Brigade*: Headquarters; three batteries each of four 18-pounder Q. F. guns, one ammunition column; total, 26 officers, 706 other ranks.

*A Field Artillery Battery and Light Horse Brigade Ammunition Column*: Four 18-pounder Q. F. guns, seven officers, 155 other ranks.

*A Howitzer Battery and Ammunition Column*: Four 5-inch B. L. guns, one major, one captain, four subalterns, 188 other ranks.

<sup>1</sup> In a battalion with eight companies, the two senior company commanders, and in a battalion with six or four companies, the senior company commander, may be of the rank of major.

*A Heavy Artillery Battery and Ammunition Column* : Four 4-7 inch Q. F. guns, one major, one captain, four subalterns, 218 other ranks.

*Engineers* : A Field Company : One major, one captain, four subalterns, 200 other ranks.

*Engineers (continued)* : Distribution of rank and file of field company by trades : Twenty bricklayers, two plasterers, two slaters, forty carpenters, joiners, sawyers, cabinet-makers and wood-turners ; five clerks, three collar-makers or saddlers, two coopers, two draughtsmen, two electricians, four engine-drivers, eight fitters and turners, twelve masons, six painters, eight plumbers and gas-fitters, one printer, one shoemaker, fifteen whitesmiths, blacksmiths and tinsmiths ; two surveyors, four tailors, five wheelwrights, six laborers and various.

*A Signal Troop* : One captain or subaltern, 42 other ranks.

*A Divisional Signal Company* : Six officers, 157 other ranks.

*A Company of Infantry* : One major or captain, two subalterns, 116 other ranks.

*An Infantry Battalion* : Headquarters, including one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one transport officer, one signal officer, one medical officer ; eight companies ; machine-gun section ; total, 32 officers, 991 other ranks.

#### JUNIOR CADETS.

The training of junior cadets begins on the first of July of the year in which the cadet becomes twelve years of age, and continues for two years. Before commencing training, the boys are examined physically. Those who are reported unfit for any service whatever, and those who are unfit to undergo the whole or any part of the prescribed training, may be exempted from the training.

#### *Training*

The period of training for junior cadets is 120 days annually. The training is in subjects as follows :

- (a) Physical training. To be carried out on each school day for not less than 15 minutes. This training is progressive ; the number of exercises taught being increased from year to year.
- (b) Marching drill, elementary, comprising principally infantry squad drill.
- (c) Miniature rifle shooting. The boy is taught to load and fire the

authorized rifle, without assistance ; to know the safety rules ; and to be able to hit within a circle, six inches in diameter, three shots out of five, when firing at 25 yards range.

- (d) Swimming. At the end of the second year's Junior Cadet Training, the cadet should be able to swim a distance not less than twenty yards in deep water, including distance transversed by diving, and to know, practically, how to rescue a person from drowning.
- (e) Running exercises in organized games. Special effort is made to avoid specializing with a few and to see that all members have a share in the exercises.
- (f) First aid. Under this heading subjects as follows are taught : Physiological outlines, bandaging, fractures and their treatment, wounds, dislocations and sprains, bleeding, drowning, shock, dressing of wounds.

The training of junior cadets is supervised by the masters of schools, wherein the training is conducted in accordance with regulations, or by the members of the Administrative and Instructional staff and area officers. To assist in the training, instructors of physical training are appointed.

#### *Evasion of Training*

Provisions somewhat similar to those applicable to members of the citizen forces are in effect to prevent the evasion of training by junior cadets, and to keep employers of the cadets from causing them to avoid their military duties.

Francotte arms 23'' caliber rifles are used, or Winchester, 22'' caliber. The number of rifles issued is about ten per cent of the number of junior cadets.

Organizations such as Boy Scouts and Boys' Brigades are not included as organizations in the citizen forces, nor are their members exempt from training in the units of the citizen forces.

#### SENIOR CADETS.

After a boy has completed his training in the Junior Cadets, he passes into the Senior Cadets, where he is trained during the period between the 14th and 18th years of his age.

The senior cadets are organized into companies and battal-

ions. Each battalion is commanded by a major or captain, and if possible, the area officer acts as adjutant. A company of senior cadets is organized as follows: One captain, two lieutenants, one color sergeant, four sergeants, four corporals, two buglers, 106 privates; total 120.

In cases in which there are not sufficient cadets in a training area to form a company of at least 80 members, the senior cadets are organized as a detachment. In any case, the number in a battalion depends upon the number of senior cadets in the training area. Educational institutions with the required number of students are permitted to organize senior cadet detachments, the officers of which are either teachers in the schools, or officers appointed on recommendation of the head master, and approved by the military authorities.

The prescribed training for senior cadets is for each year as follows: 4 whole day drills, 12 half day drills, 24 night drills.

The duration of a whole-day drill is at least four hours; of a half-day drill, at least two hours; and of a night drill, at least one hour. The number and duration of the different drills may be varied, with the approval of the Brigade Major; for example, instead of night drills, detachments at schools may do all of their work during the hours of daylight. There must however, be training for at least sixty-four hours of each year.

As is the case in the citizen forces proper, the compulsory or statutory parades are increased by extra "voluntary parades". These latter are held to enable those who are backward to obtain the necessary proficiency, to assist those who are preparing for promotion, and to enable those who have missed drills to make up the deficiency.

In order to be classed as "efficient", a senior cadet who absents himself from parade by permission, must attend a similar "voluntary parade"; however, if he misses a parade because of being absent without leave, he can only make up the deficiency by attending two separate voluntary parades, each of equal or longer duration than the one missed. It is only in special cases that leaves of absence are granted.

Each year the senior cadets are classed as "efficient" or "non-efficient". If a boy is classed as "non-efficient", his

work of the year does not count, and he is required to do an extra year of training for each time that he has been classed as "non-efficient".

The officers of the senior cadets are citizen officers, and usually men of mature years. Half of the instruction of the senior cadets, however, is supposed to be given by the area officers, or by a member of the administrative and instructional staff.

The training of the senior cadets includes the following:

Physical training, squad drill without arms, and semaphore squad drill with arms, care of arms, section of drill, musketry instruction and exercises, company drill, range practise.

There is allotted to each senior cadet for range practise, field practice and matches, 150 rounds of ammunition per year.

The requirements of law with respect to the evasion of service by members of the citizen forces, and for interference by employers with such service, are the same as those hereinbefore given with respect to the members of citizen forces.

#### *Promotion.*

Noncommissioned officers and second lieutenants of senior cadets are ordinarily promoted from those, serving in the ranks of the senior cadets, who are most successful in competitive examinations. Candidates must have served two years as privates before they can be made corporals, and must have served three years before they can be made sergeants or second lieutenants. The examinations are oral and practical. For promotion to the grade of Captain or Major, the subjects of examination are:

- (a) Regimental duties, including a knowledge of the Defense Act;
- (b) Drill and field training, including care of arms, and theory of rifle fire;
- (c) Ceremonial and training of field operations;
- (d) Map reading.

When young senior cadet officers reach the age for transfer to the citizen forces, they may be permitted to continue to

serve as officers of senior cadets. Those who do not wish to so continue will be allotted to the citizen forces, and are eligible to compete for appointment to the rank of second lieutenant.

#### *Discipline.*

Similar regulations respecting the use of cigarettes, intoxicating liquor, etc., are in effect for senior cadets as hereinbefore explained for junior cadets.

#### *Uniform and Equipment.*

Uniform is issued free of cost to officers and others of the senior cadets. The articles issued are as follows:

One military shirt, khaki, woolen, one pair boots, ankle brown, one pair breeches, cord, one hat with band, numeral and strap, one pair puttees.

In addition to the articles just mentioned, senior cadet officers are furnished: one cap, forage; one khaki jacket; one pair khaki trousers.

Uniform is required to be worn at military formations, and is prohibited to be worn at any other time.

Each cadet is furnished a cadet rifle, and in addition a regulation .303 caliber rifle, is furnished in an amount not exceeding ten per cent of the strength, for each senior cadet who is a good shot. For all purposes of drill the cadet rifles are used. This cadet rifle is the Westley-Richards, a light form of Martini-Henry. It uses smokeless powder, and shoots well at short ranges.

#### THE STAFF.

The members of the administrative and instructional staff are used for the purposes indicated by the name. Two officers are assigned to each brigade area; one is Brigade Major, the other is his assistant. A Staff Instructor is also allotted to the brigade area. For each training area, an area officer is appointed from the citizen forces, and one staff instructor is assigned for duty with him. A staff instructor is assigned to each regimental headquarters.

The staff officer, area officers, and staff instructors, are expected to be able to give instruction in either light horse or infantry training. The brigade major acts practically as ad-

jutant of the brigade area. He is responsible for the instruction of the officers of the citizen forces, conducts schools of instruction, supervises work of area officers, etc.

It is the intention of the regulations that the staff officers and area officers shall attend to most of the details of administration; relieving the citizen forces from the burdens of such administrative duties, and thus facilitating their learning duties of a combatant nature. However, in camps of continuous training, all the citizen forces are required to do their full share of administrative work.

#### *The Military College*

The Military College was established pursuant to the advice of Lord Kitchener. It is my understanding that the school is modeled after the United States Military Academy at West Point. The object of the college is the education of candidates for commissions in all branches of the Commonwealth military forces. It is open only to those who intend to make the profession of arms their life's work. Graduates are eligible for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.

Vacancies are allotted to the states of the commonwealth on the basis of population, and the candidates from each state compete among themselves. The cadets pay no fees, but are fed, clothed, instructed and paid at the expense of the commonwealth. The course is for four years and includes instruction in military art, including tactics, military engineering, map reading, artillery, military law, military administration, drill, musketry, physical training, signaling, riding and driving, in addition to the subjects usually taught in colleges. Six weeks of each year are spent in camp.

#### *Financial*

The cost of the present system was originally estimated as £17 per man per year. I understand that for the year ending June 30, 1913, the cost was estimated to be about £22½ per man.

#### *Miscellaneous*

Because of the great expense which would be involved in providing drill halls for all of the units, a very large amount of

training is done out of doors. The climate is very favorable for such training. The rainfall where most of the training is done is light, and there is no snow. During my last visit to Australia, one parade was held in Melbourne in which 10,000 of the citizen forces participated, including the naval reserve, field artillery brigades, light-horse infantry brigades, army service corps, army medical corps and garrison artillery.

The following is a true copy, furnished by one of the area officers, of a letter which he had received informing him of six boys who had failed to register for service:

OFFICER IN CHARGE OF STAFF OFFICE :

*Sir* : I am working in a Racing Stable i am a cadet a lott of boys a glenelg and plympton who are working in racing stables have not rigist and who ought to be drilinge monts ago there are six boys in a stable in plympton who have never rigist and who ought to be drillinge monts ago if you send a officer round dont say you have recvd a letter about it or they might find out who write it and i might and if they should i should be nerely kiled i never liked drilinge at first but i like it now.

Yours truly Cadett

I am writing to the Staff Office because if i tell the are officer he they might find out who told and if they should I would be nerly kiled rember mums the word

At first, there was considerable opposition to the compulsory training system. When I was in Australia in 1913, the system had been in operation for a little more than two years. During that time a great deal of the opposition had ceased. The mothers and fathers found that their boys were kept off the street corners, and that their physique and general bearing were markedly improved. Employers found that the boys in training were prompt, more obedient and more respectful.

## TRADES-UNIONISM AND MILITARY TRAINING<sup>1</sup>

MATTHEW WOLL

President of the International Allied Printing Trades Association

**F**UNDAMENTALLY, consideration of the military obligations of citizenship with special reference to the question of compulsory versus volunteer military training and service and of what basic methods may be best followed for the common defense, rests upon the broader subject of war itself—how best to prevent war and how to be adequately prepared, if this nation should become involved in war.

There is an enormous force of public sentiment in the United States for peace. Every true American stands for peace and the settlement of domestic and international questions without force of arms. No true American, however, wants peace at any price. To glorify peace at the sacrifice of ideals of human justice, freedom, and democracy, is cowardice. Resistance to injustice and tyranny and low ideals is inseparable from the virile fighting quality that has given purpose and force to ennobling causes in all nations. Our own freedom and republican form of government has been achieved by resistance to tyranny and insistence upon human rights. Only a people willing to maintain their rights and to defend their freedom are worthy of these privileges.

War is not necessarily bad. It all depends on what war is about. The war of Colonials, for instance, to win independence from England was a just and wise war. The American Federation of Labor at the Philadelphia convention declared itself in full accord with the fundamental principle, the sentiment of which appeals to the higher instincts and ennobling attributes of mankind, that independence, liberty and justice for all mankind are paramount under all circumstances. Or-

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the evening session of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

ganized labor distinguishes between wars of conquest and wars for redress of wrongs, holding that back of all wars for conquest is the spirit of brutality, greed and commercialism, and that back of all wars for redress of wrong is the spirit of independence, liberty, justice, democracy. The former organized labor condemns under all circumstances; for the latter, organized labor has not a word of condemnation. Patriotism—a love for and devotion to, one's country, a preference for its people and customs, a just pride in its excellences—is undoubtedly a good thing. It is only a family pride on a large scale. Like all virtues, if carried to excess, it becomes a vice. While organized labor believes in adequate preparedness, it does not favor—indeed it is emphatically opposed to—any plan which will ultimately establish a Germanic militarism in this country.

The European war has revealed a new danger inherent in modern militarism. This war has demonstrated that warfare is becoming more a matter of mechanics and labor; engineers, chemists, mechanics, trench-diggers and laborers are fighting the war of Europe. Military tactics include industrial organization, and every plan for the development of political power includes a plan of industrial organization. Every military plan looks to some form of coercion—not only military conscription, but industrial conscription. The ideal of military leaders is a great organization of workers under the control of the army, disciplined, taught to respond and obey. These men would be ready for war if war were desired. In time of peace, they would be occupied on great industrial projects, under the direct control of the army. If that is so, then the militarism of the future means not only an enormously increasing expenditure on armies and navies; it means also the value of men and women will be reckoned according to their capacity as money-makers and as breeding machines. This prospect is not an encouraging one for the workers, or for those striving against commercialism and materialism and for the higher ideals of human progress.

The workers recognize that rights carry with them obligations and duties. It is the duty of those who live under free

institutions to maintain them unimpaired. A duty dependent upon the maintenance of right, in some respects a correlative duty, is that of serving the state or nation as a soldier.

That some citizens are able and willing to serve in the capacity of soldiers is an axiom of government. How far any one can against his will be forced into military service is a question which closely touches every man's liberty of action. While there may have been for centuries a vague acquiescence in more or less compulsion in military service, compulsory military service is now neither legal, constitutional, nor justified. The finding of men for military service has rightfully become and should remain nothing more than an ordinary contract of service, which one may accept or refuse at discretion. Organized labor favors voluntary military service maintained by means of enlistment and is unalterably opposed to a revival of a compulsory system. That many nations, especially ancient and medieval, have in desperate time of fortune resorted to compulsory military service should scarcely be deemed a lawful or meritorious origin for an American rule of law. All the wisdom invoked from precedents of law and practise of nations ancient and modern can never extenuate the essential injustice and tyranny of seizing one class of men and making them slaves to all the rest. The assumption that compulsory military service is the only efficient method permitting the nation's defense is on cursory reflection baseless, though it is the kind of a plea to which absolute power has resorted in all ages. It is difficult to conceive that a nation, such as ours, which has fought so many successful battles for liberty, should even now consider the approval and enactment of a law which would establish compulsory service. Impressment was the ostensible cause of war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812, when it was said all the governments of Europe maintained such a right. To-day the best minds in England and France are calling the present European conflict a war upon militarism and are advocating a reduction of arms at its close. Is it possible that we Americans now seek to fall into their old error?

While armies and military preparedness are essential for

the nation's defense, the danger to American workmen is not so much a danger of invasion by a foreign government. The real danger to the workers comes from the hordes of helpless, underfed, illiterate foreign immigrants, brought into this country every year by the great manufacturing interests which want cheap and ignorant labor. Whenever American workers are drawn into the army and navy, and the industrial activities for its support are necessarily increased, a demand for more labor would serve only as an excuse for bringing in more low-paid and unintelligent workers, who would undermine the standard of living and make the real problem of the American workers more acute. Thus the question of immigration has a very close relation to this subject. It involves not only the question of an intelligent and enlightened citizenship, the development of a proper national spirit, but includes the vital problem of the American worker in his economic relations—his hope and ideal for a better life and condition of work. It is therefore essential that adequate defense be also provided to the American workers, during time of peace, against the constant invasion of foreign workmen.

To make an efficient army in modern times harmonize with all the demands of civil liberty, is doubtless one of the problems of our race and age and one most difficult to solve—forming, perhaps, with the problem of carrying out a high degree of individual liberty in large and densely peopled cities, the two most difficult problems of high patriotism and substantial statesmanship. Our people have never advocated the abolishing of the military arm of the government. The labor movement demands that the military forces of a government be so organized as to prevent their misuse and abuse as a medium of tyranny against the workers and their civil liberty.

Representing directly millions of organized wage-earners and indirectly millions of unorganized workers, the labor movement of America demands that certain fundamental principles should be observed, and that all policies and plans for defense should be determined by representatives of all the people. It is the working people who are most vitally affected

by military service in time of peace or war. The burden of fighting falls upon them. They have been the chief sufferers from war and militarism whenever that malicious system has fastened itself upon a nation. They are most concerned in safeguarding their civil liberty and in avoiding the evils of militarism disclosed by the experience of other countries. The labor movement asserts its right to representation in all committees, commissions or bodies making decision upon military action and defense. It demands democracy in all military organizations and institutions of the country. Absolute democracy in voluntary service for national defense will bind all together in an unselfish service and broaden and deepen that national spirit which constitutes the common life of our nation. It insists that military institutions must be democratically organized, democratically officered, and always under the control of men directly responsible to the citizens of the land. It holds that absolute democracy in voluntary service for national defense will have a vital and wholesome effect upon all other relations of life.

A general military organization of the people or "national guards" has been deemed by labor to be preferable to large standing armies. The following declaration made years ago clearly expressed the attitude of the American Federation of Labor on the subject.

A man who is a wage-earner and honorably working at his trade or calling to support himself and those dependent upon him, has not only the right to become a citizen soldier, but that right must be unquestioned.

The militia, i. e., the citizen-soldiery of the several states in our country, supplies what otherwise might take its place—a large standing army.

The difference between the citizen-soldiery of the United States and the large standing armies of many European countries is the difference between a republic and a monarchy—it is the difference between the conception of liberty and of tyranny.

While organized labor stands against the arbitrament of international or internal disputes by force of arms, yet we must realize we may not yet reach the millenium ; that in the age in which we live,

we have not the choice between armed force and absolute disarmament, but the alternative of a large standing army and small one supplemented by a volunteer citizen-soldiery—the militia of our several states.

The convention of the American Federation of Labor held in San Francisco in 1915 re-affirmed this declaration by refusing to adopt resolutions which called upon all workers to refrain from affiliating with any branch of the military forces.

While the American labor movement has thus for years approved the militia of our several states, the use and abuse of armed forces of the state in recent industrial disputes has been the cause for great apprehension among a large and growing number of workers. Too often has the control and action of the militia been frankly, bitterly and brutally partisan in industrial disturbances. At times the militia has been recruited from private guards and other employees of corporations involved in conflict with their employees and for no other purpose than to break their will and determination, in their struggles for an improved condition of life and work. In many parts of the country, our courts have permitted the militia, under color of so-called "martial law", to usurp their functions and defy the associations of the workers who resisted encroachment upon their rights. In many cases where the militia have been used but no labor disturbances were involved, the judiciary, almost without exception, has protested against the exercise of any arbitrary power and has almost uniformly attempted to limit that power. However, when labor disturbances were involved, the judiciary has uniformly upheld the power exercised by the militia, and in no case has there ever been a protest against the use of such power or any attempt to curtail it, except in Montana, where the conviction of a civilian by military commission was annulled.

Time and again, martial law has been declared in order to use the military arm of the state against the honest and laudable endeavor of the workers to maintain their rights and lib-

erties as citizens. Again and again has the writ of *habeas corpus* been denied in face of a direct prohibition by the constitution of the state and in spite of the fact that the courts were open and unobstructed, and without reference to the protest of the men whose freedom and liberties were involved.

In New York last summer, there was held a constitutional convention, and the committee on the Bill of Rights reported to that convention a recommendation providing in substance that no military tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction over a civilian while the regularly constituted state courts were open to administer justice. That the work of this convention failed of adoption by the people of the state of New York is beside the question. The fact remains that the State Militia or National Guard of New York immediately initiated a fight against this report and the Major-General wrote a letter to the chairman of the committee, in which he said:

The proposed amendment would seriously trespass upon the jurisdiction, established by necessity and custom, of two classes of military courts, namely, military commissions, and court-martial.

Can we wonder then, in the light of these pernicious practices by the militia, that there is quite a proportionate and growing number of men who are inclined to give no aid and comfort whatever to military organizations which foster and entertain and practise such infamous and treasonable doctrines? The drafting of rules for the conduct of the militia should not be left entirely to military authorities. Indeed, the subject of policing industry is not one for the army or the militia, and the armed forces of government should not be permitted to take part in the adjusting of industrial relations. As soon as the public is assured that enlistment in the army, or in the militia, is in defense of the country, and that the guardsman is not engaged as a deputy sheriff for the defense of employers in conflict with their employees; as soon as every worker is fully protected in his life, liberty, justice and pursuit of happiness, existing military organizations will be sufficiently enhanced as to make them attractive to the youth of

this nation, without compulsion of any kind, whether that compulsion be political or economic.

It is well to mention that organized labor views with strong disapproval the attempt at economic compulsion manifesting itself to-day in a number of places to increase enlistment in the army and the militia. Appeals directed by the officers of the militia to employers to "urge" their employees to "join" the militia, or to participate in military demonstrations smatter too much of the compulsory methods used years ago by employers in urging the workers to participate in political demonstrations and to vote for certain political parties. Organized labor resents such interference with their condition of employment and strongly condemns such compulsory practises.

Ancient laws seem to have contemplated a necessity and a duty in each citizen to be ready on any emergency to assist in war. Under these laws every man was bound to have certain armor in his house and a regular inquisition was made at stated periods. At the same time no man was held bound to go out of his shire unless a strong enemy suddenly came. Fathers and governors of children were bound to bring up those of tender age in the knowledge of shooting. Every town and city was required to have a butt for target practise. In all countries where personal freedom was valued, however much each individual was forced to rely on legal redress, the right of each to carry arms for his own protection in case of extremity was considered a right of nature, indelible and irrepresible. That the right to bear arms shall not be abridged is a fundamental principle of our government. However, this right has been abridged. The workers have been disarmed and their arms have been placed in the hands of private detectives and other irresponsible men in the employ of interests hostile to the hopes and aspirations of the workers and for the sole purpose of forcing them into submission. We find now, as then, the more this right is sought to be repressed the more it will occur. If there is any danger in this right being clung to as a vital condition of personal security and self-defense there are modes of taking proper precaution from

dangerous indulgence. A reversion to and an encouragement of this older practise would seem to be in furtherance of personal security and tend to quicken the impulse to national defense, whenever a common enemy presents itself.

After all is said and done, the human element—strong, healthy, intelligent, and liberty-loving men and women—is the most essential element and vital factor in the science and art of government during peace or war, just as strong, healthy, intelligent and liberty-loving men and women are the dominating factors in the sciences underlying all other relations of mankind, whether as individuals or as group. There must be a citizenship physically fit, ready and able to serve in the nation's defense. Physical training with knowledge and the ability to bear and use arms will not only result in preparing the people of the United States for a time of emergency, but will also have a wholesome effect upon the health and strength of the people during time of peace. Physical training fits the citizen for industry, for service in the work of nations, as well as for service in the defense of the nation. Training of this kind should be given through voluntary institutions, democratically organized and democratically controlled.

Our existing industrial and commercial life does not at present permit a full mental and physical development of manhood and womanhood. The majority of our citizens no longer live in the open. A restricted and confined life in the office, shop, factory or mine has had a most disastrous effect upon the physical development of the workers of this nation. No nation can possess endurance whose citizens bear the inevitable consequences of sweat-shop labor, long working hours, low wages, and insanitary conditions. The workers constitute the great rank and file of the citizenship of a nation. If they are underfed, partly clothed, physically stunted, they are a menace to the nation in time of peace and in time of war. That nation whose industries exploit human workers during time of peace will find its existence threatened during time of war, because of inability to produce supplies, and because of dearth of fit soldiers. Policies and institutions which conserve human life and which afford opportuni-

ties for the development of every citizen are the greatest safeguard of a nation.

Individual initiative and resourcefulness are of incalculable value to a nation. In war time every nation expects loyal support of its wage-earners. Organized co-operation on the battle-field and in the making of munitions is essential to a proper safeguarding of our national interests. Organized co-operation is likewise necessary during time of peace. A nation which fails to stimulate and to develop qualities which work for voluntary associated effort among the workers for the common welfare assumes a responsibility for national peril. It foregoes its right to a full and free patriotic sacrifice from its citizens. The workers—the citizens—must be protected in their condition of life and work and such protection must come from their own educated initiative. The nation should consist of men and women conscious of their own dignity, aware of their own powers, and intelligently prompted in following a course of action best intended to promote their interests. The wage-earners are entitled to take part in determining those matters which so vitally concern them and the nation.

Opportunities for physical training are not freely and readily available to all. Some definite national policy should be devised for physical training and physical preparedness of all citizens. Physical training for the youth is properly a part of educational work and could readily be given through our public school system and other auxiliary agencies. Training of this kind, however, should be of broad and humane ideals and general usefulness and not be narrowly specialized or dominated by the purpose of militarism. The school should do all possible to develop keen, ready minds and healthy bodies. The co-operative instinct which would result in willing obedience for the best interest of all proceeding from knowledge which is best, is the ideal which should inspire the training. The body of every child should be so trained in our schools as to develop him into full manhood. The mind of every child should be so trained as to know best how to protect and advance its individual and collective interest, to

determine right from wrong and should be instilled with a spirit to resent wrong and fight for every right.

To make sacrifices for America, we must be sure that our state in the country justifies it. To attain the requisite national spirit, it is necessary above all things to create a confidence in the equality and impartiality and fitness of the laws and their administration. This cannot be done, with reasonable men, unless they have some voice in settling those laws and moulding them to the necessities of the time. Much of the history of nations consists of a series of mistakes, made by legislators of all ages, as to things they have tried to compel people to do. The last hundred years seems to have been occupied in the discovery of the mistakes made and the successive efforts to retreat from false positions. Modern legislators now acquiesce in the conclusion that most of the old tasks were impossible which sought to compel absolute uniformity of thought and action and of social life. Most of the governments of the world, after centuries of experience, have learned that laws are made for the benefit of those governed as well as for those governing—and obviously rather more for the benefit of the governed. When laws are the fruit of choice and deliberation and a joint labor of the governed and those governing, and approach most nearly to self-made laws on both sides, this partnership of feeling and of self-interest engages all the prejudices of human nature in its service and thereby draws after it not only a willing obedience but a ready and immediate response to their protection, whenever threatened, no matter by whom. A government in which compulsion is least employed, is that which is most conformable to its true nature and most completely fulfils its duties to all of its citizens.

In concluding, it is fitting that I quote Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in his interpretation of organized labor's attitude as expressed in an address at the 16th Annual Meeting of the National Civic Federation, on January 18th of this year:

There are no citizens of our country who are more truly patriotic  
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than the organized wage-earners—or all the wage-earners—and we have done our share in the civic life of the nation as well as in the nation's wars. We have done our share to protect the nation against insidious attacks from within, that were directed at the very heart of our national life and would have inevitably involved us in foreign complications. The wage-earners stood unfalteringly for ideals of honor, freedom and loyalty. Their wisdom and their patriotism served our country in a time of great need. No one can question that the wage-earners of the United States are patriotic in the truest sense, no one can question their willingness to fight for the cause of liberty, freedom and justice. No one can question the value of the ideals that direct the labor movement.

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## UNIVERSAL TRAINING AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE CREEL

ULTRA-MILITARISTS and ultra-pacifists, blind to everything but their prejudices and preconceptions, are alike guilty of blasphemy against facts. A world war does not carry the conclusion that the United States will be attacked either today or tomorrow, but it does declare the truth that civilization has not yet reached that stage of spiritual development where peace may be trusted to moral suasion. War is not something that *will* come, but something that *may* come; and insistence that plans for national defense shall be based upon the imminence of war is no greater folly than insistence that national defense shall be disregarded wholly.

What the majority of Americans are seeking today is some sound program of preparedness which will treat war as a contingency, not as a dread certainty, permitting full adherence to the democratic ideal without surrender of prudence. The one answer is the adoption of a system of universal training that will give finer expression to the aspirations of democracy even while providing for its defensive needs.

The volunteer system has been attended at every step by waste and failure, draining the national treasury of two billion dollars in ten years and contributing to farce and tragedy in equal degree. It is history that fifty per cent of all volunteers are rejected because of their unfitness, while of those accepted, fully one-half die, before the firing line is reached, by reason of their utter lack of stamina. Even today, when only the supposedly fit are offering themselves for enlistment, just one out of every six applicants for the army and the navy it is found possible to accept. In the Civil War and in

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at meeting of Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1919.

the war with Spain, thousands died from their inability to stand physical strain, and other thousands blundered on to death through their own ignorance or the incapacity of untrained leaders. The greed that expresses itself in embalmed beef and paper-soled shoes is an inevitable consequence of the confusion that attends eleventh-hour preparedness.

It is the lesson of the past that every country, in every great war, has had to resort to conscription because of the cowardice or indifference that hides at home while bravery and patriotism make their sacrifices of blood upon the battle-field. The question for the United States to decide is whether this step shall be taken in the day of pressing need, when precious time must be lost in winnowing and drilling, or when years of peace permit a slow, scientific process that may be made to conserve democratic ideals and strengthen civic virtues.

No greater proof of prejudice's power to becloud could be had than the manner in which the pacifists have overlooked the utter unfairness and utter undemocracy of the volunteer system. It rests, in effect, upon the proposition that the national defense is not a duty that is owed, but a favor to be conferred; that it is right and just for the nation to ask of one citizen what it does not ask of another; and that the brave and patriotic must bear double burden by reason of the evasions of the craven and the traitor.

On the other hand, universal training declares equitably that the protection of the republic constitutes a natural and inescapable obligation of citizenship, making equal call upon the high and the low, the rich and the poor, disregarding class and taking no account of circumstance. Instead of meaning militarism, it is the one sure escape from militarism, for it will eventually do away with all need for a standing army and destroy utterly the propaganda of the militarists. It is inconceivable that men and women who profess to believe in democracy should be fighting this sane, orderly plan, even while upholding the volunteer system, which reeks with graft, inequality and discrimination.

The outcry against "compulsion" affords another instance of muddy thinking. At every point in our national life, com-

pulsion is seen as an active, driving force. We compel our children to go to school; we compel observance of health, sanitary and fire laws; we compel observance of the rights of property and the sacredness of life; in a word, if compulsion were taken away, chaos would ensue. There is this difference, however, between the compulsions of a monarchy and the compulsions of a democracy. The one proceeds from the whim of kings, the other from the voice of a people. To apply this established principle to the national defense is no more than a further expression of the majority agreement that decides upon the action best fitted to advance and protect the nation, the state, the city and the individual.

The evils alleged against the adoption of a system of universal training are prophesied, not proved. The benefits are many and obvious. Switzerland, and our own state of Wyoming, testify alike to a finer, firmer physical base, an improved national health, a nobler conception of patriotism, a keener understanding of civic obligations and the meaning of fraternity, and a far saner, more wholesome outlook on life in every possible way.

In such systems as the Australian and the Swiss, where is there hint of militarism or menace to democratic institutions? Youthful training that is part and parcel of the educational process, and dominated by educational ideals! A brief yearly service that does not dislocate industry, but strengthens it!

The Americanization of these systems, as exemplified by the Welsh-Slater measures in the state of New York, contemplates even shorter instruction periods than either Switzerland or Australia. Commencing at the age of eight, boys and girls alike in the elementary and secondary schools are to be given physical training along lines laid down by a commission made up of a representative of the school authorities, a representative of the militia, and a representative of the people.

Boys from sixteen to nineteen will receive military instruction for periods aggregating not more than three hours each week during the school year, and in summer field camps requiring an attendance of two weeks. This comes close to the

Wyoming method, where, for four years, the training of youth has been carried on with results that justify every hope and refute every prophecy of gloom and prejudice.

The people of Wyoming cannot truthfully be called "militarists". Its voters, as a matter of fact, are much the same sort as those of Nebraska, where Mr. Ford ran so remarkably in a presidential primary. When the training idea was first broached, every bitter word was said against it that is now being said in New York, yet today pacifists, parents, teachers, labor unions and educators unite in praising the plan as fine, democratic and absolutely desirable. Wyoming found that it was not necessary to make soldiers in order to manufacture fit defenders, and discovered also that the same methods that produced a minute-man also produced a better individual and a more intelligent, interested citizen.

America is not a fit nation by any means. Of the thirty million wage-earners in the United States, each loses an average of nine days a year through sickness, a wage loss of \$500,000,000, not to take account of the millions spent in medical attendance and lost in the curtailment of productivity. Six hundred thousand people die annually from preventable disease, among them being 150,000 infants sent to death by ignorance and neglect.

It is not alone that universal training will necessarily instruct in sanitation and personal hygiene, but the emphasis on physical development is bound to hurry the social legislation that will do away with slums, low wages, over-work and the other evils that flow from economic maladjustment. A more vigorous mind goes with a more vigorous body. Australia reports that her system of universal training has greatly reduced juvenile delinquency, and in Switzerland the murder rate is twelve per million, as against one hundred and twenty-four per million in the United States. The cadet system in Wyoming is responsible for an amazing development in juvenile self-control and restraint.

Another tremendous benefit lies in the complete elimination of class distinctions and class lines. Snobbery finds it impossible to live in the democratic atmosphere of a cadet corps,

for just as every squad has its weak and strong, so is it made up of the rich and the poor, the Fauntleroy and the Smikes. The fraternal instinct flowers inevitably, and every youngster grows up in the understanding that no group, whether it be a cadet company, a city, a state or a nation, is stronger than its weakest member.

As I conceive universal training, it is not only an adequate preparation for the defense of the nation against armed invasion or unbearable aggression, but an even finer preparation for the daily demands of citizenship. As it is today, democracy is the emptiest, stalest word in the English language. We teach our youth to talk it in a vague way, but not how to work at it in a definite way. Radicalism has so fallen into the ruts of an habitual antagonism that it has lost all power of positiveness. The so-called champions of the democratic ideal are so busy being *against* things that they have no time to be *for* things.

Great economies will be effected through universal training, for with every fit citizen ready to answer the call to arms, there will not be even a shadow of a need for the forty-eight army posts that are now maintained by congressmen more concerned with the golden drip from the national honey-barrel than with common sense and common honesty. To fit its citizen army of 500,000 for mobilization within forty-eight hours, Switzerland spends about \$8,000,000 a year, while the people of the United States spend over \$100,000,000 for an army of less than one hundred thousand.

Educational authorities and social workers, as a matter of course, will have a voice in the establishment of the training courses, and it is inconceivable that they will not insist that all emphasis be placed on national defense and none at all on national aggression. War and valor and militancy—great and shining words that have been led away into a slavery of false meanings—will be restored to truth by proper teaching, so that we may see them express man's hatred of evil and not man's stupid hatred of man.

It is not militarism that universal training involves, but pacificism with foundations under it. Preparation for the

national defense, when confided to the people as a whole, will rob the military clique of all power and eventually destroy it entirely. The very confidence engendered would have a vital and helpful effect upon the nation itself and the national character. Brag and bluster and hysteria, when analyzed, are seen to be the natural consequences of unpreparedness or semi-preparedness. The country that does not know whether it can fight or not is always a country that lends itself to extremes of bravado and alarm; and did the United States know itself to be ready for any emergency, it would be difficult indeed for a yellow press and still yellower politicians to work up emotional debauches by preaching a religion of valor based upon blood lust.

As things stand, we have spent \$250,000,000 a year for the last ten years on our national defense, receiving small return on the investment except in greed, graft, intrigue and the growth of a financial-militaristic-political combine that poisons the wells of democracy. In order to resist an extension of the present policy—and their resistance is already seen to be futile—the ultra-pacifists are put in the position of standing for the things that are. They champion existing evils because they fear larger evils; they are willing to perpetuate stupidity and undemocracy because they have no faith in the ability of the people to control change; they cannot see that there is anything else in the world but frying pans and fires. In the last analysis, those who fight universal training because they have neither courage nor faith, are as much the foes of democracy as those wretched persons who talk in terms of blood and iron.

## DEMOCRATIC ASPECTS OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE <sup>1</sup>

MUNROE SMITH

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**A**S I have read the discussions of "preparedness" in the newspapers during the past year, and as I have heard the speeches this afternoon, I get the impression that words like "monarchic" and "democratic" are being used to express emotion rather than ideas. They are used as terms of censure or of praise, with little consideration of their real meaning or of the historical or the logical connection between modes of military service and forms of political organization.

In the whole course of European history there has been, broadly speaking, a fairly close connection between the rendering of military service and the exercise of political power. In the ancient Mediterranean cities, for instance, and in the Teutonic tribes, every free man who was a member of the army was a member of the assembly; and even in those cities or tribes that were called monarchic because they had kings, it appears that nothing of particular importance could be done without the consent of the whole body of free men. It was apparently necessary even for a king to satisfy himself that he would have the free fighting men behind him before he took any serious political step. In these more or less democratic organizations every able-bodied free man was trained for war and was held to military service.

After Rome became a military monarchy with a mercenary army, and after the Germans who had conquered the West-Roman Empire developed states that were nominally monarchic but really aristocratic, with feudal armies, politi-

<sup>1</sup> Discussion at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

cal organizations that were more or less democratic first reappeared when the cities of medieval Europe began to fight themselves free from the control of their feudal lords and to develop their own municipal governments. The fighting force of these cities consisted normally of the citizens, all of whom owed military service.

In the great modern European states, universal military service, which reappeared in revolutionary France, has been generally adopted because of its demonstrated economy and efficiency. The establishment of universal military service in European monarchies has not been followed by an increase of royal power; the tendency has been toward more democratic government. In all these states, not excepting Russia, the people have today some voice in determining the laws and policies of the country; and it looks as if, broadly speaking, the imposition of the duty of military service upon every able-bodied male citizen had forced the monarchic and aristocratic elements to concede to the people some measure of political rights. They had to admit that the men who are to fight for a country ought to have something to say about its government.

It would, of course, be absurd to say that universal military service necessarily makes a country democratic. It will not have this result if the people are monarchically minded. But if the people of a country are democratically minded, universal military service seems to make for constitutional government in monarchies, and for the maintenance of popular government in republics.

Historically, the system of hiring men to fight seems closely associated with monarchic absolutism. It destroyed popular government in the ancient Roman world, and in those medieval cities that adopted it. It destroyed feudal aristocracy, except where, as in England, the power of the king to maintain a standing army of mercenaries was jealously limited. Here the government remained essentially aristocratic until the nineteenth century. There is no reason to assume that such an army will necessarily destroy republican or democratic government, if it be limited in strength, if its supreme

control be placed in the hands of civilians, and if the country be democratically minded.

Historically, the system by which only those fight who have a mind to fight—the volunteer system—seems on the whole to make for aristocracy. One of the chief roots of the feudal system was the retinue, the *comitatus*; and this was composed originally of volunteers. The men who entered the retinue of a king or prince differed indeed from our modern short-term volunteers, in that they normally volunteered for life, or at least for that part of their life in which they could render efficient service. Modern volunteer service, however, is not wholly devoid of aristocratic features. In the German army the so-called “one-year volunteers” may be said to represent the natural aristocracy of the country; they are men of at least moderate means and of more more than average education. From these volunteers is drawn the greater part of Germany’s reserve officers. It is a corresponding class that is being drawn in our country into summer training camps.

That volunteer service creates a sense of superior merit is quite intelligible. This may easily beget claims. Those who voluntarily bear the burdens of the state are not unnaturally inclined to assert greater rights than they are willing to accord to the shirkers. In our country this sense of superior merit has shown itself, socially, in organizations of veterans of our various wars; and the distinctly aristocratic idea that those who have served the state in arms transmit credit to their descendants has appeared in the formation and perpetuation of various “orders”, from that of the Cincinnati to the junior membership of the Loyal Legion. A claim to political reward for military service has exhibited itself in the assertion of the prior right of veteran soldiers to civil appointments. To lay too much stress on these manifestations would be absurd; but they are not without significance. There has been throughout human history a very close relation between the discharge of political duties and the exercise of political powers. In the United States this exhibits itself most strikingly in what we call “machine” politics; and the analogies between our actual political system and the feudal system have

been frequently noted. The neglect of political duties by the majority of citizens and the discharge of those duties by volunteers has created a political oligarchy.

If we pass from history to theory, it is difficult to see why universal military service is not essentially the democratic system. This can hardly be questioned by any one who admits that democracy means equality of duties as well as equality of rights. Those, indeed, who identify democracy with liberty alone, and not with liberty and equality—those to whom democracy means the minimum of governmental constraint—may consistently assert that a volunteer army is essentially democratic. This idea of democracy, however, is a false one; and a democracy organized in accordance with this idea can not endure. Rights can be held permanently only by those who discharge corresponding duties; and the natural tendency of *laissez faire*, in the political as in the economic system, is toward oligarchy.

The most serious objections, however, to relying upon volunteer armies are not political. Of the technical military objections I need not speak; they have been amply indicated. It is the social objection which I desire to stress. It is one of the greatest evils of war that it spares those who are physically defective and confines its ravages to those who are physically sound. It is the greatest evil of the volunteer system that it slays or maims those who are most energetic and enterprising, who have the highest courage and the warmest devotion to their country, while it spares the inert, the timid and the selfish. If modern war makes in any case for the survival of the physically unfit, modern war waged by volunteer armies makes for the survival of the socially unfit.

Returning to political theory, the standing army of hired soldiers seems essentially undemocratic. If such an army is paid by the people, and if it owes obedience, not to a ruler personally, but to an executive chosen by the people, it may not produce Cæsarism; but in a constitutional monarchy or in a republic, a mercenary army savors of plutocracy, in that it throws the burden of national defense, at least so far as the rank and file of the fighting force is concerned, upon the

needier part of the community, the Have-nots. Within limits, such an army may be as necessary in the greater modern states as are bodies of municipal police in modern cities. Even in those states which carry universal military training to the highest point of efficiency, special forces must be enlisted for colonial service; and in those states which do not enforce universal military training, or do not carry it far, a standing enlisted army is needed to meet the first shock of invasion. But to entrust the defense of a country entirely to such an army is not only economically impracticable and politically dangerous, because of the dimensions which such an army must assume, but it is undemocratic, because it violates the principle of equal duty. To supplement the regular professional army by conscription and to permit those who are drafted to buy substitutes, as we did in the War of the Rebellion, is even more objectionable. Such a system is in the highest degree plutocratic.

By a process of exclusion, it seems to me, we come to the result that the defense of the country must, on democratic principles, be secured through universal military service; and if universal military service is to be enforced, we must have universal—that is to say, compulsory—military training. How much training shall be required is, of course, a technical military question; and its answer depends on the peculiar situation and needs of each country.

## CITIZENSHIP OBLIGATION: NATIONAL TRAINING FOR DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

LEONARD WOOD

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**I**T is a great deal better to get ready for war and not have war, than it is to have war and not be ready for it. This is the proposition that stands out before the American people today. Business men know a great deal better than I do that it is impossible to do certain things without time for preparation. While willingness and money are great forces for accomplishment, they are not of themselves sufficient without the element of time. Preparation for war requires a great deal of time and a tremendous amount of organization.

The proposition which is put up to us as soldiers is on a line with one which would be put up to you if you were asked to go out into the street and fill up your business houses, your factories, or whatever business you are engaged in, with men who had no instruction whatever. You would hesitate at the proposition; it would mean ruin and disaster, but it means nothing more in your business than it means with the military affairs of the nation. We cannot take a million or two of men, despite the splendid promise of a former great statesman, and make them soldiers between daylight and dark; to attempt that sort of thing is simply murder. It would mean the destruction of tens of thousands of men and certainly ruin to the nation that depended upon that kind of preparation. We must take up this whole question from the foundation. It is a question of organization, organization thorough, far-reaching and complete. Of course we must do immediately the things we can do: The increase of the regular army, the absolute and complete federalization of the militia, its conversion into a federal force, into a United States force, and its complete severance from the state as a state force or its use for state purposes, except perhaps under certain conditions of sudden and grave emergency such as would render the use of

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

the United States troops proper and necessary and the immediate provision of reserves of men and material. Those things must be done and done quickly; but there is a much deeper foundation which must be laid—you must build up in this country a general sense of citizenship obligation toward the nation. You cannot maintain a free democracy or representative government on any basis in which a mercenary military establishment plays the vital part in national defense. You must have a paid army for the everyday needs of the nation; but you must adopt some system which rests upon the basic principle on which this and every other democracy stands, has stood and always will stand if it is to resist any severe strain or go through any great crisis; and that is the basic principle that manhood suffrage means manhood obligation for service. It may not be service in the line with a rifle in hand; it may be service as a minister of finance; it may be service as a surgeon back of the line; it may be as an aviator, or a pilot of transports, or a maker of munitions—it may be one of a thousand different things; but somewhere everyone has a place, if of the right age and physically fit, and he must know where that place is and the government must know what his qualifications are. All these little makeshifts of a few regiments here and a few guns there amount to almost nothing except as a stopgap. They are all right for the demands of peace but they mean very little as preparation for the strain of a great war.

You will remember during the Civil War, when the population was only one-third of what it is at present, we had over four million men in the armies, in the North and South, and we had 127,000 officers in the northern army and about 65,000 in the southern army, nearly 200,000; in other words trained officers. A very large proportion of officers must be trained in times of peace, and that is why we are asking for a corps of 50,000 reserve officers. It sounds like a lot, but it is very little when you think of the call to be made upon them.

We need a million and a half of citizen soldiers, that is, men trained to come in behind the regular army and militia

in case of trouble. Fifty thousand officers will be needed to officer them. This is one of the reasons why we are asking for a reserve corps of 50,000 officers. We must prepare them in time of peace.

I think Congress is going to give us this number. My personal opinion is we must eventually adopt some system not unlike the Swiss and the Australian, under which all of our youth, all our men, will receive a basic military training which will make it possible for them to become, quickly, reasonably efficient soldiers. This republic can never maintain a standing army big enough to insure its security in time of real war. We never yet have had a war with a first-class power prepared for war which we have waged unaided. It is an experience entirely ahead of us.

War to-day is based upon organization, an organization not only of the material resources of the nation, of its industries, finances, etc., etc., but above everything else upon a moral organization of the people. By this I mean the building up of an appreciation on the part of each and every one of their obligation toward the state in time of need. This is the real foundation upon which everything rests and without which the other organization cannot be accomplished.

There is another aspect of this moral organization quite apart from the military side, and that is the value on the citizenship side. We are taking in enormous numbers of alien people. They come in racial groups, they live in racial groups and they go to racial schools and are fed by a dialect press. We native-born citizens have too little contact with them and do little to make them good citizens. I think some system of universal training would have a great influence in this direction. If we put ourselves shoulder to shoulder with these newcomers working in a common cause, and that cause is preparation to defend the country, it will go a long way towards building up national solidarity and making real citizens of all concerned.

The men who have been at Plattsburg represent all classes from great wealth to the laboring class, and yet no man who has been there will ever look upon any other man there as be-

longing to a class apart—they have all worn the same uniform and they are all branded with the same brand, and that brand is the brand of the American man who has been trying to do something to help his country, something to fit himself to discharge his obligation as a citizen of a democracy in case his services should be needed in war. The work these men did altogether shoulder to shoulder has had a tremendous influence not only for preparedness but for better citizenship.

If we desire to protect this country effectively we must promptly adopt some form of universal military training under which we can build up an adequate force of citizen soldiers to meet the demands of modern war. These men must be trained under conditions which interfere as little as possible with their educational and economic careers. We can do it and the result will be not only an adequate measure of preparation but it will give us a much better class of citizenship.

There are many things which give all of us who are at all thoughtful occasion for grave anxiety. Many of you gentlemen have been connected directly or indirectly with the great munitions contracts growing out of the present war and you know how desperate the struggle has been to turn out arms and munitions; you know how vitally defective our equipment has been in many instances. We have been able up to the present time to accomplish very little on many lines of effort. You all realize how few rifles have actually been built even after a year and a half of uninterrupted effort. In some instances we are just turning out the first samples. You appreciate the fact that our industrial organization is very imperfect. You realize that we could not make machines for the making of weapons because the amount of high-speed tool steel was lacking. You appreciate, some of you, that the shortage of high-speed tool steel was in a way dependent upon a shortage of certain kinds of tungsten, antimony and other things. Some of you appreciate the fact that we cannot make the best class of armor plate in large quantities because we have not the necessary tungsten to put into it. Many of you realize that chemistry today is one of the great factors in war and yet our chain of

chemical resources is broken every few links. Take nitrates, for instance, the very basis of our high explosives. We procure all our nitrate from Chile. We should be out of it in a very, very short period of time if we lost sea control. Here is a case in which we must take steps to provide nitrogen from another source. European countries have been doing it for a long time. We must take up the question of producing nitrogen from the air; in other words, we must develop our chemical resources.

War in these days is not a matter of getting a certain number of men together and putting arms in their hands and having a band march them out of town. War is opposing the organized might of a nation by the organized strength of your own, and you cannot do this in any happy-go-lucky way.

No amount of money, no amount of willingness, no number of men, unless there is organization, preparation and time for it, amount to much. One of my officers, speaking of the value of undeveloped military resources to some patriotic gentleman who was describing our resources in men, money and material, said that unorganized, undeveloped resources are of no more value in the onrush of a modern war than an undeveloped gold mine in Alaska in a Wall Street crisis. That is just about the situation. The fact that there are great numbers of men in this country means little in the way of defense unless these men are trained, equipped and organized. Some of you gentlemen are connected with great railroads employing possibly from 100,000 to 200,000 men in different capacities. What would you think of a proposition which involved your putting 200,000 untrained men, men picked up without reference to antecedent, training or present qualifications, in charge of one of these great roads? You would see ahead of you nothing but disaster. And yet you expect us in the military service to accept a million or more untrained, uninstructed, unequipped, unorganized men, and in the short period of time which conditions of organization on the part of all our possible enemies would give to us, to so prepare these men that they may meet equally intelligent men, men their equals in physique, men who have been trained, organ-

ized and equipped and who are led by thoroughly trained and well instructed officers. You know as business men that this proposition is impossible. We cannot accomplish the training and organization necessary to meet the conditions of modern war without time. Spread-eagle-ism and "hot air" are not a secure foundation for national defense. We need time just as you need it to build up a great business and to organize it. We must have time to train these men, to build up their physique, to develop leaders, to make the munitions and arms they will need and to teach the men to use these arms. War is of all games one in which team-work counts, and yet you expect us to put into the field a million or more men and have them ready in a few days. You must realize that this is absolutely impossible, knowing as you do how quickly modern war comes. You have seen something of its onset recently. It is a matter of days rather than weeks or months.

Our early Presidents were patriotic men of sound judgment. You will find that they urged in almost every message sound measures for preparedness. They told us in effect that the best insurance for peace is preparation for war. If their advice was good in those days when the ocean was a real barrier, when it took months to get troops across the sea, when no nation in Europe had a large, well-equipped army organized and prepared for oversea service, when the weapons of war were few and easy to learn to use, when our own forefathers knew something about the use of arms, when our territory was limited in area and we possessed no colonies, when our commerce was small, how much more important is preparation when steam has divided time and distance by ten, when every great power except China and ourselves, and I speak literally in this particular, is well organized and has the transport for oversea operations, when the weapons of war are intricate machines requiring a long time in their manufacture and a still longer time to become familiar with, when our people are absolutely unskilled in the use of arms, when our territory stretches from the Caribbean to the coast of China, when our wealth is enormous and our commerce aggressive

and spreading all over the world. It does not seem to me that any argument is needed to convince men of ordinary intelligence that under the new conditions preparation is more important than ever before. It seems almost an insult to have to tell intelligent men these things. They are self-evident to the most casual student of affairs. If any of you will sit down and consider carefully and thoughtfully the problem which would confront the United States in case of hostilities, the great problem of defense, and attempt to solve it, I think the need of action will be brought home to you very quickly. The dangers of the situation and the need of thorough organization and preparation are clearly evident to every one who has given this matter even the most superficial consideration.

Such weapons as the federal government has must be its weapons and not the weapons of any state nor under even a limited degree of state control. Those who know the militia and understand and appreciate the handicaps under which it labors realize that it has done all that could be expected under a fatally defective system, a system which makes a high degree of efficiency absolutely impossible. The officers and men are good. The regular army today put under administrative control of forty-eight different governors would soon cease to be a dependable force. The militia should be transferred absolutely to federal control. Attempts to continue control by the states and provide control by the federal government in time of emergency through dual oaths of enlistment will not, in my opinion, accomplish what we desire, which is a militia which is federal, whose control is vested absolutely in the federal government and whose instruction, discipline and personnel are federal and not state matters. In time of emergency we want men and not lawsuits. We want a weapon which is certain and dependable. In my opinion, not less than 90 per cent and perhaps more of the personnel of the militia want to establish such a condition as I have outlined above. They desire earnestly to be federal soldiers.

We must have a regular army adequate for the peace needs of the nation, which includes the garrisoning of our

oversea possessions, an adequate mobile force at home and adequate coast artillery for our seacoast defenses. We must also have an absolutely first-class navy ready at all times for immediate and effective action. It must have all the elements required by a great fleet.

To accomplish these ends requires time. Time is a great and determining element. The fact that we have unlimited resources in the way of men and money is an assurance only to those who do not understand that neither men nor money are of much value without time for organization and preparation. Our condition is understood thoroughly by all nations. Generally speaking, it is more thoroughly understood by the intelligent observers of foreign nations than it is by the people of this great republic. Foreign nations appreciate the value of time and they know how much of it we need in order to complete our organization. If you made up your mind to attack a man and realized that he is absolutely unready you are not apt to give him time to prepare to meet you successfully. If any nation makes up its mind to attack us it is not going to give us time to get ready.

We must take an intelligent and business-like view of the situation. The army and the navy do cost a good deal but they are relatively small items compared with many others which are not as necessary for our safety. We pay every year more for automobile tires than we do for the army, some sixty millions more. For the building and maintenance of our automobile industry as a whole we pay about seven and a half times as much as we do for the army and navy combined. What we spend for the army and navy is in the form of insurance, an insurance in case we are involved in war and at all times an insurance against it because it means preparation, and preparation is the strongest influence for peace. It is the strong, well-prepared nation that determines whether issues are to be settled by arbitration or war. Congress will do whatever the people of this country want it to do. It represents the views of its constituents. When the constituents are interested in adequate defense we shall have adequate defense on both land and sea. The whole proposition is squarely up to the people of this country.

We officers of the army and navy are looked upon sometimes as extremists and as professional fanatics, but we are not. We are your professional servants, employed as are your engineers, doctors and lawyers. Our business is to do what we can in the way of organizing and training the elements of defense and recommending what should be provided. We do not want to see your sons and your young men thrown into war willing but unprepared and unready. Such a procedure is simply murder, not only murder, but wanton murder, because it can only result from deliberate neglect and failure to heed conditions which exist today and to take heed from the lessons of all time. It is gross and brutal disregard of human life.

We as officers of the army and navy are simply citizens of the republic like yourselves. We have the same interests. We have our families, our small properties, our rights as citizens; and we are no more desirous of war than you are and we understand much better its horrors and dangers. When we urge preparation and give you the reasons for it we are simply giving you professional advice, advice based upon some experience and a great deal of study.

People tell you a nation cannot be prepared without becoming aggressive. Such a statement to our people is an insult. We can be ready and be conservative. We can be prepared and at the same time exercise self-restraint. We can be strong without being vicious. The plain lessons of the moment, written in language which even he who runs can read, is that we must be prepared and be prepared quickly. It is true that preparation is going to cost money. We must pay for it. We have done little in the way of preparation for many years. The responsibility for this condition does not rest upon any particular group of men. It is a condition which has been growing for years. But new world conditions and new responsibilities have arisen and we must meet them.

## THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH MILITARY SYSTEMS AND THEIR BEARINGS UPON AN ADEQUATE AMERICAN POLICY<sup>1</sup>

C. DE WITT WILLCOX

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THE modern army has certain features that completely differentiate it from the army of the past. Of these we need here to mention but one: its method of recruiting its forces. This method, taking its origin in the distress of Prussia after Jena, has been followed by all considerable nations but two, and has now become the head of the corner. It rests upon the principle that military service is an obligation due the country and that it is, or should be, universal. Keeping in view then the recent increase of interest in matters military in our own land, we may announce that if we would put our house in order, we must in some fashion or other follow the example set abroad, not because it is foreign, but because it is right.

It would be natural, perhaps, at first blush, to go to Germany for our model, for in this land the system of universal service first took form and has reached its highest development. But for some reasons this model would not serve our purpose. We need perhaps not only an example, a model, but also an inspiration. We must look for a people that has voluntarily accepted universal service, by its own expressed will, rather than for a people upon whom this condition has been thrust, upon whom rests an obligation in the attainment of ends with which it might conceivably not sympathize. These conditions limit us to France. And at the same time we must set over against France, the system, if it be a system, that has prevailed in Great Britain, not only for the sake of contrast involved, but also and more, because in Great Britain we can

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

see ourselves. For Great Britain and the United States form the exceptions already mentioned, of peoples who blind, or have blinded, themselves to the necessity of preparation for defense.

In France, military service is universal and obligatory. If we ponder the meaning of these words, we shall see that not only is the conception of military service democratic, falling alike on rich and poor, illustrious and obscure, high-born and lowly, but also that it is a lofty conception. For this service is regarded not as a compulsion, something forced upon the individual by an authority outside of his own being, but as an obligation, a duty. It is a condition imposed by the people itself upon itself, and for a distinct purpose. And that purpose is the only one that can form any justification whatsoever for the existence of a national army, namely, the defense of the country, the maintenance of its rights, and the protection of its honor. It is important to bear this in mind, for although France is, and has been for years, one of the great military states, yet under no circumstances can it be charged with militarism.

Bismarck is quoted as saying that he had made but two mistakes in the Franco-Prussian war: he had overrated the French army, and underrated the French people. Were he alive to-day, he could repeat neither the mistake nor the statement, for the French people is the army, and the army is the people, and this by its own decision. The French army is of the people, by the people and for the people, and is therefore held in affection by the people. Of its officers, one-third come from the ranks, the remainder from the military schools. As promotion is partly by selection, it naturally came about that the trained graduate of the Polytechnique or St. Cyr had some advantage over his less fortunate comrades. Accordingly, the principle of the "unity of origin" was some years ago announced, under which accepted candidates for Polytechnique or St. Cyr, before entering these schools, must serve one year in the ranks. Obviously this does not equalize advantages, but it at least gives every graduate a real knowledge of life in the ranks.

Democratic as are the foundations of military service, discipline has not suffered. There is no risk in saying that French officers respect their men, and conversely. Indeed the point of view is the same; they are both serving France, each in his own place. This community of views is but the outward and visible sign of a community of interest, growing out of the conviction prevailing during these past few years, that sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, all Frenchmen would be called upon to make a supreme effort to save their land. It is certain further that the existence of a great army has not given birth in France to ambition of military conquest or aggrandizement. No one can assert that the international policy of France has been conditioned by a consciousness of military strength. In no other country are peace and tranquillity so fervently cherished, the desire so strong to live on terms of amity with ones' neighbors. We may even declare that the French people have regretted the necessity of a great army, but that under the stress of necessity regrets have given away to action.

If we cross the channel, we come upon a wholly different state of affairs. Great Britain had at the outbreak of the war a regular army, that is, a professional army in which service was voluntary, not obligatory. Separated from the Continent by the "silver streak" and depending for defense upon her navy, universal service as an obligation due the state made no appeal to her appreciation of the necessities of the case. But after entering upon the Entente with France, it began to be felt that possibly some part would have to be taken in a future continental struggle, but that this part would not call for great numbers. Hence the resolution to prepare an expeditionary force for continental necessities; by keeping out of entangling alliances, and trusting to her mighty navy for imperial defense, her little regular army would be adequate to occasional little wars in various parts of the Empire and she need go no farther on the road of preparation. In some high quarters this view found no favor. For years it had been evident to some men of foresight, chief among them Lord Roberts, that the measures taken would prove insufficient, and that

universal service would have to be adopted. Pleas to this end, however, fell on deaf ears; there would be no great war, or if there were, England would not be involved, or if involved, the expeditionary force would meet all requirements.

Other things equal, we may find in England's military policy, in the principles of her military organization, substantially what we have in our own land in respect of these matters. Like us, she draws her officers from military schools, from civil life and, in very small numbers, from the ranks. Again, her army is a thing apart from the nation; the idea that military service is an obligation to the state, necessary in certain cases to the very existence of the state, had, before the war, not only never flourished, but had never taken root. Nothing would be gained now by pushing the comparison further home; what we have to consider is the possibility of applying to our own needs the experience of others.

Let us clear the ground by declaring that military service in our land, should it be found necessary, ought not to be called compulsory. This word sounds ill in our ears, and moreover is inaccurate. It is a far cry from the conception of military service as a subjective obligation honoring each man, to the objective reality of compulsion thrust upon us by external authority. One of these calls upon our higher being, the other is repugnant to our prejudices. Service that is a duty, national training, preparation for the national defense, whatever we may choose to call it, this appeals to us; the other term connotes conscription, and by so much would convert honorable duty into a mechanical act.

Obviously the example of England, under normal conditions, is valuable to us only in so far as it may help us in the future to cure our own radical defects. The case changes somewhat if we turn to France, for here we have a republic, a military republic if we choose, organized as such for defense, but uninspired by either military ambition or the desire of aggrandizement at any one else's expense. Under pressure similar to that of our sister republic, we should have to make a similar effort, and introduce universal military service. Nothing less would serve, because anything less would be

undemocratic, that is to say, unjust. But we are not yet quite ready to admit similar pressure, that is, we are tempted to turn aside when universal service is mentioned. Nevertheless we must recognize the necessity of some alteration for the better, in order not to be caught naked and helpless. We must at all costs avoid the calamity of having to raise, equip, arm, supply, drill, discipline, and officer our armies after war shall be upon us. If we could make up our minds today to introduce universal service the matter would in theory be simple. But this implies an education, a mental training that is almost lacking in our economy. Apparently then our first task should be to lead our people to see the necessity of it by themselves.

But even so, the practical difficulties next to be overcome would be enormous. For example, suppose 1,000,000 young men annually reached military age; how could we train them? We have not the officers or non-commissioned officers for the purpose. Evidently then one of our first needs would be the formation of a corps of officers. The lack of such a body has apparently been one of England's difficulties in the present war.

Arms and equipment and supplies, the organization behind these and other material elements are however just as much needed as officers; we must furnish them, and what is more, create in time of peace, a system by which they may be provided in increasing volume in time of war. One thing is plain, the modern army—that is, the conversion of the potential energy of an entire people to military purposes at a moment's notice—is not a matter of mere resolution. It is on the contrary the resultant of much effort spread over many years—the result of growth; in short, an evolution.

The example of France shows us that the maintenance of great forces for reasons understood by the people, and by it approved, is compatible with the highest ideals of personal and national liberty, nay, may be the sole condition under which these ideals shall persist. England's example at least suggests the distress that may overwhelm us if we neglect the conditions. It is for us to choose. Of one thing we may be certain: it takes two to keep the peace; liberty is ours only so long as we are willing and prepared to fight for it.

## A SCHOOLMASTER'S VIEW OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING <sup>1</sup>

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I AM very anxious, in this discussion, to mind my own business. My business is that of a schoolmaster. In so far, then, as the proposal of universal military training involves a change in the purposes and methods of the schools, I am concerned about it. I do not intend, if I can help it, to discuss the issue of "preparedness". You may think it advisable or inadvisable that this nation prepare for war. But in either case there is a fair question which confronts you—a question of equal interest to both sides—viz., "Is the proposal of universal compulsory military training a good one as a matter of educational policy?"

What sort of education our young people need depends of course upon the kind of young people they are. In the recent discussions of military training as well as in other discussions, I have heard some very uncomplimentary descriptions of the younger generation. Some of our older people speak as if by some strange caprice of chance or Providence, a plague had come down upon us. It is not this time a plague of locusts or of rats, but rather a plague of brats. Men seem to be asking, "Whence came they, these children who will not obey? What has destroyed the discipline of the world? Children nowadays do nothing as they are told to do; they do nothing properly, nothing with precision or orderliness; they are not at all like us, their parents and elders; how came they here to plague and terrify us?"

And it is from such complaints as this that, so far as I have been able to observe, the educational argument for compulsory military service is mainly derived. "Turn these disobedient

<sup>1</sup> Address at the evening meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

brats over to the drill-master," men are saying; "let him bring them into order and give them the virtues they so sorely need." But so far, at least, the argument does not seem to me convincing. It has too much the appearance of a "patent remedy" and too little the quality of the careful study of the disease. If one regards afflictions as "plagues", as inexplicable strokes of ill-fortune, one may treat them in this summary fashion. But surely the better way is to treat them as matters of cause and effect. If our children do not obey, why do they not? What has made them so unlike ourselves? It may be that if we can discover the cause of the disease we may likewise discern a remedy. It is practically certain that we shall not discover a remedy until we do know the cause.

Now the outstanding fact in the situation is that these children are "ours". They are our flesh and blood, our spirit. Our families have moulded and shaped them; the society which we are has developed and influenced them. They are what they are chiefly because of us. As against the conditions which created us, the conditions which create them differ in only one essential respect. The climate differs little; the soil is much the same; the only really important difference is that we had wiser and better parents than they. It would seem well, therefore, that we examine ourselves before prescribing a remedy. And the real issue appears, I think, in the remedy which has been proposed. The trouble is not apparently that children will not obey, for it is assumed that they will obey the drill-master. The complaint is that they will not obey *us*. And that of course admits of another explanation quite different from the one we have been giving. What is there in us that fails to command respect and obedience? Why is it that before us a younger generation does not yield its will and acknowledge its masters? In my own opinion, the greater part of the mystery lies here. We as a generation have become somewhat uncertain in our attitude, in our grip on life. We wish to be obeyed, but we do not know just what to command. And our children feel that uncertainty in us. And just because we are not quite sure what to command we are all the more determined that we shall be obeyed. Whether it be

in the home, the church, the state, the business, we find our opinions changing, our points of view shaken. And as a result of it all there comes the rather hysterical tension between the two groups, the one demanding instant obedience and conformity, the other feeling instinctively that those who give the commands are not sure of their wisdom, do not really expect or wish that they will be obeyed.

Now if this be really the source of our trouble, it is obvious that there is no quick and ready solution of the problem. Only as our grip on life becomes firmer, only as we work out a clearer and saner view of human values and procedures, will the ordinary relationship of old and young be reestablished. It will take a long time to do that and meanwhile we must labor at the task and wait for its completion.

But I fear that I am not after all minding my own business. Let me now hurry back and discuss directly this proposal that the drillmaster shall do for the teacher what the teacher has not been able to do for himself.

With many features of the proposal I find myself in hearty sympathy. I believe in discipline, in order, in obedience to what is worthy of it. And I am much attracted by the promise of proper physical development which the proposal offers. And again, the plan appeals to me because it involves "compulsion", gives us a required study. As against the scheme of election, it seems to me of vast importance that all our young people should be required to take certain common elements of training. But, on the other hand, there is room for choice by teachers as between required studies, and I am not at all convinced that this proposed choice is a wise one. May I state to you the questions which a schoolmaster would ask if such a requirement were proposed to him?

The plan is that all our young men shall be trained for military service. It may be presumed that this training is to be well given, that the young men will be in some important degree ready for military service when the training has been acquired. This would mean ultimately that all our young men of sufficient health and vigor would be available for use in the army in time of need. It has been estimated that it would

render available a force of 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 men between the ages of 18 and 30. Now the first question which a schoolmaster would ask in the face of this suggestion is "Do you need an army of this size; is it a requisite of your military policy that you should have so many men as this available for service?" And I think he would say further, "If you do need such an army, you might to advantage take this necessity as a basis for educational procedure; if you do not need such an army, you could not possibly establish a successful scheme of instruction upon it." It would not be a very promising venture to require attendance at theological schools if there were to be no churches in which ministers might practise their art. Medical schools would, I think, lose something of their force and charm if there were no diseases in the human form. And in the same way, to attempt to build an educational procedure upon the creation of an army which by hypothesis is not needed or is not believed to be needed would in my opinion be folly and would end in futility. It would be to build teaching on fiction, and fictions are not so good material for the purpose as is truth.

In order to make sure of minding my own business, I ought to keep my statement in the hypothetical form. If you need such an army, you can teach by means of it; if you don't, you can't. But I have had much opportunity for asking experts on the subject whether or not such an army is needed and almost without exception they have answered in the negative. The opinion of the country must be in some measure represented by the bill just now passing through Congress and that bill is measuring not in terms of millions but of hundreds of thousands. And so again I say that practically speaking, compulsory military training would be a lamentable failure as an educational procedure if it attempted to train up an army the need of which is not recognized by the people whose children are to be trained.

The argument I have tried to state is so easily misunderstood that I should like the privilege of restating it in another form.

Under what conditions of a school or college course may a

given subject be made compulsory? It seems to me that two conditions must be met. It must be clear first that the course gives something which is essential to the purpose of the school or college and second that the same value can not be secured in any other subject with equal success. I wonder if available evidence shows that military training does, in our American life, give better results in terms of obedience, discipline, precision, the sense of order and of obligation, than does non-military training. Are the graduates of our military schools better boys than those who come from other schools? As against that suggestion I would put in evidence the statement that apparently the overwhelming majority of our schoolmasters have been opposed to military teaching. Are the graduates of the state colleges which, under the Morrill Act, have long had military training, better men and citizens than those of other colleges? As against that it is worthy of note that prior to the war at least other colleges which were free to choose had not deemed it wise to follow the lead of their sister institutions which were giving such training under compulsion. Are our soldiers and sailors better men, better citizens, in the ordinary relationships of life than are other men? I would not deny it, but I should hesitate to found a universal scheme of training upon it.

And, on the other hand, will not other subjects give the desired training as well as does the discipline of the soldier? Is it not possible to demand obedience in the classroom in English, to insist upon precision and order in mathematics, to require subordination of the individual to a common purpose in any classroom? If not, then I think the advocate of military training will find himself in a dilemma. Are we to understand that the virtues in question are to be practised under the direction of the drillmaster two or three hours a week or four or five weeks in the summer, but that for the remainder of the week or of the year they are to be lacking or ignored altogether? If the virtues in question can not be practised in other fields, then there is no value in getting them from the military exercise; if they can be practised in other fields, then there is no need of giving military training in order to secure

them. The plain truth is that there is not one of the virtues under discussion which can not by proper teaching be as well developed in connection with the teaching of other subjects as under the guise of military training. If those subjects are not giving the virtues as well as we have a right to expect, then they are not properly taught. But the remedy for that is not the supplementing of bad teaching by good; it is the substituting of good teaching for bad in the field of those subjects which, for their own value, are chosen as proper parts of a school curriculum.

We arrive at the same conclusion in another way if we examine to see under what conditions military training has apparently given the virtues for which we seek. If it be granted that it has been of value in Europe as a compulsory system or at Plattsburg as a voluntary system, does it follow that it would be equally valuable in America as a compulsory system? Nothing seems more obvious than that it has been the necessity, the sense of necessity, underlying the system in Europe, rather than the system itself which have given the results of which we hear so much. When a people like the Swiss, surrounded and hemmed in by undetermined forces, gathers itself together for the common defense, it may well be that every individual spirit feeling the common danger, the common dread, yields itself up to it. And we have often been told that in the German schools and the German industries there is the same dominating pressure from a national impulse which leads and controls the individual as appears in the discipline of the army. We have heard it said that the German schoolmaster has drilled the nation quite as effectively as has the army officer. And on the negative side, the evidence is equally convincing. Whence comes the efficiency of the English navy? Every one deplors the individualism of the Briton, his refusal to submit to restraint and domination to which has been attributed his lack of an army. But he has had a navy, a navy which is perhaps the most successful weapon in the present war. And why has he had it and kept it so well? Simply because he has seen and felt the need of it, so that men have been willing to pay and to serve for the

common cause. And in our own country we have not always found the connection between military establishments and military virtues a constant one. We have had pension scandals, and we are not sure that army expeditions have always been wisely made. Why is it? Simply because our hearts have not been in it. Rightly or wrongly, we have not felt the importance of military provisions, and so we have neglected them and have allowed to grow up briers as well as virtues in the military patch.

And again it would be very unfortunate if we should argue from the values of voluntary military service to the same values in compulsory service. A goodly number of our young men, inspired with enthusiasm for a cause, have taken the training of summer camps. And there can be no doubt that they have learned many valuable lessons (though I gather that the science of logic is not included in the curriculum). Any man who gives himself heart and soul and body to a cause will develop strength and loyalty and endurance. But it does not follow that he who does the same task unwillingly, whether lazily or because sober judgment condemns the work, will secure the same advantage. And the essential weakness of the proposal of compulsory military training is just this—that it hopes to train our young men by compelling them to do something which the sober common sense of our people does not yet think it necessary to have done. Quite apart from the desirability of such a venture, whether in itself one approves it or not, as a piece of practical school teaching, it seems to me inevitably doomed to failure. The argument for it is based on false analogies. The virtues it seeks are well worth seeking, but the road suggested would not, I think, lead to them, but rather to national disappointment and regret.

Ever since William James began the search for the Moral Equivalent of War we have been seeking some activity which would fuse us together as a people just as the peoples of Europe are now become living flames of fury and zeal. "How," we have been asking, "shall we keep the virtues of the tiger, but let the tiger die?" And to this question one person may give one answer and another another, without noting a certain

fallacy in the question itself. Is it not the plain truth that you can not have the virtues of the tiger unless you are the tiger, do as he does, feel as he feels, live as he lives? And it is my impression that most of these proposals for the integration of our national life are at this point begging the question. "How shall we achieve the unity of a European nation; by what machinery shall it be done?" It may be that it is not to be done at all, that it is a unity which we do not desire or at least for which we are not willing to pay the price which is demanded. We have not as a people lived in relations of attack and defense, of fear and hostility, with our neighbors. And if we are not to come into such relations we shall not develop the virtues which grow from them. But we have great tasks before us—the tasks of a nation's inner life, and here it is that our virtues as we develop them are to be found. I do not believe that by any great miracle this people is to be integrated, is to be fused into a single Will. A war might do it but we hope that we shall not have a war. But lacking that we must win our unity not by some miracle of will, but by growing understanding of each other, by growing consideration for our fellow citizens.

It seems to me that our hope lies not so much in the growth of a Will as in the development of a Mind, so that by our understanding of each other we shall learn to will together. We are suffering, I think, from volitionism—the notion that if only you desire to do something and try to do it, you will find, first, that you can do it, and second, that it is worth doing. Against that volitionism, for the sake of balance, our schools and colleges must oppose intellectualism, the eagerness to know and to understand so that the right things rather than the wrong may be done.

## THE SWISS MILITARY SYSTEM AND ITS ADAPTABILITY TO THE UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>

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THE Swiss Military System is based upon the fundamental principle of obligation for all, and on common sense, uninterrupted effort and the hearty coöperation and approval of the entire nation, combined with and reinforced by the most intricate and painstaking attention to details. These few characteristics form the basis of the organization of the defensive strength of the Swiss, and they have worked in such a way that when the great test came they met all the expectations which the Swiss people had in them.

The government of the Swiss republic, watchful and aware of the difficulty presented by the Austrian ultimatum to Servia on July 23, 1914, decided upon the most momentous step they had taken in many a decade—the complete mobilization of the national forces. The decree of mobilization was published on August 1st, our national holiday, on which we celebrate in our simple way the anniversary of that first meeting of representatives of the small mountain cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden in 1291, for formation of an alliance for the defense of their rights and preservation of their liberties. On this first Saturday of August, 1914, every man up to the age of forty-eight, who had ever had military training and was enrolled in a unit of the army, was called out for Monday morning, August 3rd, at 9 o'clock. Even on the same day the local *landstrum*—that is, the older men not members of any troop in the army, and the youths of sixteen to nineteen, who had undergone rudimentary training with the rifle—were mobilized for the protection of railroad tunnels, bridges, stations, and at once took over these guard duties.

<sup>1</sup> Address at the afternoon meeting of the Academy, on May 18, 1916.

On August 2d, the railroads of the country were still open for civilian travel. All the soldiers and officers who lived away from their appointed places of assembling returned to their homes, and on Monday morning at 9 o'clock everybody was at his post. From the distant chalets in the high mountains, from the farms on the creeks and in the level lands, from the factories and work shops, from the houses of the wealthy and the dwellings of the poor, thousands upon thousands poured out to the public places of the little towns or to some meadow in a village where they knew they had to assemble. Each one was armed and equipped, ready from head to foot. At the same time the horses and wagons, which even in peace time in Switzerland are registered for just such an emergency and for nothing else, were brought out, examined and taken over by committees of experts, former cavalry officers and veterinary surgeons, appointed beforehand for that purpose. The supernumerary horses went into horse depots, to be immediately available for use in the army and to replace those used up.

After the assemblage was completed, concentration of the smaller units (battalions of infantry, batteries of artillery, squadrons of cavalry) into larger units (brigades, divisions and army corps) began on the same day. The railroads stopped for civilian travel and transportation, and completed the work of mobilization by carrying to the exposed posts on the frontier, on time tables long before prepared by the general staff, the army fully organized, equipped and officered from the highest command down to the men in the ranks. The work of putting them into a state of defense by building observation towers, digging trenches, executing field fortifications began at once. At some places the building of new roads or the enlarging of old ones was undertaken by the soldiers, obstacles to the defense were removed, at one place even a forest was cut down—all this on plans and orders long before prepared.

In the meantime our powerful neighbors who were to enter the war themselves as belligerents had started their mobilizations also but ours was completed before theirs, and we know

of proclamations posted in parts of southern Germany, where a surprise attack through Swiss territory from France was possible, telling the people that such need not be feared for the Swiss army was quite ready to prevent such a surprise.

The success of the mobilization was thus complete. In forty-eight hours the full strength of the army had been assembled and transported with all the reserves, all the equipment, all the horses, to the full number of three hundred thousand men.<sup>1</sup>

This saved the country. Had we not been able to shut the door that led to the neighbors' domain, those neighbors would have had to come in and in self-protection close it against their enemies. It would have been a race between France and Germany as to who would get to Switzerland first. In September, 1912, the German Emperor, with General von Moltke and other members of his General Staff, attended the maneuvers of the Swiss army. These maneuvers, which I had the privilege to follow personally as an officer in civilian state, were on a large scale and were very inspiring. His Majesty, whom I saw at such close range as to hear his voice, was very favorably impressed with the troops, the organization and the leadership. A short time afterward he told "Somebody"—that is some man, woman or child—"somewhere in Europe" that "another route to France would be chosen." That "Somebody"—man, woman or child—repeated the words to "Somebody whom I know" and from whom I have it; it is more than plausible that to the trained eyes of the "War Lord" and his suite the endurance and earnestness of effort and the spirit which animates the Swiss soldiers and officers—to the officers he paid the highly appreciated military compliment of *schneidig* (alert, energetic, spick-and-span)—was an indication of the kind of resistance they would be not only willing but able to offer.

<sup>1</sup> Three hundred thousand is a fairly conservative estimate. The official figures of the government are not known. Some experts claim that the mobilization yielded even larger numbers, some going as high as 425,000. We will have to await the official report of the General Staff after the termination of the war.

In April, 1913, a report of the German General Staff that the Swiss had the will and power successfully to prevent invasion fell into the hands of the French Government. France, too, counted on our readiness, and in this way we have protected both Germany and France from each other, and last but not least, ourselves. The Swiss army, without firing a shot, has attained a victory more brilliant because it was an entirely bloodless one. The Swiss "Army-in-being" did not have to fight; its state of readiness was sufficient.

How was it possible to mobilize in such a short time such an immense army, immense indeed in proportion to the number of inhabitants? It was only possible through obligatory military service for all and through the fact that all ages of men called to arms had received training in the course of time. The Swiss military system is simple and at the same time inexorable. The military resources and the strength and characters of our four neighbors as revealed by past history, the political and governmental ideals and customs of the Swiss nation, and its limited financial resources, made necessary a military system that in its simplest expression should aspire to the following cardinal desiderata:

1. *As large an army in proportion to the number of inhabitants as possible, through universal obligatory service in accordance with the traditions of our forefathers dating back over five hundred years.*

2. *As thorough training as the short time allotted by the will of the nation permits and the financial resources of the country justify.*

3. *Speediest possible mobilization through complete organization and territorial formation of the units.*

4. *Encouragement of all efforts to foster the military spirit in the nation.*

Let us see how it works. When he reaches his nineteenth year the young Swiss is examined for fitness. He has to appear before a committee of experts who travel around to the remotest districts. On a date long before advertised, the young man presents himself. From their earliest youth, the

young Swiss have a goal before their eyes—their nineteenth year. Something occupies their mind and consciousness that does not consist in selfish satisfaction of their own wishes, but which brings before their eyes something honorable, yet at the same time demanding sacrifice in time, effort, fatigue and subordination of their own wills to the will of a qualified and legally appointed superior. This looking-forward to their nineteenth year makes all the boys of the same age somewhat solidary. It creates a collective feeling—not collective in the sense of social class, wealth or education, but collective in the sense of a duty before them which they have to perform together. The same expectations, hopeful and otherwise, permeate their consciousness. They give their thoughts and aspirations something of earnestness which prevents indulgence in thoughtless frivolity.

At the age of twenty the first training or recruit service in which a raw recruit is molded into a full-fledged soldier, begins. The recruits of a district assemble in sufficient numbers to organize a full infantry battalion. The recruiting takes place in barracks and lasts, for the infantry sixty-seven days, including one day of entry and one for dismissal; for the artillery, seventy-seven; for the cavalry, ninety-two, and for the medical corps, sixty-two days. The training is gone through with great energy. In the course of many years, a system has developed which brings out of the men in a minimum of time a maximum of results. No time is lost with unnecessary frills or playful games. The young men are there for one purpose only, and that is to receive military training at the least cost in time to them and money to the state. The reproach made against the regular or standing army of the United States that the soldier's life is one of deadly tedium for lack of sufficient occupation, does not apply to the Swiss soldier or recruit. His time is so fully occupied that he has no time for thought of desertion, and when he leaves the service, he has gone through a school of training that has given him no time to acquire habits of loafing.

The day begins in summer at 5:30, in the cavalry at 3:30; they work until 11:30, then eat and clean up and rest until

1:30, and work again until 5:30. The men receive ample food, and their night rest is long enough for they must be in at nine. Their treatment is good, not harsh. The only criterion is willingness. The young man does not have to be a genius to satisfy his superiors. The requirements are simple, but woe betide the shirk, the laggard, especially him who offers passive resistance and seems a danger of contagion to the others who would do well. He has no easy time, he is made to change his way; his life is not made pleasant for him. But on the other hand to him who shows willingness to do what is asked, or even a little more than is asked of him, reward comes.

The training is practical and thorough and up-to-date. Shooting, marching, outpost duty, entrenching and maneuvering, under day or nighttime conditions, in squads, company and battalion, are practised, together with drill gymnastics, and last but not least, discipline that is the virtue of co-operation with others for a common goal, singly or in masses. The moral training in soldierly honor, and truthfulness is not less important than the acquisition of physical stamina and technical knowledge, and some of this the recruit will take back into civilian life. And what practical lessons in democracy does he not receive? Class distinctions are abolished; all are wearing the same clothing, live in the same rooms, eat the same food. The son of the wealthy and the poor, perhaps for the first time, are on absolutely equal footing; no distinction is made as to their ancestry or social standing. They are put into the ranks according to height, and not according to individual wishes or the whims of mutual attraction. Their military superior may in civilian life be their inferior, but while in service, honor and obedience is due them according to their rank; there are no classes, only grades; no social, only military distinctions.

The military training these men receive has been to many their making. Many a man has been brought out for the first time according to his merit. Those over-estimated at home will be found out. Bashfulness and shame will not go. Many a man comes home with new resolutions. He has formed ac-

quaintances which establish his standing and which he will have to live up to; he has seen the light for the first time as to his duties towards others, and his position in the whole, his importance as an individual, and as a part of the state.

After this original recruit service the young man is a full-fledged soldier, and takes his uniform, his rifle, bayonet, saber and revolver and whatever his equipment is, home with him. In the cavalry even his horse is given to him, and he takes it to his stable on the farm. For only such young men are taken in the cavalry whose fathers or who themselves have stables and facilities to keep a horse. This naturally limits the cavalry to the farmers. This is a distinctive and unique feature, which as far as I know is not found anywhere else. It is based on traditions of centuries, for the Swiss have always been armed and have kept their arms in their own hands. It is an evidence of the great confidence the government has in the individual for the proper care of this valuable and expensive equipment. But the confidence is fully deserved and the quick mobilization, which was possible through the fact that every man was able to present himself fully equipped and armed, justified the measure a thousandfold. The man is personally responsible for the condition of his equipment and annually on a certain day in his immediate neighborhood it is inspected and whatever has not been well taken care of must be replaced at his own expense.

The recruit, on leaving his recruit battalion, is then enrolled into the battalion of his own home district. The Swiss military system is based upon the principle of territoriality; that is, the units are formed of men in a contiguous district. They are assembled in that district where they have grown up or where they are living and which they know thoroughly. Upon his return home he takes off his uniform and after an absence of just sixty-seven days in the infantry, and that is the majority, he takes up again his work or his studies as a civilian, and he is a better man in every respect, physically developed, intellectually more alert, morally with an added sense of responsibility, and spiritually filled with pride over a task well performed.

His duties as the defender of the nation are, however, not over. From now on every year until he is twenty-seven—that is, seven times—he has to serve thirteen days a year with his regiment, in so-called repeat service and in maneuvers. The repeat service is in the smaller units and is devoted mainly to the training of the individual soldier under his immediate subofficer and officer. It alternates every other year with regular maneuvers. These maneuvers are in large units, as large as army corps, and they are so warlike that only the shooting of actual bullets would be required to bring about the dire reality of actual warfare. Long marches, rainy nights spent in deep trenches, outpost duty on high mountain passes and heavy equipment on their shoulders and backs. These maneuvers furnish an opportunity to the commanders and to the administration, and to the staff officers as well as to the railroads to be tested as to their efficiency and readiness. The army in maneuvers have their own bread furnished them from the army bakeries that are erected at the base of supplies in the rear of the army. The meat cattle are slaughtered by army butchers and bread and meat are carried forward to the units on requisitioned wagons, just as in war time. The Staff and commissary officers of each unit must see that their supplies get there in time, for if they do not, the men have nothing to eat, just as in war time. Moving kitchens on wheels follow each unit. In villages occupied the soldiers take shelter in whatever building they need, and the medical corps establishes infirmaries for the troops and hospitals in the rear, just as if on the morrow a big battle were going to take place and thousands of wounded were to pour in upon them. There is nothing except actual war that is more soul-stirring than these maneuvers, which are really annual mobilizations, not complete over the whole extent of the country nor of all age classes, but mobilizations over part of the country, of part of the ages, and while all of the men are not mobilized annually, the material, equipment of units, cannon, supply train and bridge-building supplies are annually taken out of the storehouses and put to the test. If anything is missing or destroyed it at once is replaced or repaired.

Now we come to the training of officers and sub-officers, and as every young man is a recruit in the ranks, all the officers have started their careers from these ranks. Therefore, *an aristocratic corps of officers that had its training away from the ranks in some secluded officers' college does not exist.* It is one of the elements making for democracy in the army and the nation. The young men, who in their recruit service have shown greater interest and talent for executive ability, are asked to become non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. Great care is taken in their selection, as the acquisition of a grade entails great sacrifice, not only in effort but also in money and chiefly in time, and as acceptance of the call, formerly optional, now is obligatory, no one is asked to assume the burden whose shoulders are unable to carry it. They are selected mainly from among the educated men of Switzerland and among them are found the leading men of every profession and business.

Their career for higher degrees begins at the special training course for corporals. This training course lasts twenty-two days. After this short course the young corporal has to go now as a corporal to a training course for recruits, *and he at once becomes the instructor of the new recruits in a responsible position*, in the same way as in his own recruit course his superiors were his instructors. He learns the practical handling of men at once. After that he serves as a corporal in his home battalion when his home regiment assembles. The future officer, after completing his training as a corporal, goes through a training school for lieutenants, which in the infantry and cavalry lasts eighty-two days, in the artillery and engineer corps one hundred and seven days. There he acquires all the knowledge necessary for a lieutenant,—army organization, map-reading, commanding, hygiene and all the technical military knowledge that is necessary for a young officer. He then returns to a recruit course *where he at once handles and trains young recruits as a lieutenant.* In this way both the officers and sub-officers in the shortest possible time become responsible instructors and leaders of their men. The training might be longer but it certainly is not too long for

these young men to stifle their energy and enthusiasm by too tedious and impractical studies. The sciences and mathematics enter their studies only so far as they are necessary for practical purposes. Probably none of them, after he is through such a course, could build a Panama canal, but then, none of them will ever be asked to do that. On the other hand he is put on his own feet as a practical instructor, moral teacher and military leader of his men, the men he would lead in battle, and is at once held responsible to his superiors for those under him. The leading men in the Swiss army seem to consider now after the experience of the long mobilization that the theoretical training of the young officers is sufficient, that what is needed is still more service with the men, not away from them.

Afterward the young lieutenant, after a total of 241 days of instruction of the most intensive kind, is assigned to some troops, preferably to the home regiment of his neighborhood and district in which he lives. From time to time he has to go to some special course before an advancement. *No one is allowed to attain a higher degree without having passed through service in the lower, and having suitably qualified for the higher.* In the course of years he will become a captain, a major, a lieutenant-colonel and a colonel, and successively command larger and larger units, but *in between his time of service he always enters civilian life again*, just as much as his sub-officers and simple soldiers do; only more frequent and longer periods of service and higher requirements distinguish his duties from those of the rest. He is a civilian most of the time and an officer part of the time. It is only in the higher degrees that the officers have to devote all of their time to their military duties, and where they have to leave civilian life altogether.

The army is divided into three age classes. First, the so-called *elite*, or first line of fighting troops—twelve years, from 20 to 32; second, the so-called *landwehr*—from 33 to 40; third, the *landsturm*—from 41 to 48.

Let us see what is asked of a simple soldier of the Swiss army serving in that branch of the army which always must

be the most numerous—the infantry. At his nineteenth year, he spends one day in physical examination; in his twentieth year, sixty-seven days in recruit service; from his twenty-first to his twenty-seventh year, seven times thirteen days of repeating service and maneuvers—ninety-one days. Hereafter in the *landwehr*, once repeating service—thirteen days—and an annual inspection of clothes and arms, each of one day during the years in which he has no repeating service up to his forty-eighth year—twelve days; that is a grand total of 192 days. In addition, if armed with a rifle, every year he has to practice shooting under the supervision of local shooting societies, which receive a subvention from the government for rifle pits. He has to shoot thirty shots at the target. This is usually done some Sunday morning, takes about two hours of his time all told and interferes in no way whatever with the man's occupation. The full extent of sacrifice in time to the simple soldier, that is the laboring man, the farmer, the school-teacher and the large majority of men in general, is one hundred and ninety-two days—or one-half year—altogether in thirty years and the only really long continuous period of sixty-seven days is in one year, his twentieth, when his responsibilities are light and when as yet he has no family to support. Truly this is not a sacrifice of forbidding magnitude.

What is asked of the man who is not found fit to serve in the army? Does he simply avoid the universal obligation he owes to the country without anything being asked of him? "No," the Swiss say, "if he cannot serve in the army he has to help support it." He is therefore made to pay a small tax, \$1.20 a year for men of small means (this tax during this war time has been doubled), rising with the means, earning capacity and financial standing of the man or his parents; this tax does not yield a large sum; it has been instituted much more to emphasize "a universal obligation". *It goes without saying that only physical unfitness frees from the rank; no influence whatever can interfere with the findings and decisions of the examining committee, either for or against exemption, and no option exists to substitute the military tax for actual service.* This tax is quite a distinctive feature of the Swiss

military system; I hear that it is to be introduced in other countries.

Inseparable from a military force is the cost thereof. The Swiss army not only furnishes the largest possible number of trained, equipped and thoroughly organized men with the quickest mobilization, but it furnishes these at the least cost. For the last few years before the world war the annual cost was about \$6,600,000, that is, \$1.75 per head of the population, and if we divide this sum of \$6,600,000 by the number of men now mobilized, the army of 300,000 men has cost on the average \$22.00 a head a year. This is only possible, of course, because the older men who are included in the 300,000 now ready, have not cost the government anything for many years past, yet they are still there, ready, available and useful, too. This annual budget, of course, does not include such extraordinary expenses, as for instance, an entirely new artillery or fortifications, but it includes the running expenses and the new equipment every man entering the army receives. Compared with the war budget of the United States, we see that last year about \$160,000,000 were spent for the army, yet we could not mobilize in a short time one hundred thousand men. This large sum represents about \$1.50 per head of the population. If we take (1913) Army (\$160,000,000), Navy (\$133,000,000) and Pensions (\$175,000,000), we have a grand total for military purposes of \$468,000,000, that is about \$4.60 per head, and with what small results in actual preparedness!

We have at present the aggregate of 30,000 men and officers of our standing regular army within the confines of the United States proper, mobile and available wherever needed; the rest are in the colonies and immobile at our coast defenses. Reserves for these there are none; in other words the gaps in the ranks through losses in battle and through disease could not be filled except with entirely different material vastly inferior, if at all. Under forty-eight different sovereignties, we have on paper about 129,000 men of the state National Guards, with no uniform standard of efficiency in training and command; of these hardly half, according to the expert

opinion of a former Secretary of War—not more than 60,000—could in any way be counted upon; these 90,000 men at the utmost have never maneuvered together, have never been under a unified command, no commander-in-chief knows them and their material has not been brought together; they are smallest units that would have first to be taken in hand, re-equipped, better trained and officered; co-ordination and co-operation with each other they know not. How long would it take to do that? Would the enemy patiently wait till we are ready? How many of our American generals have ever had the opportunity to lead in warlike maneuvers an army corps of 40,000 men? And what tremendous sums does it not cost to recruit our army? In the year 1913 to 1914 the cost of recruiting alone for every new recruit to the United States army was sixty dollars.

Not only have we no army but we have no military system, deficient equipment, no organization. Our “military system” in the past has been to wait for the emergency and then to begin getting ready.

Just as the “fleet-in-being” of England has saved England without fighting, so the “army-in-being” of the United States would save the United States without fighting. We would not be attacked, because nobody could think of doing so with any chance of success. While we need a navy of a size to command respect and to be able to imperil landings and transports of troops, a sufficiently large army would be less expensive, a better protection and could be organized in a few years under the protection of the world war now going on, while our potential future enemies are occupied elsewhere. We must therefore look to our land forces as that peace insurance that will forever protect our territory from successful invasion and remove the chief attraction for conquest, the combination of wealth and weakness.

In order to do this *it is essential that the army be large enough*. The time of small professional armies is passed now and forever. War in its simplest definition is the supreme effort of nations; and modern conditions and facilities of transportation, the immense and still increasing wealth of

the nations, the diversity and availability of their means of production for the production of war material and last, not least, the spiritual forces of modern times, the energy and strength of national consciousness and cohesion, make war quite a different thing from what it was in the past.

It is of no use to decree by laws on paper an increase in numbers. If men will not enlist, the increase cannot take place and the law becomes futile. There are extremely potent reasons why we may doubt that voluntary enlistments will even fill the ranks of our standing army to 200,000 men: First—on account of the bidding of industry for labor at higher wages, then on account of the tedium and lack of outlook of the professional soldiers' life and finally on account of the stigma attached to service; the soldier feels and is made to feel himself as of minor quality and standing in the community, almost as outside of it; therefore the incredibly numerous desertions, the sprees and infractions of discipline; and the despicable practise of judges to let men go unpunished if they promise to join the army, make things still worse; can we blame the young man for not wanting to enlist? Obligatory service for all, changes all this at once. The training being of short duration, must be intensive and leaves no time for thoughts of desertion; for the man knows that in a short time he will be in his customary surroundings again, and he will be free to follow his career and pursue his ambitions as before. It will be the natural and honorable thing to be in the army, because it denotes physical fitness, and for the same reason, undesirable to be outside of it; and all classes being represented, it will represent the high average standard of American manhood.

Can the Swiss system of military organization and universal training be applied to the United States, or are we so radically different from the Swiss? Differences of course here are political and economic, but the points of similarity are indefinitely more numerous than the differences. Both countries have a republican form of government and believe in individual rights and in self-government on democratic principles. Both are extremely jealous of their

liberties. The main political differences of the two commonwealths are, that the Swiss people through initiative and referendum, have greater control over the legislative branch of the government, whereas we in the United States through frequent elections are more concerned over the personnel of the executive branch. Otherwise I see no deep-seated difference politically. Temperamentally, the Swiss are rather more serious-minded, probably from racial differences and a more inclement climate and poorer soil, and Switzerland is a country the different parts of which speak different languages. In other respects, the two peoples have very much in common. The size of the country has nothing to do with the introduction of the Swiss military system. Size is merely an incident. The Swiss military system could very well and should be adopted in the United States, not only its underlying principles, but even in detail is this possible and desirable. The principles we must adopt are:

First. *Federal control of the army.* Federal control alone makes uniformity in training, standard of quality and promotion. Forty-eight different state armies would be the death of any effort; the Swiss have tried it and had to give it up. Federal control alone makes possible the formation of the largest army units, divisions and army-corps. Federal control for the last century had to supersede state control in Switzerland, until today it has vanished to a mere shadow.

Second. *Adult manhood service for all. Enrollment and examination for fitness at 18 or 19, first-training service 19 or 20, preferably in barracks, continuous for a few months only, and for a number of years afterwards, annual assembly and tactical maneuvers and brushing-up service of short duration up to a certain age, then entry into a reserve with occasional mobilization similar to those of Switzerland. No reliance on voluntary enlistment or other subterfuges and evasions of the main issue by school boy, college boy, business men's camps and Saturday afternoon rifle clubs. They do not produce soldiers, still less armies, and it is armies we are in need of.*

At present the proposition is made to substitute for service with the army instruction of a quasi-military character in

private academies and to give the pupil credit for this instruction. For two reasons this should be discouraged; first, because it is a class institution; poor parents cannot afford such advantages for their sons and the favors afforded the rich would create a gulf and cause class distinction. The favored ones would look down upon the others and resentment might follow where equality should rule. The other reason is that the training for a soldier can only be adequate under real army conditions and these include in a democracy especially the living, sleeping and working together of all sorts of men; a future officer has to have gone through real, not attenuated, soldiers' duties in order to be an instructor of his men. The "camps", while at present valuable for creating enthusiasm and interest in those who would otherwise have no opportunity to taste military service, have the immense drawback of creating the impression that we are on the right way to preparedness for national defense.

Third. *Adoption of a certain tax for those excused from service for any cause, the tax to be proportionate to the financial means. No possibility of choice between the military tax and personal service.* The tax emphasizes the universal obligation.

Fourth. *Promotion to any grade, only on the principle of having earned it through service in the lower and after having qualified suitably in special courses through sufficient length of service and command for the higher degree. This would mean a final abolition in this country of appointments of men to high command from civilian life through social or political influence.* The science of warfare is so complex and technical that only systematic training from the very ground up will enable the mentally gifted to master it.

Fifth. *Territorial recruiting and organization of units. The country should be subdivided into twenty-five army-corps districts of approximately equal number of inhabitants. The boundaries of these districts to be determined on geographical lines, independent entirely of boundaries of political, state or election districts.* This is quite essential, for nothing could be more detrimental to the interest of the army than the sug-

gestive influence of a coincidence of the boundaries of military and election districts. The call on members of Congress for administrative interference, is burdensome enough as it is, and senators and representatives should be protected from further encroachment on their time and energy; election districts having become military districts, the clamor of constituents would multiply many times and destroy both the usefulness of the congressman and the army; for the army might enter politics or politics invade the army and that would be disastrous for both. These districts should be formed in such a way that mountain ranges, or deep rivers, should not run through them, so that they are to form geographical units for the quickest possible mobilization and concentration. Each district should have barracks, store-houses, all the war material, its maneuvering grounds, and general headquarters at a place chosen for its location, as to railway communications and safety from surprise attacks. Most of our army posts could be retained and either be used as storehouses for additional supplies, remount depots, training posts of the units of special arms, bridge builders, or medical companies, or officers' schools, while still others might be enlarged to the proposed headquarters of the future army-corps districts.

Within these districts of about 4,000,000 inhabitants, the units of the army corps could be recruited, trained and organized. The army-corps district would be subdivided into smaller districts, two or more division districts, each of these into two or more brigade districts, each of these into regimental districts and finally these latter into the last subdivision for the tactical unit—the infantry battalion. Within this battalion district—the men would be recruited for that battalion and in addition for a certain unit of the cavalry—(perhaps one-fourth part of a squadron), for a certain unit of artillery and train troops (perhaps one-fourth or one-half a battery), some part of engineering troops (sappers, bridge-builders, etc.), the necessary medical troops, and supply troops and artisans (bakers, butchers, horse-shoers, wagon-makers, shoe-makers, etc.). On the seashore certain districts would furnish less infantry and cavalry but more artillery for the

coast defenses, for it would not do to recruit these "at large", that is, over the larger district, for the simple reason that quick mobilization would suffer if the coast artillery men had to travel to their post from a distant interior city.

Thirty-six of these battalion districts in an army-corps district would give each a population of about 110,000 inhabitants; of these there would be yearly about a crop of one thousand young men of the age of nineteen or twenty and if we suppose 60 per cent of these to be fit for military duty, it would give each district an annual contingent of about six hundred recruits. Four hundred to five hundred of these would be assigned to the infantry, in the entire army-corps district about 16,000 (the proportion would vary according to changing views on the proportionate number and importance of the various arms.) Should first training or recruit service in the infantry be of two and one-half months duration, that would give four periods, training of four thousand men each time, if they were to be trained all in one place; it is to be expected however that within an army-corps infantry barracks would be in the divisional districts (let us say two in each army-corps district). That would fill each of the two infantry training grounds four times a year with a new set of about two thousand recruits each time. These would be divided into three parts of about seven hundred each, to form a battalion and three battalions would form a regiment. All the officers and subofficers of a regiment would undertake the training, and army life on the basis of a full regiment would be given the recruits, the subofficers and the officers; should there be more training grounds—and probably the solicitude of congressmen would see to it that there would be—a training unit might be a battalion of seven hundred to one thousand men; below the battalion one ought not to go, for both recruits and officers get a better and especially a truer idea of army life in large units. The recruits would be assigned, if possible, to the courses according to their occupations; farmers would be called to the courses in winter when they can be spared on the farms, students in the summer, etc. Nor should the re-

cruits of one locality all go at once, on account of the too great depletion of the workers; as little inconvenience should be caused as the purpose—best training in the shortest time—will permit. After this training service, the recruits would return home and be put on the register of their home battalion with which they would drill and maneuver in the future and they would be civilians again for a year. Their next service is the following year in the fall, after the harvest, when the fields are bare and maneuvers do little or no damage to agriculture. During recruit service, the officers and sub-officers would have their eyes open to discover those that would make likely subofficers and officers. About one-tenth would be so picked, and the same year, or as soon as possible, these would in a short course of say four weeks, be made corporals. This corporals' course would take place either in the same barracks or in some other army post and a unit would again be formed. After this course a test would determine their merit—not too severe and they would all be made corporals; about one-fifth of the more apt pupils in this corporals' course would be asked to become lieutenants. In going home they would be assigned to "corporalcies" in their home battalion. The next year these corporals who had not been asked to become lieutenants would have two services, a recruit-course of two and one-half months as corporal-instructors in a recruit battalion and a maneuver service with their home battalion. Hereafter these corporals would only serve once a year with the battalion, till they go to the reserve. Those corporals however who had been selected to become lieutenants would go to a lieutenants' course of perhaps three months duration and after they had attained a certificate of efficiency, would be assigned to a lieutenancy in their own home battalion, or one of the other ones short of officers. They too would have two services in the following year, one as lieutenant-instructors of a recruit course of two and one-half months and one of two weeks in the fall maneuvers of the battalion in which they would have a command. This battalion would not maneuver alone but with two or three others in a regiment, two regiments forming a brigade, two or three

brigades a division; in addition to the infantry officers and soldiers there would be in every battalion a number of litter carriers and male nurses who take courses from the medical department under their officers, the two doctors; drivers from the train service with the battalion and company ammunition wagons and field kitchen on wheels and the wagons with the entrenching tools; the infantry regiment would have its staff wagons and wagons for the wounded. And the division would be a combination of all the arms, cavalry, artillery, engineers, signal corps, medical corps, field hospital and supply department, with their commanders and their staffs, which all work from the top down, transmitting and coordinating the orders given by the commander of the division. This would be a complete entity standing on its own feet, ready with officers, staffs, men, horses and material (guns, wagons, supplies, bakeries) to take the field. Below the division unit there should be no combination with other arms. And these maneuvers would be not only for the training of the men, they would be just as much, even more a test of the officers and the working together of all units. The two or more divisions of any army corps may maneuver together against an imaginary enemy or against each other as the case may be and as is done in Europe, even in Switzerland. *Not before we have attained this stage of annual mobilizations for peace maneuvers can we say we have an army worth having ready to take the field. We must learn to think in army corps, not men.*

To return to our lieutenant; he would serve as such for some years, then become a first lieutenant and as such, before becoming a captain (at the age of about thirty), he would take a special course for captains, after which, his certificate attained, he would receive a company and advance further, as far as his aptitude, judged by his superiors, will permit him.

The simple soldier after a few years (say eight), would go to the reserves and swells that important body. Reserves are of immense importance; I regret that space does not permit me to dwell on this subject—too little appreciated and understood in America.

It is sufficient to point out, however briefly, the importance of reserve officers; it is said, and probably with truth, that the lack of such in sufficient numbers has played an important rôle and had a detrimental influence on the success of Russian and British arms. It takes longer to train an officer and his training must be thorough, for only in this way will the men in the ranks have sufficient confidence in the wisdom of their leadership and will the officers easily enforce that discipline in their men that balks at nothing. When the lieutenant says to his men: "Now we have to advance to die together, come on boys," they will have to have the discipline born of supreme confidence. Germany, France and Austria seem to have sufficient officers to fill the gaps and their warfare has not failed them on account of a lack of them.

The material should be stored within the army corps or division district complete, so that on mobilization nothing would have to be ordered from Washington or elsewhere, perhaps with the exception of the flying-machines attached to the highest command. All this requires the building of barracks and store houses and the selection of their location.

This is what the territorial organization of the army means and the division of the country in (say twenty-five) districts means. (If less than twenty-five they would become unwieldy.)

Sixth. *Utilization of the officers of the present regular standing army to command the new-formed units of the universal army until the latter can furnish its own lower grades.* The officers of the standing army to be the first to advance to high command. Of course there would be a period of transition which would present a number of difficulties. Units would have to be formed from which qualified officers would first have to be trained: regiments, brigades, divisions, army corps. For these the West-Pointers should be taken from the standing army and be given the command of these new units. These new units of course would not be under arms all the time, only during annual maneuvers. For the rest of the year, the officers of the standing army would return to their commands in the latter. The regular officers and subofficers, and even

some of the privates of the standing army, might be used to help train the recruits of the new universal army. After the first year, the universal army would begin to produce its own non-commissioned officers, and officers, and these would gradually advance until in a few years the whole machinery could be put into thorough working condition. Until that condition will have been attained the present standing army would form chiefly the complicated technical branches, flying corps and the horse services (cavalry, artillery), etc., and also be used for service in our few colonies. The question whether we should give the full equipment to the men and intrust it to their care at home, as the Swiss have done with such success, for almost lightning-like mobilization, is a question of detail.

And what would be the result of the above simple proposition. In the military sense, we would get an annual contingent of about 900,000 young men of the age of nineteen. If we assume that 60 per cent would be fit, we would have an annual crop of about 550,000 men to be given training and to be organized into the national defense forces. It would give us in a few years a few million men, and after we had attained a sufficient number we could then reduce the number of years during which the men could be called out, or increase the standard of bodily fitness in recruiting, give exemption to widows' only sons, etc., and mobilize part of the men for so-called industrial preparedness by securing their services for ammunition factories. We would not lack men.

In a larger sense, we would gain infinitely by such a training. Every man would get physical, moral and intellectual training, which would be a benefit to him outside of purely military considerations. The preparedness of body would make for the preparedness of the soul and the spirit, as it does elsewhere.

## ORGANIZED LABOR AND MILITARY SERVICE <sup>1</sup>

JOHN P. WHITE

President United Mine Workers of America

I AM asked to discuss, from the point of view of organized labor: (1) The obligation of citizenship to the common defense; and (2) compulsory or volunteer military training, as to fundamental principles and methods.

Another question is raised by mere statement of the subject. To organized labor, this is the question of immediate importance: What constitutes the "common defense"? If we can agree on that point, it will be much easier to agree on the others.

Labor accepts nationalism as a fact and as a necessary expedient for the progress of the race. Labor is patriotic. It sees these 100,000,000 people of ours as a nation, bound together by our devotion to certain ideals. These ideals are liberty, justice, education, and equality of opportunity for every child. They are the same for every American; but whereas a part of us have actually attained these ideals, the great majority of us are still striving to attain them. For the great majority of wage-earners, they still are only ideals.

There are between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 wage-earners in America today, and the United States Public Health Service tells us that hardly more than half of these earn enough to maintain a healthful, decent existence. Of these, less than 3,000,000 have freed themselves from industrial tyranny and feudalism so far as to enjoy the right to bargain collectively and to interpose a strong organization between the individual worker and the employer, for the worker's full protection. Of the children of the workers, only a small percentage go out into the world equipped, as they should be, with an education fitting them to win in the struggle for

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

bread. And who will say that the under-nourished children of the workers in mill and factory, surrounded throughout their infancy and youth by poverty and ugliness and anxiety, enjoy equal opportunity?

And so we have this difference of opinion as to what America means. To the workers, it means a land where the ideals of liberty and justice and equality are supreme, where the opportunity exists to make them real, but where they are still ideals with the hour of their attainment still far off. They love this land nevertheless for the hope it holds out to them, for the assurance that here they have at least a free field in which to strive and struggle. If only the comfortable, well-fed men and women who march in preparedness parades and who yearn for glory on foreign fields of battle could understand the martial spirit and the fervent devotion that animate the workers in their struggle for the attainments of American ideals!

But to the wealthy and powerful and influential, America means something very different. It means, not the opportunity for struggle to make real what is now only dreamed of, but something already accomplished—accomplished in 1776 and in 1861-65. The spirit of America, the spirit of American ideals, is not in the keeping of any group or class. But if that spirit was ever involved in any struggle or movement in this country, if those ideals were ever at stake, then the spirit is involved and the ideals are at stake in the struggle that is only just beginning in this country to conquer the nation for its own people, to win for the workers and the producers the liberty and the justice and the well-being to which they are entitled. To that struggle, organized labor is committed. For it organized labor exists. Nothing else is so important. Nothing else is important at all, except as it directly or indirectly affects the attainment of the American ideals for which labor is striving.

I do not agree with those who charge that the cry for great armaments and for an aggressive foreign policy is entirely the work of selfish interests. I think it is very largely tied up with the interest of American international bankers

and munition makers. It is they who pull the strings. But the chief danger does not lie in selfish financial and commercial interests. By themselves they could do little. It lies in the idleness and boredom of our well-to-do and wealthy leisure class. That class unfortunately cannot join in the great heroic struggle of the toilers for the attainment of American ideals. As a class, it rests under the delusion that American ideals have already been completely realized, and the men and women who compose it are red-blooded enough to want something to do more exciting than golf or tennis or bridge, more exciting even than fox-trotting on Broadway or playing the market on Wall Street. As a class, it is highly romantic, it has a code that belongs to past centuries, when nations were divided into the gentility and the populace, when gentlemen drew swords over absurd points of honor, and when kings declared war over fine points of honor no less absurd than those of the duelling code. It is a class that would plunge this nation into war today over some issue that means infinitely less to the average American, either as a matter of honor or material welfare, than the conduct of the police or the constabulary or the armed guards in any one of a dozen strikes.

What does war mean to labor? It means death to their dearest hopes. It means the re-establishment, where they do not still exist, of feudalism and autocracy, in order that everything may be subordinated to the success of the war. And when the war is over the feudalism and autocracy remain. It means the absolute suspension of the struggle for more democracy and justice. A strike becomes treason, and in the passion of the moment any man temporarily in command can work his will by resorting to the sacred word "patriotism". It means establishing the habit of obedience without thought or question. It means the death and maiming of the workers in the proportion of about four to one of other groups of the population.

And so labor cannot discuss with much enthusiasm the methods of preparing for war. But labor must be prepared for the worst. If war comes, the workers will respond. Whatever the cause, no matter how great the pity and the sin of it,

they will respond. And it is well that you challenge us to say how the response shall be ordered. We must think of it, and be prepared to insist that as much of those things we love shall be preserved, even in war, as can be preserved.

Perhaps all I have said belongs properly in a discussion of diplomacy and not of military means. I realize that this nation cannot be defenseless in a military sense. We must be prepared just to the extent that other nations will understand and respect our strength without fearing it. I believe we are already prepared to that extent and that any considerable addition to our armament would be construed by other nations that we have war-like and aggressive intentions, that we fear and expect trouble. There is no better way of getting into trouble than to show that you fear and expect it.

Let us keep up our navy. Let us keep alive among us the science of arms through the maintenance of a small expert army. Let us have a thorough overhauling of our military establishment to assure ourselves that our expert military men are foresighted and abreast of developments. Let us have a plan for the quick mobilization of men and munitions and supplies.

Above all, let us reorganize our present military force on a basis that will permit its enlargement, if ever the need arises, without endangering democratic ideals. Leaving aside every other objection, labro will always fight any considerable extension of our military forces so long as the army and navy are ruled by a class and a caste. The social distinction that goes with a position as officer in the army is one of the most insidious evils connected with militarism. That is why many a man who is a snob and an autocrat and an enemy of true democracy is today clamoring for preparedness. It is for them a new sport, a new means of climbing toward social distinction. It is no more dangerous than polo, and the people pay the bills.

Give us an army in which any enlisted man of intelligence and industry can hope to attain a commission. Abolish the age limit after which enlisted men are ineligible for examination for a commission. Provide for West-Point training for

any enlisted man who shows ability and who passes certain fair tests. Diminish the number of offenses for which enlisted men can be tried by court-martial and imprisoned for long terms without a trial by jury.

Several well-meaning writers and speakers have advocated an industrial army—the use of the regular army during times of peace for the construction of public works and similar tasks. I wish to point out the danger of such a scheme. Militarism belongs with a past age. Probably it can never be made truly democratic. The conduct of war means autocratic rule by a few. And however we may reform our army in these respects there will always remain the poison of military absolutism. Let us not poison civil life with this spirit of autocracy. Let us not set a dangerous precedent for private employers by putting the government's industrial workers under a drill sergeant or a major. The time is coming when hundreds of thousands of workmen will be in government employ. We do not want them organized on a military basis.

The proposal to establish compulsory military service in this country is the saddest and most abject surrender of American ideals ever made in this country. It is that because it is put forward on the ground that only through putting men in regiments, under martial law, and drilling them with weapons of slaughter, can we make our young men efficient and patriotic!

Labor knows a better way. Establish industrial freedom. Abolish privilege. Give the workers a voice in determining wages and conditions, and with that voice a responsibility. Pay him his just wage, so that he can provide leisure and education for himself and his children, so that he can afford the services of a good doctor, so that he can buy books and pictures and magazines, so that he can bring up his children happy, healthy, strong, intelligent and free; above all, so that he can raise his voice in the councils of his country. He will raise it, as the 2,000,000 members of organized labor invariably have raised it, in behalf of humanity and justice and liberty, in behalf of the honor that means, not glory for a handful of leaders, but life and freedom for the millions.

## ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SWISS AND OTHER EUROPEAN SYSTEMS<sup>1</sup>

ERIC FISHER WOOD

*Author of The Note-book of An Attache and The Writing on The Wall*

**S**CARCELY a day passes that I am not called either a "militarist" or a "jingos". I do not consider myself to be either; I take pride in being a "pacifist". I have seen actual warfare, and no one who has ever looked with his own eyes upon the visage of war can ever be a "jingos".

Within the space of a single day I have seen something like 50,000 of my fellow-men lying dead and wounded upon the field of battle. I want peace for my country—as much peace as possible. Before the present war, I was a "pacifist" and an "anti-preparationist". Today I am a "pacifist" and "preparationist". I have yet to meet an American who has had the opportunity to see the present war, who is not a "preparationist" and a "pacifist".

As a matter of fact I think all Americans are "pacifists". We not only abhor the thought of war, but we have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by war.

But our forefathers were not pacifists. Nor did they find 3,000 miles of ocean to be an impassible barrier. They crossed the ocean and by force deprived the American Indians of their possessions. Then, not content with that, they drove away the Dutch, then the Spanish, and the French; and finally they pushed the British out of the country. Now that we of today possess all this, we want peace; we are pacifists.

Today in America such terms as preparedness, military training, and war, have superseded the weather as popular subjects of conversation. An extraordinary amount of loose generalities are being indulged in where these topics are con-

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science May 18, 1916.

cerned. Nothing has so vividly brought this home to me as the fact that during the past two days I have asked eleven educated men, all of them preparationists, if they knew or had in mind any specific definition either of war or military training. In each case I received a negative answer.

Let us consider the question: "What is the purpose of warfare"? The members of our General Staff write very concise English. In a little brown book called "Rules of Land Warfare", written for the General Staff by Colonel Edwin F. Glenn, we find the following definition:

"The purpose of warfare is to reduce the armed forces of the enemy to complete submission at the earliest possible moment by means of regulated violence."

I find such a definition or rule very illuminating. It helps me to better comprehend various incidents of world politics. It, for instance, completes my understanding of the Lusitania affair. The Germans didn't "play the game" of war according to rules. They did not "reduce the armed forces of the enemy"; they subjugated our unarmed citizens, the unarmed citizenry of a friendly country.

Let us consider the question: "What is the purpose of military training?" Concise definition proves illuminating. In our American infantry drill regulations, we find statements to the effect that preparedness in general and military training in particular have but one purpose in view: *The sole end of military training is to produce efficiency in battle.* It is an axiom, in all the armies of the world, that at least one year of training is necessary to fit the troops for the firing line. This is axiomatic, not only in the armies of Japan and Russia, of Germany and France, of Austria and Italy, but also in those of Great Britain and the United States.

I shall indulge in one illustration. Military experts agree that at the commencement of the present war the British territorial battalions were superior to our own militia regiments. To begin with, they attracted a better class of enlisted men, due principally to the fact that the British militiamen are not required to perform strike duty. They were better officered;

a considerable number of their leaders were retired or resigned regular army officers, who had had experience in actual war. They had certainly received the equivalent of more than four months' training. Nevertheless, in spite of the desperate need of reinforcements in Flanders, no territorial battalion was considered fit to withstand the test of fire until it had received eight months' additional training. The first territorial battalion to see service, a battalion of the London Scottish, did so only after it had spent eight additional months in a training camp. Troops which have received less than one year's training are worse than useless. Their addition to a weak army only tends to make that army weaker.

In what manner are the various nations of the earth accustomed to impart this year or more of training to their citizens? Countries such as Belgium, China, and the United States, have, of course, no system at all. The true military systems of the world may be divided roughly into two types or classes. The first class is composed of Switzerland and Australia, and for purposes of argument we will call this type the Swiss System. The second type, of which Germany, Russia and Japan are examples, we will call the monarchical type.

In the monarchical systems, the government takes over each able-bodied man for from one to three years, in order that he may be made into an efficient soldier. There is some difference of opinion as to whether the economic value, the personal efficiency, gained by these years of service, is a full equivalent in economic value received, for several years of time subtracted from the productive life of the individual, but it is worthy of note that most of the disapproval is voiced in countries which have never tried the monarchical system, and that in countries such as Germany, the army is known and approved as the poor's man's university.

Assume, however, for purposes of argument that these years taken from the life of a man and spent in a monarchical army are in reality a complete economic loss to him. In the light of this assumption, consider the democratic system of Switzerland. The Swiss system, and its counterpart in Australia,

are in strong contrast to the monarchical systems. In Australia, for example, the individual spends only about eight weeks in military service *after* he has reached his twenty-first year. This astonishing result is made possible because in Australia and in Switzerland every boy receives the equivalent of more than one year's military training as a part of his education. It serves as a vehicle of education, like mathematics or the languages. Military training teaches truthfulness, self-restraint, self-control, discipline, obedience. It makes men sound in mind and body. It teaches patriotism. It is the only vehicle in school education which teaches patriotism. Hence in the Swiss and Australian systems military training is not a loss to the individual, since it is an educational gain and does not conflict with the individual's productive years.

When the adoption of military training was under discussion in Australia, the women of the country violently opposed it and almost defeated its enactment into law. Within two short years, however, they had become its most ardent advocates, for even that brief time had been sufficient to bring out such a marvelous improvement in their sons as to demonstrate its great educational value.

We thus arrive at one very strong point of contrast between the democratic system of Switzerland and the monarchical systems. In the latter, the individual receives his necessary military training as part of his life work. In the former, he receives it as part of his education.

The Swiss system is organized for defense only, and no Swiss soldier may be sent out of his country on military duty unless he specifically volunteers for such foreign service, just as our soldiers who fought in Cuba were volunteers who expressed their willingness to serve their country on foreign soil. The Australians who fought so courageously at the Dardanelles were men who had specifically and willingly volunteered for foreign service.

For successful military aggression, the monarchical system is necessary. Aggressive monarchies, which, like those of Germany and Japan, frankly indorse a policy of military aggression, need great standing armies, waiting ready to be

hurled upon the prey at any opportune moment. They must be ever ready to rush into the enemy's country.

We thus arrive at a second great point of difference between the Swiss system and the monarchical system. The Swiss system is organized for defense only and would be incapable of offense except after a laborious reconstruction, which would in effect convert it into a monarchical system. The Swiss system is the expression of a nation whose ideals are ideals of peace, whose motto is not "Switzerland über Alles" but "Peace on earth, good will to men." I once saw it on the wall of a humble Swiss mountain home; and under it hung the army rifle, which is to be found in every Swiss household. The text upon the wall serves as a reminder of the religious principles of the father of that Swiss home, and as a greeting to all peacefully-minded men. The presence of the rifle in no way contradicted the text, and yet, for those to whom the text may be "but a scrap of paper", the meaning of the rifle was unmistakable.

The Swiss army has impressed me as the most democratic institution in the world. Every individual, be he a farmer's boy or the son of a banker, stands on the same footing. Every individual, no matter what his antecedents, must begin as a private in the ranks. Consequently every officer has at one time been a private. Neither birth, social position or wealth have any influence in the selection of officers. Officers are appointed solely on a basis of military merit.

Thus we perceive the third marked point of difference between the Swiss system and the monarchical system, for in Germany, Japan and Russia, and even in England, the armies are so extremely undemocratic that it is well nigh impossible for those not of high birth and possessed of social position to become officers of the army.

The Swiss system, while thoroughly adequate for defense, is one of the least expensive military systems in the world. It is inexpensive, not merely in that it exacts no long terms of service from its citizens, but also in that it requires a smaller expenditure of the national funds than any other military system in the world. The Swiss system costs less than nine million dollars a year to maintain in time of peace.

Here is its fourth point of contrast. Germany in money alone spends nearly four times as much per capita per year on her armed forces. The cost of the Swiss system is about \$1.60 per capita of population. Our inexecutive system costs us about \$2.40 per capita. Switzerland and Austria offer us for adoption a defense system which not only has been successful, but also is economical.

If the United States needs adequate preparedness it should adopt a system inspired by the Swiss system. It is not possible to copy slavishly any foreign system. It is impossible to transplant piece-meal to a new environment and climate a system which has been constructed for an entirely different environment and climate. The United States should adopt a system inspired by the Swiss system, and the United States might well adopt a spirit inspired by the Swiss spirit.

Some of our self-styled pacifist friends say that we do not need preparation, maintaining that when this war is over, the combatants will be too exhausted to think of attacking any other enemy. But this is not true. Armies are never so effective and nations are never politically so powerful as immediately following long wars. Practise makes perfect. Greece was never stronger than after Salamis and Marathon. Rome was never more powerful than after the Second Carthaginian war. When this war is over, many nations will be in excellent condition to attack us.

Three conditions must prevail before any nation will attack us: we must possess something which other nations need; there must be race antipathy, or there must be a dispute—a *casus belli*.

All three of these conditions will prevail at the end of the present hostilities. They even prevail at present. We possess many things which other nations need. We are the only opulent nation in the world today. In all history there is no single example of a nation which has been opulent and unprepared and escaped invasion.

And what of race antipathy? The weakness and vacillation which we have displayed in the last two years have made us frankly despised by all the virile nations of the world; and

to be despised is the most dangerous form of all race antipathies for the despised nation.

And what of disputes? We have commenced disputes with Germany, Austria, Great Britain and Japan. Those disputes have dragged along for more than a year. They will continue to drag along until the end of the present war. Then, and only then, when the hands of our antagonists are free, will they be settled.

The situation is exactly similar to one in our own history. In 1862, when our entire attention had to be given to the armies of the Confederacy, France ventured to invade Mexico in order to protect her citizens from attack by the irresponsible savages who at that time inhabited that territory. In 1865, however, she renounced Mexico and dreams of colonial empires and abandoned Maximilian to his fate, for even Napoleon III dared not oppose the veteran and disengaged army which marched down Pennsylvania Avenue on May 23, 1865. Our self-styled pacifists and anti-preparationists and mollycoddles in general, maintain that weakness and cowardice mean safety, and that preparedness means war. If preparedness means war, then learning to swim means drowning; surgeons are murderers; fire-insurance is arson; and Noah built the ark to bring the flood.

## THE COMPULSORY SYSTEM IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE<sup>1</sup>

EWALD HECKER

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MUCH has already been written and discussed regarding the compulsory military system in the German Empire, and no doubt many of you are familiar with various phases of it. My object is merely to present to you the routine organization, which takes the German young man at the age of twenty, proceeds to train him as a soldier, and exercises a certain control over him, in a military sense for the benefit of the nation, until he is forty-five years old.

A short historical summary of the causes, which led to the adoption, or rather the development, of the universal compulsory system in Germany may be of interest. After Napoleon I had conquered nearly all of Europe and incidentally shattered the old Prussian army, General Scharnhorst conceived the idea of placing the entire population capable of bearing arms under a military regime. The fundamental basis of General Scharnhorst's idea was naturally to free Germany from the burden of the French yoke. According to the stipulations in the treaty of peace with the French in the year 1806, it was agreed that the standing Prussian army should not exceed 40,000 men at any one time. With these arbitrary restrictions in mind, General Scharnhorst, who already had the nucleus or skeleton of an army available, undertook to train the entire populace into a military force, and he did so by giving a severe intensive training, lasting several months, to the 40,000 men called for service. As soon as that number was sufficiently trained, these men returned to their fields of home endeavor, and a new batch of recruits were summoned and trained. In this way his standing army never exceeded

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

40,000 men and through the interchanging process gradually the entire population was thoroughly grounded in military service.

Thus we can almost assume that the German military system was due to, and made possible by, the restrictions imposed upon the Germans by the French at the treaty of 1806. By the development of this military system, the successful termination of the War of Liberation in 1813 was assured. The soldiers who had served their term in the aforesaid army of 40,000, when retired to make room for a new levy, were thereupon called the *Prussian Landwehr*, and we may almost say became the backbone of the army. In fact public opinion in Prussia voiced its sentiment in approval of the continuation of General Scharnhorst's idea, and the military scheme was more carefully organized and developed. The other separate states of Germany soon recognized the value of the Prussian system and adopted it in the years following.

The three and four years' service required by this method of compulsory military service placed rather a heavy burden upon the people. The terms were too long, and the men called to the colors were absent from their agricultural and mercantile pursuits for so long a time, that finally the economic conditions of the country suffered.

Gradually also the improved conditions in social life brought greater rewards than did a military life. It was therefore necessary to carefully study the best needs of the nation as well as of the individual, to produce the best possible conditions in the interest of a sound economic national existence, and also to provide an efficient and capable military establishment so vital and necessary.

A limited period of training of, for instance, two or three years, had proven sufficient to make a good soldier out of the average citizen.

One of the strongest bulwarks of a good military system is an unfailing reserve force of non-commissioned officers. To those to whom the military service was agreeable and who desired to continue in the army after absolving their two years' period, an opportunity was given to enable them to remain

for longer periods. Their development and training thereupon was such as to give assurance that upon their return to private life, they would be equipped with an education which would be of value to them in their future civil career.

In time of peace the standing army of modern Germany approximates only 1% of the total population. The figure varies but a small fraction of 1%. The Reichstag stipulates the number of troops required in times of peace and controls the appropriation of the necessary funds. The standing army has never exceeded, as a matter of fact,  $1\frac{1}{2}\%$  of the total population, as, for instance, in the summer of 1914, the standing army amounted to 1.117%.

The above figures will readily demonstrate that from 30 to 40% of the available male population capable of carrying arms was never called for military service.

The German citizen is liable for military service beginning with his twentieth year and continues so until he has passed his forty-fifth year. Once every year, from his twentieth birthday on, the German citizen must appear before a local military "Kommandant" of his district for control. According to the military requirements of the nation, the available men who are not drafted for military service, 30 to 40% of the total, are always subject to service in the reserve.

Owing to the surplus of available recruits, the greatest care is exercised in the selection of the men. Physical characteristics are predominantly considered, but concessions are always possible on account of educational motives or family dependence. In fact the human equation always plays a prominent part in the selection of men for military service.

The German military force of today consists of the so-called *regular army* and the *landsturm*. The "regular army" consists of the active standing army and the *landwehr*. The standing army is divided into two branches: the active and the reserve forces. The active army is composed of men capable of military service, beginning at the age of twenty, who serve two years, with the exception of the cavalry and parts of the field artillery, who serve three years. After the two or three years of actual service the soldier is delegated to the reserve.

The reserve forces consist of soldiers who have served the prescribed two or three years and who thereafter for four or five years serve a period of training of from four to six weeks every few years, according to whatever branch of military service they are incorporated. After a soldier has served in the standing army, including service in the active as well as reserve forces, he is automatically transferred to the *landwehr*, in which he remains for five years. In times of necessity, the *landwehr* is liable to a call to the colors.

In summarizing the foregoing, you will note that the German citizen who enters the military service at the age of twenty has by this time usually reached the age of thirty-two years, his twelve years of military service being divided as follows: two years in the active forces, five years in the reserve, five years in the *landwehr*. Occasionally parts of the *landwehr* are called upon to undergo a special fortnightly-term of service, usually in connection with special maneuvers. After absolving his *landwehr* period and until he is forty-five years of age, the German citizen belongs to the *landsturm*, which is again divided into two branches: Those who have served and were trained, and those who were not drafted owing to the reasons given before.

Mention should also be made of a certain group of the last form, which includes the youths of from seventeen to twenty years of age, who, however, are not called for service in ordinary times. It may be added here, that special consideration is given the young men, who started to learn various trades and professions, before they entered their first period of service in the army. Their assignments to the various regiments are always made from a double standpoint.

In a well-organized regiment, it is essential to have representatives of the various trades included in the personnel, which assures a better organization and independence of the regiment as a complete unit. The other advantage of this system of selection is that it enables a recruit to develop his chosen trade, so that when he retires to civil life again he will have the additional benefit of a thorough training in his chosen work as well as having become a good soldier. For

instance, after three years service in a cavalry regiment as a farrier, the soldier receives a certificate, which practically assures him a good position in civil life as the result of the training he has received in that branch while in the army. The same applies to tailors, bakers, carpenters and so on.

For those to whom the military life is agreeable, particularly non-commissioned officers, as mentioned before, special courses of instruction are available to enable them to develop still further in their military career as well as in general education. Lessons and lectures are provided for the study of languages, mathematics, geography, etc. When they desire to retire into civil life to positions in the postal or railway or revenue services, preference is given. After twelve years of faithful service, a premium of 1,000 Marks is given to enable them to start independently in business in civil life.

We now come to the men of whom you no doubt have heard as *Einjaehrige* or one year's service men. This institution is of great importance from a practical as well as a military standpoint. It originated at the time when the army was not yet large enough to accommodate all eligible men, and recruits were drawn by lot. In order to enjoy the rights of a one-year service man, a young man has to provide his equipment, and receives no pay to support himself. Likewise proof must be given of a superior education, by means of school testimonials or on the basis of a rather severe examination. The one-year voluntary service, then, is in no sense a privilege of wealth, but rather a privilege of education, for whereas the examination may never be remitted, assistance is given to young men of superior education or exceptional ability in their trade who lack the means for supporting themselves throughout the entire year.

The one-year service, which was introduced by Minister of War von Boyen in 1814, together with the duty of general military service, has two striking advantages. In the first place, military service for only one year interrupts but slightly the general training of the young Germans. On the contrary, it is regarded by many as a great advantage that young men, whether merchants, students or farmers, interrupt once in

their life their civil employment and become familiar with an entirely new world. In the second place, these one-year service men provide the indispensable material for replenishing the body of officers in time of need. After one year of service has rendered the sifting possible, the superiors select those suitable for the position of officers, who are then called to the colors twice for a period of eight weeks, thoroughly trained, and become eligible for a commission as officers. In the event of mobilization, these reserve and *landwehr* officers are intermingled with the regular officers in such a manner that a great number of reserve officers are drawn into the line regiments while regular officers are assigned to the reserve and *landwehr* regiments, especially in positions of command. Acquaintance with officers' corps in time of war shows that a large proportion of them are judges, state's attorneys, teachers, professors, artists, writers, farmers, merchants, engineers and officials of all kinds.

The military spirit in the German army is chiefly represented in its corps of officers and the education which they impart to the youth of the land.

When the decision is reached by the German youth who desires to embrace the military career as a life's work, he makes application, when becoming of military age, to the colonel of the regiment he intends to join. The choice of selecting the branch of service, and the particular regiment is open to the candidate. If the applicant possesses the necessary qualities, mentally, physically and morally, in a degree sufficient to appeal to the regimental commander, he is accepted and enters the regiment as a private, where he does the same work as the other privates, but in addition thereto must practise and study for his profession. After one year's service in the ranks he is sent to the "Kriegsschule" or "Military Academy", where he spend nine months in patient application to military studies.

Thereupon he takes an examination to show his eligibility to become an officer. If he has successfully passed this examination he is proposed for admission by the regiment's officers and, to be acceptable, must receive an unanimous

vote in his favor. Before being admitted to the officer's rank, the facts are placed before the Emperor, who thereupon presents to the office his commission.

As to the broad aspects of compulsory military service, with reference to its advantages to the individual as well as as to the nation, it is universally conceded that the two years' military service is of great benefit. It broadens and educates; it gives mental and moral support; it provides a physical foundation of a superior order; and, last but not least, it inculcates the highly desirous disciplinary features, which have proven to be so necessary. In peace times, the same moral force has been a powerful factor in instituting social reforms.

Contrary to general belief a two years' military service does not imply any disadvantage whatsoever in a country where every male individual is placed under the same obligations and where preference in any industrial pursuit as well as in social life is visible to the man who has served his country faithfully.

In conclusion, I quote from a leading military authority of the present period, Major Deutelmöser. In a statement written several years before the present war, he characterized the ideals and achievements of true military training as follows:

"An army fit for war is not a great machine in which, if it is properly constructed throughout, the motive power proceeds from one point and by automatic compulsion sets the most distant wheels in operation. Each element of which an army is composed is an individual being, has its own world of thoughts and feelings, with an individual will, which may just as easily express itself against the operation of the whole as in agreement with it. Herein lies the principal difficulty in the leading of great masses. If the highest plane of agreement is to be reached, it is needful that the many thousands act together, not under mechanical compulsion, but as independently thinking and willing units. Formerly this was quite different from today, since the close rank formations of the past left but slight latitude for the individual. King

Frederick's Grenadiers fought shoulder to shoulder, closely knit in serried ranks. The battle formation of present-day infantry fighting, on the contrary, is that of the deployed firing line.

"Thus the individual, at the very moment when brought face to face with the immediate danger of death, is deprived of the influence of the word of command. He must furthermore, seek cover in order to offer the smallest possible target to the enemy. As a result, he disappears from the supervising eye of the leader more than might be desired and he is in a higher degree left to himself. The danger is herewith created that the expediency and uniformity of the action be lost, and that the will to victory give way to the consciousness of the continuing presence of death, calculated to undermine the morale. There is but one counter measure for this: to so develop in each man in time of peace the independent power of decision so that he may know how to act correctly without any constant direction, and above all to train him to honorable feelings and strength of will which under the stress of necessity and danger by their own force overcome the instinct of self-preservation."

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## COLLEGES AS TRAINING CENTERS FOR AN ADEQUATE STAFF OF OFFICERS<sup>1</sup>

EDMUND J. JAMES

President of the University of Illinois

I SUBMIT for your consideration at this time only a few suggestions upon a fundamental element in this whole question of military preparedness; namely, the creation of a sufficiently numerous body of adequately prepared officers to man properly the armed forces of the nation.

This is of course one of the fundamental problems in the creation of an army. Our own Civil War, like all previous wars, demonstrated that fact. It was further emphasized by our experience in the Spanish War, and certainly no war ever furnished a more complete proof of it than the present one. The statement by the distinguished ex-Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, that in answer to a call from the president of the United States for volunteers to repel an actual invasion, a million men would answer over night, is not, I believe, in any sense exaggerated. Thank God for this fact. The existence of such a spirit is of course the best guarantee of our national salvation. But these million men would not be an army, but a mere horde, and to convert them into an army would require months of severe discipline under the tutelage of a trained and efficient corps of officers, and to produce such a corps of officers would require years. Let us make no mistake on this point.

We see how true this is from the experience of England in the present world struggle. When the history of this war comes to be written, it will be found that the slowness with which England got into the real conflict on the land is not explained merely by a lack of ammunition or by the lack of volunteers, but in a still higher degree by lack of officers to

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

command the volunteers and direct wisely the use of the ammunition.

Now where are we in the United States going to get today under any scheme which has been thus far proposed a sufficiently numerous body of properly-trained officers to man these enlarged forces which we are talking about, whether they take the form of a large regular army, an energized militia, or a newly-created continental body, or consist of all these together?

We may just at this point, by inconsiderate action, waste an enormous amount of money, as we are apt to do in this country in so many other public enterprises, by attempting to do over night what requires months or years. The longer it takes to accomplish any enterprise which it is necessary to complete, the sooner we ought to be about the beginning of it.

Any method of training officers for the active and reserve forces of the United States which is to be efficient and satisfactory to the country at large, must rest, I believe, on three principles.

First, the officers must be liberally educated as well as technically trained men. The old days when all that was necessary to become an officer was to possess a rifle and be raised to command by the votes of one's fellow soldiers, have passed away, and any nation which relies on the old system will certainly be doomed when thrown into the vortex of modern war.

Even fifty years ago in this country where all the conditions of life favored the development of the volunteer officer, and where the volunteer officer, man for man, was fully equal in intellect and general ability to the trained West Pointer, as the war wore on, its conduct on both sides came more and more into the hands of the educated and trained man.

Today the officer who would be competent for the serious responsibilities resting upon him must know far more and be far better trained than his predecessor in 1861.

Second, such a body of officers should be recruited from all sections of the country, from all states—roughly speaking, in proportion to the population. If we are to develop and maintain our armed force in such a way as to protect the country

adequately from invasion, we must keep alive the interest of every section of the United States in this fundamental function of government. One of the most efficient minor means to accomplish this result is to see that the national forces and the corps of officers are recruited from every section of the country alike.

Third, the majority of such a large body of officers as is called for under present conditions should be obtaining a practical preparation for the pursuits of civil life while acquiring their military education, since the most of them will of course enter the reserve instead of the active corps.

West Point offers an admirable center for the training of a considerable number of the officers of the active and permanent force, but even if it were greatly enlarged and often multiplied, it could not turn out a sufficient supply even for the active service alone.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that neither West Point nor schools like it can turn out the body of reserve officers necessary, since its curriculum is too exclusively military in character, and not sufficiently broad to serve the purposes of a training which, while primarily organized for other purposes, namely, the pursuits of civil life, should as an incident, furnish the preparation required for a reserve officer.

A partial answer to the question I have raised, namely, how can these officers be provided,—and I believe it will be found to be more nearly a complete answer than it would seem to be at first blush,—is to utilize the means at hand in the series of national-state institutions, now more than fifty in number, at least one in each state and one also in Porto Rico and Hawaii, known as the land-grant colleges.

These institutions are first of all national institutions. They owe their origin to national initiative, were created in response to national legislation, and are supported in large part by national appropriations. They are required by federal law to give instruction in military science and tactics, and nearly thirty thousand young men are now receiving in these institutions such military training as may be obtained by three hours' work per week through two years under the supervision for

the most part of an officer of the regular army detailed for this purpose by the War Department of the United States, and carrying out a scheme of instruction approved by said Department.

All that is necessary to make at least the beginning of an adequate scheme for supplying the reserve officers, and for that matter, many of the active officers of our national forces, is to energize and vitalize the military departments of these institutions, already in organic connection with the federal War Department, already attended by fifty thousand young men, all of whom are pledged to perform at least two years' military service. How much better it is to train effectively the young men who are now on hand and who are willing to accept this training, instead of trying to get thirty thousand other volunteers who will come in, in any case, with reluctance.

These institutions are already among the strong centers of intellectual life and light in the states where they are located. They are permanent foundations of no mean extent, and will with the passing years exercise an ever larger and more important leadership in their respective communities. The value of the property of these institutions already exceeds one hundred and sixty million dollars; their annual income exceeds thirty-five million dollars; and their total attendance exceeds one hundred and fifteen thousand.

The fact that they are state as well as national institutions, drawing the bulk of their income from state sources, and that in them the co-operation of the state and the nation is so finely exemplified, should be an additional reason for making them an important link in this great chain of national defense.

These institutions are moreover peculiarly democratic in their nature. The tuition charges are moderate or altogether absent, the mode of life of the student and professor is simple, and the cost of living is comparatively low. Because of their relation to the state and the nation, the feeling of loyalty and patriotism on the part of the students is strong, and the time and effort and expense required for this military service are given cheerfully, and in some cases enthusiastically.

In my opinion this military drill at our land-grant colleges is one of the most valuable elements in the general education of the young men who come to these institutions. The drill in regular, immediate obedience to the commands of superior officers is something which is needed very much by our American youngsters, and the habit of doing things in the proper way because they are told to do it, is worth cultivating in the young people of this country.

This military drill is one of the most democratizing elements at work in our student body. It crosses all lines of college, church, fraternity or social organization. It is susceptible to no pull or favoritism. It measures all classes, rich and poor, idle and industrious, social and misanthropic by the same standard and insists on efficiency or elimination. Its principle is "do" or "get out"—a most desirable antidote for the enervating policy of indulgence pursued by so many American parents and college faculties which tends to develop a race of mollycoddles and inefficient.

I am not disturbed by the fears of some of my pacifist friends that such military drill as we are proposing will develop a militaristic spirit. This nation is much more likely to go to pieces upon the greed of Mammon, or indulgence in the lust of the eye and of the flesh, or the pursuit of pleasure and other dangerous rocks of that kind than upon any development of a war-like spirit.

But, after all is said and done, the real results accomplished by two years of such training as we have at the present time, and as I have indicated in the above description, are very limited; results which are well worth while accomplishing, fully worth all it costs to achieve them, and yet entirely inadequate to meet the present needs of our national defense.

I desire to present for your consideration, therefore, a still more comprehensive plan in connection with these land-grant institutions, and that is in brief the establishing of a regular four-year course in military science and tactics in each of these universities, at any rate in each of the larger institutions, leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science in Military Science and Art, and qualifying the student to enter the regular

army as second lieutenant upon a par with the graduate of West Point.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the elements of such a curriculum are already present in the schedule of any of these larger institutions, and in many of the smaller ones. The courses lacking could easily be supplied by the staff of officers which the institution would be entitled to if the plan above suggested were to be carried out.

Such a course in Military Art and Science could easily be combined with the other courses now offered in the University in such a way that the student could complete both courses at the same time, taking, for example, the degrees of Bachelor of Military Science, and Bachelor of Electrical or Mechanical Engineering in the course of six years. Such a graduate would have, in addition to the military course, an extended curriculum in an entirely different field which would greatly heighten the value of his military course from the standpoint of a military officer. On the other hand, in addition to his course which would prepare him for a civil occupation, he would have the military training which would be no mean supplement, strengthening and fortifying the other course. Such a graduate would be fully qualified to enter the army as second lieutenant or to enter civil life as an engineer, or lawyer, or farmer.

If, after the completion of this course, he were admitted to the army for one year, he could obtain a final and complete training, qualifying him fully as a reserve officer in the regular army, continental army, or national guard.

So far as I am aware, all of our military authorities would agree that such a course properly constructed and properly taught would be amply satisfactory from the military point of view. The subjects of instruction would be so distributed throughout the curriculum that the student would be pursuing

<sup>1</sup> A more complete statement of the details and practical workings of the plan proposed by Dr. James will be found in his testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs on February 10, 1916. (Vol. 2 of Hearings on H. B. 2766, page 1379 *et seq.*) The plan of organization for military training at the University of Illinois, under Dr. James' supervision, is also there presented.

a military subject in each semester, thus completing the military features of the course at the same time as the others.

I believe that if the federal government would offer a military scholarship of \$250 per annum, or \$1,500 for the course, on condition that the candidate after graduation in the University should enter the army as second lieutenant for one year, with lieutenant's pay, and then enter the reserve corps for a certain number of years subsequent, the government would find no difficulty in getting a considerable number of first-class officers in each of these institutions at a cost very much less and for the purposes of such an officer under very much better conditions than a corresponding training can be furnished in an institution like West Point. I believe that at Illinois, for example, we could turn out fifty such men a year, half as many as graduated from West Point in 1914. It would be necessary, of course, for students who wish to pursue this curriculum to enlist for this service much as they enlist at the present time when they enter West Point.

Some distinguished military authorities whom I have consulted, think that the necessary combined course leading to both these degrees could be completed in five years instead of six, and an officer of high rank expressed to me the opinion that by utilizing the vacations in the training camps recently established by the government, the work could be done in four years. If so, all the better. It would save time and money. But the important thing is that the work should be well done and not that it should be done quickly or cheaply. This is a matter for the expert opinion of such bodies as the General Staff and the War College.

Now the advantages of such a scheme as we are proposing are:

First, a *large* number of officers can thus be secured, and it will be necessary to have a very large number if we actually try to enlarge the regular army, or create a continental army, or energize the militia, and particularly if we attempt all three.

Second, a *well trained* body of officers can be thus obtained; officers who would have not only the military point of view, but the civilian point of view; officers whose military prepara-

tion would be greatly strengthened and vitalized by their other studies.

Third, a *well distributed* body of officers could thus be obtained, coming from all sections of the country and all classes of society.

Fourth, a body of officers would thus be secured who, while competent from a military point of view, would have received their training in institutions dominated by *civilian* ideas and ideals; a body whose members, while trained for their duties as military officers, would still feel themselves not primarily soldiers, but primarily civilians, having prepared themselves primarily not for a military but a civilian career.

Fifth, a body of officers would be obtained animated by the same fundamental notions on politics and government as the great mass of the American people from whom they have sprung and in whose midst they have lived while receiving their training. They would be, in fact, a true citizen corps of officers, qualified to command a citizen soldiery.

## THE PLATTSBURG CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY TRAINING<sup>1</sup>

HALSTEAD DOREY

Captain Fourth Infantry, U. S. Army; Aide-de-Camp on Staff of General  
Commanding the Department of the East

I DID not know that anyone still thought we would never again need any of our boys to fight for their country. They may not necessarily have to fight on the firing line, but there is some place in the community where they will fit in. It would be entirely wrong for all of the two, three, five or ten millions to be on the firing line, because then there would be no one to feed them, clothe them, furnish them with the necessary ammunition, and replace those injured. In time of peace, we soldier men expect and want to conform to civil custom and civil usage. In time of war, if the nation is to be at all successful, things must run in a military way, and even those back on the farm and on the railroads and in the factories must know something of the military way.

In addition, we believe that a man is improved by military training, but it is not necessary that he be trained every hour of the day, or every day, any more than he takes physical exercise every hour of the day, or every day. The fact that he is only under military discipline for two hours of the day does not to me seem any more absurd than that he does not take more than two hours of physical exercise, or one hour, each day. In other words, the necessity for having him under military discipline all the time does not appear any greater than that he should be taking physical exercise all the time he is studying history or Latin.

Of course, anything short of universal training is from our point of view a make-shift. It is rather interesting in this connection to note that the only two English-speaking coun-

<sup>1</sup> Discussion at the evening meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

tries where they have universal military training are Australia and New Zealand. These are also the only two English-speaking countries that have woman suffrage and in which the representatives of organized labor are politically in power. The details as to who shall be exempt and at what ages the others shall serve, and the like, have been worked out and decided by the representatives of organized labor in those two countries, and from all I can learn, they have done it very well indeed.

One of the make-shift ways of dealing with our defense problem is the plan of giving four or five weeks of intensive, progressive military training, during the vacation period, to the youth of our country. That was started in 1913 at Gettysburg, where there were some two hundred college boys and students in their senior year at the high school gathered together for this practical instruction under regular army officers. Certain school masters, presidents of colleges, became so interested in this and so enthusiastic that they organized an advisory committee to extend the idea. Dr. Drinker, of Lehigh, was the leader, and the presidents of Cornell, Yale, Harvard, Princeton, the University of Illinois, and many others, are now on that committee. Largely through their efforts at their respective colleges and universities, the student camps grew each year until last summer the attendance throughout the country was about one thousand men.

The war in Europe had broken out in the meantime. Some of the older men who had been driving ambulances in Europe came back, and as one of them expressed it, "Any of us who have been over there and come back home are simply scared to death". They talked to their friends, and applications began to come from men who were over the age limit, thirty years. This was taken up with General Wood, who said that if we could get a hundred men to enroll he would hold a camp in continuation of the student camp at Plattsburg. When that camp opened there were over twelve hundred men, and then there was another camp of over five hundred men. Those men became so interested, and have interested so many others in what they consider a good cause, that tonight (May 18th)

there are eight thousand, seven hundred and seventy-three enrolled in 1916 for Plattsburg alone.<sup>1</sup>

Camps are also to be held in the Central Department and in the West, and one is now running at Fort Oglethorpe at Chickamauga Park, in the South. We do not pretend to make officers by any means. The men who have been in these camps are most modest concerning their military knowledge. One of the first things they learn is that you can't make even one soldier between sun and sun. They really know a great deal more than they think they do, because with their intelligence and with the magnificent spirit in which they come to the camps, they are able to absorb a great deal more than the average man, and they work from daylight until long after dark.

The prime reason for the success of the camps is the magnificent spirit of the men who go to them. The effect upon us regular officers has been one of great encouragement. Here were eighteen hundred men who showed us, not only by word, but by deed, by sacrificing a full month of their vacations and also at some expense, that they looked upon our profession as something more than a survival of a medieval custom. It was an inspiration to have these men working right shoulder to shoulder with us, doing the same sort of work and wanting to learn all they possibly could in the short time they had.

It is a little more difficult for me to try to tell you what the civilians got from these camps. Our effort was to give them a fair idea of what the military profession is like, how complicated it is, how important it is that the man who is going out to lead other men in battle should know his business, so that it wouldn't be as it has been in all our previous wars, when very often the incompetent man was put in charge of the better man, either because he had had a few weeks of military training or had political influence. The men in these camps would come to us at night, after some of these drills, and say: "Why, I never realized how important it was to be able to look quickly

<sup>1</sup> On June 15, 1916, the number had increased to 12,321, for the Plattsburg Camps.

over the ground and then remember what it looked like after I had gotten down into the valley."

We give them a chance to try out the different arms, so that when trouble comes, if and when it does, they will have a fair idea as to the branch for which they are best fitted. We regular officers have often seen, in the Philippines and in the Spanish War, a good infantryman wasted in the engineer corps, good cavalry material in the infantry, or vice versa, because when war broke out the man volunteered with the nearest organization, which might not fit his particular ability at all, and there wasn't time to find out where he would be most useful. We never have had any organization before our wars have started. We have always organized our volunteer fire departments and built our fire engines after the fire has broken out.

This is the reason for our large pension list now. If either side had had an organized force of twenty thousand men at the outbreak of the Civil War, it would simply have been a question of how long it would have taken to march to the other's capital to finish the war. Instead of that, we went along and built up two huge and eventually magnificent armies. At the beginning they were simply two armed mobs.

I think I have time to tell you one Civil War story. At the French maneuvers in 1908, I was talking to a French general officer who had been a lieutenant in Mexico with Maximilian. He found that I had been in Mexico, and we discussed various places we both knew. I had on my blue uniform, the nearest we have to the old Union uniform. Finally one of his young staff officers said, "General, why did we get out of Mexico in such a hurry?" He laughed, and pointing his finger at me, said, "Because there were over a million trained men in that uniform who told us to get out and we would have been fools not to have hurried," and that was at the end of the greatest struggle this republic has had to go through in its history.

These camps are democratic. The men are assigned to tents in the order in which they report. No man knows whether he is going to be with his brother or an utter stranger.

It is like it is in the French army. At the French maneuvers we were riding into a village one evening with an officer of the general staff who was of the old aristocracy. There was a peasant standing beside the road and when the officer saw him he jumped off his horse and they embraced. Then he turned to us and said, "This man and I were together during our period of obligatory service in the ranks. *He and I are of the same class.* All the other men of our class in the vicinity are coming in tonight and we are going to have a reunion. He and I are of the same class." That is, they had been called to service at the same time and had served together for two years with the one same object—to prepare themselves to defend their country in time of need. Today I know that one of them is doing it, and I am sure the other is, if he isn't dead.

That was what we tried to teach at Plattsburg, perhaps more than anything else. There were no Jews nor Gentiles, Catholics nor Protestants, no men from Yale, nor Harvard, nor Columbia, no men from Illinois nor Missouri. They were simply good Americans, trying to prepare themselves to defend their country should their country ever need them.

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## COMPULSORY TRAINING UNDER STATE AUSPICES AND THE PLACE OF STATE MILITIA IN NATIONAL DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

BRIGADIER-GENERAL LOUIS W. STOTESBURY

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THE objects of civil government cannot be better expressed than in the words of our constitution: "To establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty." Of these objects, that upon which the strength and stability of the whole structure depends is "the common defense".

From the beginning of our history, provision for the common defense has been an impelling motive in the development of our governmental system. The first union among any of the colonies, that formed in 1643 between Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven, known as "The United Colonies of New England", was for common defense against the Indians and to resist the claims and encroachments of the Dutch. After the Declaration of Independence and the establishment of a central government under the confederation, provision for the common defense was formally declared in the Articles of Confederation as the primary object of that firm league of friendship. The weakness of the common defense during the confederation was abundantly manifest. It was said that Congress had the power to declare anything, but could actually do nothing. They were authorized to contract debts, but thirteen independent legislatures, according to their own convenience, granted or withheld the means which were to enable the general government to pay them. Congress might declare war and determine what number of troops were necessary to carry it on, but could not raise a single soldier.

<sup>1</sup>Address at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

They had only the power to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions upon each state for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants of such state.

The experience of the whole country during the Revolutionary war demonstrated the utter inadequacy and impropriety of such a system of requisition. It was equally at war with economy, efficiency and safety. It was not surprising that Washington should write as he did to a member of the Congress:

You talk, my good sir, of employing influence to appease the present tumults in Massachusetts. . . . But influence is not government. Let us have a government by which our lives, liberties and properties will be secured, or let us know the worst at once.

To devise a new plan which would give strength and authority to the central government, stability and form to the Union, was the great problem of the time, and when there was finally substituted for the loose and unsatisfactory Confederation of the States a real Union of the people of the United States, as one nation, under the constitution, provision for the common defense was declared in the enacting clause to be one of the express purposes for which "this constitution for the United States of America was ordained and established."

No provisions of the constitution were the subject of more careful deliberation than those by which there were finally committed to the general government the abundant powers and authority for providing the means of common defense. By the powers conferred upon the Congress, and the prohibition enjoined against the keeping of "troops or ships of war" by the states, the responsibility, as well as the obligation, of providing for the common defense, was placed upon the federal government. In pursuance of this object, the Congress was given power,

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. . . .

To raise and support armies. . . .

To provide and maintain a navy.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

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To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. . . .

Two distinct and independent fields of action are indicated by the powers conferred upon the Congress in respect to the land forces of the United States. The one is to raise and support armies, with no limitation upon the number to be raised, the purposes for which it may be used or the manner in which it is to be supported. The other is the provision for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, with a limitation upon the governing of the militia in time of peace, the appointment of its officers and the uses for which it may be called out.

The plan of the framers of the constitution was that all the male citizens of the republic should be trained, organized, armed and disciplined, and subject to the immediate call of the Congress, to meet any requirement for the common defense. When Congress, under the constitution, was given power to provide for the organization, arming and disciplining of the militia, it contemplated a system of universal training and compulsory service. The word "militia" was not defined in the constitution. Its meaning was well understood. The framers of the constitution knew to what it referred. It did not mean the male citizenship between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, or any other particular age, nor did it mean the arms-bearing population or "the little armies of the several states", as it is so often referred to in present-day discussions. What it did mean and was intended to include was, "*every man able to serve*", "*all who are capable of bearing arms*", "*the entire male population*", limited only by the

necessities of the common country and subject to such exemptions only as public convenience or experience might dictate, as when the character of one's service in a civil capacity might be deemed of greater value to the state than his service in arms.

Washington declared this military obligation of citizenship to be the main pillar of a free government, and held that every man of proper age and ability of body was "firmly bound by the social compact to perform personally his proportion of military duty for the defense of the state." The first constitution of the state of New York, adopted in 1777, in its provisions relative to the militia, began with the declaration, "It is the duty of every man who enjoys the protection of society to be prepared and willing to defend it."

Instead of providing some form of universal service, such as was contemplated by the constitution, Congress provided only for the enrollment of the "able-bodied male citizens of the respective states" between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and even in that respect, provided for such exemptions as might be authorized by the laws of the respective states, notwithstanding their being above the age of eighteen and under the age of forty-five. It did recognize the obligation of the citizen to prepare himself for service, by requiring that every citizen enrolled should provide himself with a good musket or firelock, sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges suited to the bore of his musket and firelock, and that he should appear so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise or into service.

Instead of providing for the organization of the militia, Congress expressly delegated such authority to the several states, and provided only, that the militia should be organized into such divisions, brigades, regiments and companies as the legislatures of the several states should provide. In respect to the discipline, while Congress had every authority to provide continuous training for one or more years, or for six months, or intensive training for two months or one-month periods in each year, it did none of these things, but again re-

refused to interfere with a system which had grown up under the confederation and left it to the disposition of the several states to prescribe their own system of training. In New York State the legislature provided for three so-called parades in each year, twice by company, once by regiment.

The militia organization planned by the constitution has never had a fair test. It has never had any test at all. No system of training for the militia as such was ever provided. The so-called militia system is characterized rather by its defects than its inherent character and possibilities under the constitution. Washington did his best to induce the Congress to revise the system. In his fifth message, after the enactment of the militia law under which these defects subsequently grew up, he said, referring to the militia:

They may be trained to a degree of energy equal to every military exigency of the United States, but it is an inquiry which cannot be too solemnly pursued, whether the act which is to provide for the national defense by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States, has organized them so as to produce their full effect, whether your own experience in the several states has not detected some imperfections in the scheme, and whether a material feature in an improvement of it ought not to be to afford an opportunity for the study of those branches of the military art which can scarcely ever be attained by practise alone.

Under the authority of the act itself, which permitted such other exemptions from the enrollment as the states might provide, every state eventually abandoned the enrollment, and substituted a system of state volunteers in its place.

The state of New York continued nominally under the system of enforced universal service until 1846, when under the authority conferred by the Federal Militia law, it exempted everyone from service, on payment of a commutation fee of seventy-five cents per individual per year. The so-called "uniformed militia" had, in the meantime, grown up as a protest against the lack of organization and training provided for the militia, and the state, recognizing the real value of these forces, took them over under the name "uniformed mili-

tia" and the theory of the system of commutation introduced was that the proceeds received from the commutation of those who did *not* wish to serve, should be devoted to the support of the uniformed companies, which were made up of those who really *desired* military training and service.

Other states were quick to follow the lead of New York State in this respect, and passed similar laws, doing away with the old system of compulsory service, and substituting in its place the system of state volunteers.

The difficulty of enforcing the fines and collecting the commutation became so great that the enrollment periods were extended to two years and the fee for commutation reduced from seventy-five to fifty cents. This continued until 1869, when the enrollment period was changed to every five years, to commence in 1871, but in 1870 the first military code was adopted which provided that there should be an enrollment only when the governor deemed the same necessary, and while that provision is still in our military law, there has been no enrollment since that time.

The Federal Militia law of 1792 remained in force substantially without change until 1903, notwithstanding that the privilege of exemption which had been granted to the states had been exercised to the extent of exempting everyone from enrollment and service, and the only organizations left in any state were the state volunteers, which had been variously termed organized militia, national guard, or volunteer organizations under the constitution and laws of the several states.

The great possibilities for national defense which had been pointed out by Washington and Jefferson and Madison had all disappeared. Compulsory service, which was to have been the safeguard and reliance of the nation, the citizenry in arms, did not exist.

Even the enrollment, which at least had had the effect of recalling to the citizen an obligation of service which was reciprocal to his rights as a citizen, had been abandoned and was no more. And it had disappeared, not by reason of any right or authority withheld to the states under the constitution,

but under the express provision of the militia law, which provided among those exempted from the enrollment, "All persons who now are or may hereafter be exempted by the laws of the respective states."

At the time of the Spanish-American war, we had no organized militia, in the national sense, ready to be called into the service of the United States, and our federal volunteer laws were so defective and inadequate, that there was no authority by which the National Guard organizations—the only forces available other than the regular army—could be accepted into the service of the United States as part of the volunteer army, save as individuals. That defect in the volunteer law has been only recently corrected, and even now what is regarded as one of the most essential provisions of our present militia law, providing for the use of the troops beyond the territorial limits of the United States in time of war, is concededly unconstitutional.

With the great world conflict raging all about us, we have at last had forced upon us the realization of the defects in our military system. The most pressing and important problem of the day is to determine the plan upon which our future military policy is to be established. It is doubtful that we will be able to secure at once a regular army sufficiently large to meet present requirements. It is necessary that the existing organizations of the National Guard be placed in a situation, through appropriate legislation, to be utilized to the fullest extent as a national force. That they are not at this time capable of being so utilized is not due to any disposition on the part of the states or on the part of the organizations themselves to withhold such service, but wholly through the defects in the militia law and the general lack of training and inefficiency which are the results of such defects.

The problem to be solved in respect to the National Guard is the precise manner in which the National Guard can be made available as a national force consistent with its present situation. It is an obstacle and hindrance to the recruiting and keeping up of the National Guard that it is subject to use in civil disorders within the states in which the organizations

are maintained, and yet, with the privilege of using these forces for state purposes removed, there would be no consideration to the states for continued maintenance of such a force.

The state of New York, for example, has invested in its armories used by the National Guard more than \$26,000,000, and is expending each year between two and three million dollars towards the maintenance of its military forces, and the organizations could not be maintained under present conditions without such expenditure. It is unlikely that the federal government would undertake the full cost of maintaining the armories occupied by these organizations, and supply them with military funds, headquarters allowances and other moneys which the states are now contributing to their support, but the federal government is at the present time contributing largely in funds and property for the support of the National Guard organizations, in providing or affording the opportunity of participation in camps and maneuvers, in the establishment and maintenance of rifle ranges and the furnishing of equipment.

It is proposed to remove the limitation upon the use of the National Guard in time of war beyond the territorial limits of the United States, by providing a double form of enlistment by which the member of the Guard at the time of his enlistment will undertake not only to perform his duties as a soldier in time of peace, according to the regulations governing the state forces, but will, at the same time, in the event that the president of the United States shall order the National Guard into active service because of war or imminence thereof, agree to serve as a member of the National Guard in the service of the United States within or without the continental limits of the United States for the period of two years, unless sooner discharged by order of the president of the United States.

This form of enlistment, it is believed, will remove the limitation upon the service heretofore existing under the militia law, and justify the further support of the National Guard by the federal government.

The new army bill recently passed by Congress provides

for the organization, discipline and training of the National Guard to a fuller extent than has ever been exercised before by the federal government. The failure of the Congress for more than a century to fully exercise its power over the militia, led to serious differences of opinion in and out of Congress, whether the Congress possessed sufficient authority to provide for the organization, arming and disciplining of the militia to such an extent as to create of it a truly unified and coordinated force.

The weight of opinion is, however, that Congress does possess all adequate powers of organization and control, and that, as Washington said, the National Guard may, under federal supervision and control, "be trained to a degree of energy equal to any military exigency of the United States."

The great weakness of the militia system, heretofore, has been in the authority of the governor to disband the force. Under the new law, the number of troops required to be maintained in each state is specified, and the governor has no right to disband the force or any part of it without the approval of the president.

There is also question about the ability of the various states to maintain the quota specified by the law. In the state of New York we have anticipated that difficulty by the passage of an act which, in case of necessity, authorizes the governor to order an enrollment of the reserve militia residing in any city or town, and that a draft be made to make up or complete the complement of organizations to conform to any requirement prescribed by the laws of the United States.

The total number required for the state of New York, under the new law, is between thirty-four and thirty-five thousand. It is unlikely that the necessity would arise to enforce a draft in order to maintain that quota, but it is a part of reasonable foresight to provide the machinery for keeping up our quota, if it should prove necessary.

The weakness of the system, in the judgment of military experts, is in that it depends upon a voluntary enlistment. All military students agree that the only safe and sound policy for any nation that is free and intends to remain so, is to

adopt a policy based upon compulsion, by which every man, whether he wants to or not, is required to perform a patriot's duty, by which every man, when he attains the high privilege of citizenship, and even before, is taught the practical lessons of military training and exercise.

It is the most democratic system that could possibly be devised. Under such a system none can complain. All are treated alike; all are required to render the same sort of service, to submit to the same system of discipline. Nothing so much increases the spirit of loyalty and patriotism as service. To make every citizen feel that he individually is part of the defensive force of the country would make him justly proud; the physical and mental training and discipline and practical instruction which is part of the education of a soldier today, would make him a more valuable citizen in every way; and the time spent in his military service would be returned to him manifold in increase of efficiency and ability for sustained and disciplined effort in all his subsequent career.

It is fair in principle, avoids discrimination, excludes conscription, as well as the abominable practice of substitution or securing an exemption by payment of a stipulated amount. It makes a better man, a self-respecting man—in all, a better citizen—and we can only become really strong and invincible when every man in the broad expanse of our land can be taught cheerfully to recognize his obligation of service and to take pride and satisfaction in the knowledge that he is a qualified defender of our common liberties and one of the guardians of this glorious union.

## LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL COMPULSORY SERVICE OF STATE MILITIA <sup>1</sup>

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### I

#### *Compulsory Service*

WHILE the government of the United States is one of delegated powers, and Congress has not been vested with all powers, the powers actually delegated are, in some respects, limited and confined in scope and operations, but in other respects they are entirely unlimited. The practical question which here confronts us is whether there is any limitation in the constitution upon the power of Congress to require compulsory military service. The power of Congress to raise armies is general and plenary.

As Chief Justice Marshall said in *Cohens v. Virginia*, our constitution was framed for ages to come and designed to approach immortality, as near as human institutions can approach it.

See, also, the language of Mr. Justice Brown in *Holden v. Hardy*,<sup>2</sup> and of Mr. Justice Story in *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*.<sup>3</sup>

Not only is Congress empowered to "raise and support armies" and to "provide for the common defense", but it is also authorized to enact any laws "which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers conferred by the constitution.

In a democracy, the military power is of necessity composed of all the citizens. Common participation in government brings

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the afternoon meeting of the Academy of Political Science, May 18, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> 169 U. S., 366, 385.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Wheat, 304, at p. 326.

a common obligation to defend it, if need be. By the New York State constitution, all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, who are residents of the state, constitute the militia.<sup>1</sup>

"To prevent the executive power from being able to support armies," says Montesquieu, "it is requisite that the armies with which it is intrusted should consist of the people and have the same spirit with the people."<sup>2</sup>

Blackstone says:

The military state includes the whole of the soldiery, or such persons as are peculiarly appointed among the rest of the people for the safeguard and defense of the realm. In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of arms. In absolute monarchies, this is necessary for the safety of the prince, and arises from the main principle of their constitution, which is that of governing by fear; but in free states, the profession of a soldier taken singly and merely as a profession is justly an object of jealousy. In these no man should take up arms but with a view to defend his country and its laws; he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because he is a citizen and would wish to continue so that he makes himself for a while a soldier.<sup>3</sup>

Under the liberal construction of the constitutional provisions authorizing Congress to raise and support armies, Congress can require all citizens and aliens capable of bearing arms to render military service.<sup>4</sup>

During the Civil war, "Conscript Laws" were passed by the federal government. These acts have been held constitutional.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Art. XI, sec. I.

<sup>2</sup> Spirit of Laws, II, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Blackstone's Comm., p. 408.

<sup>4</sup> Act of Apr. 22, 1898, 30 U. S. St. at L., 361, Chap. 187, Sec. I; *Lanahan v. Birge*, 30 Conn., 438.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Bowling*, 39 Ala., 609; *Parker v. Kaughman*, 34 Ga., 136; *Walton v. Gatlin*, 60 N. C., 310; *Kneedler v. Lane*, 45 Pa., 238; *Ex parte Coup-land*, 26 Tex. 386; *Burroughs v. Peyton*, 16 Gratt (57 Va.), 470.

If, in the judgment of Congress, in view of the changed conditions as to modern warfare, in which preparedness is half the victory, some form of compulsory service in time of peace is desirable (and there can be no question that such service will make the army more effective), then Congress has the power to enact legislation requiring compulsory military service, subject only to the constitutional limitation that the appropriation for that use shall not be for a longer term than two years.

The power to pass an act to render an army effective for defensive purposes is of the very essence of sovereignty. Without such power residing somewhere in the state, no nation can exist. The preamble to the constitution of the United States expressly states that the United States of America was formed in order the more effectively to "provide for the common defense".

In the convention of the commonwealth of Virginia on the adoption of the federal constitution on June 2, 1788, Mr. Madison said:

The power of raising and supporting armies is exclaimed against as dangerous and unnecessary. I wish there were no necessity of vesting this power in the general government. But suppose a foreign nation to declare war against the United States; must not the general legislature have the power of defending the United States? Ought it to be known to foreign nations that the general government of the United States of America has no power to raise and support an army, even in the utmost danger when attacked by external enemies? Would not their knowledge of such a circumstance stimulate them to fall upon us? If, sir, Congress be not invested with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by ambition or avarice, will be invited by our weakness, to attack us, and such an attack by disciplined veterans, would certainly be attended by success, when only opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia. Whoever considers the peculiar situation of this country, the multiplicity of its excellent inlets and harbors, and the uncommon facility of attacking it—however much we may regret the necessity of such a power—cannot hesitate a moment in granting it.

It is not of the essence of our constitutional government that

our soldiers should be unprepared and unfit to perform in time of war the duties required of them.

The law making mayhem a crime is based upon this principle of preparedness. It was a crime to commit any assault upon a person which would render that person unfit for military duty.

In the recent argument before the United States Supreme Court on the Oregon ten-hour law for men, it was urged, in support of such a law, that the state was authorized to enact it in order to keep its citizens fit for military duty.

In the debates on the federal constitution in the constitutional convention on August 18, 1787, Mr. Gerry objected that there was no check in the constitution against standing armies in time of peace; that while the existing Congress was so constructed that it could not itself maintain an army, this would not be the case under the new system. He thought an army dangerous in time of peace, and accordingly, Mr. L. Martin and Mr. Gerry moved that the section empowering Congress to raise armies should have added to it the following clause: "Provided that in time of peace, the army shall not consist of more than ———<sup>1</sup> thousand men.

I quote from the report of these debates:

General Pinckney asked whether no troops were ever to be raised until an attack should be made on us. Mr. Gerry: If there be no restriction, a few states may establish a military government. Mr. Williamson reminded him of Mr. Mason's motion for limiting the appropriation of revenue as the best guard in this case. Mr. Langdon saw no room for Mr. Gerry's distrust of the representatives of the people. Mr. Dayton: Preparations for war are generally made in time of peace and a standing force of some sort may, for aught we know, become unavoidable. I should object to no restrictions consistent with these ideas.

The motion of Mr. Martin and Mr. Gerry was disagreed to, *nem. con.*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Gerry's idea was that the blank should be filled with two or three thousand.

<sup>2</sup> Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution in the Federal Convention, Vol. V, p. 443.

It is clear that Congress is authorized to enact a reasonable statute providing for compulsory military training or service, and more especially can it do so for defensive purposes, inasmuch as, under express provisions of the constitution, the power to "provide for the common defense" is absolute and unlimited, except as to appropriations, and is broader than the power to raise armies for offensive purposes.

## II

### AVAILABILITY OF STATE MILITIA IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

#### (a) *Origin and history of constitutional provision giving Congress control over militia*

At the time the constitutional provisions giving Congress the power to provide for the common defense of the country were being considered by the convention, the delegates feared that the creation of a very large standing army in time of peace would be dangerous to the public safety.<sup>1</sup>

On August 18, 1787, Mr. Mason introduced in the convention the subject of regulating the militia. He believed that it was necessary to give this power to the general government, in order that there might be no need for a standing army in time of peace.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly he moved that Congress be empowered "to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the militia of the several states, reserving to the states the appointment of the officers". He thought uniformity was necessary in the regulation of the militia throughout the Union.

"General Pinckney mentioned a case during the war in which a dissimilarity in the militia of the different states had produced serious mischiefs. Uniformity was essential. The states would never keep up a proper discipline of the militia."

Mr. Ellsworth, however, thought that Mr. Mason's motion went too far. He proposed "that the militia should have the same arms and exercises, and be under rules established by the general government when in actual service of the United States; and when states neglect to provide regulations for

<sup>1</sup> See statement of Mr. Gerry, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Elliott's Debates on the Federal Constitution, p. 440.  
(672)

militia, it should be regulated and established by the legislature of the United States."

Mr. Dickinson proposed to limit the general power to one-fourth part of the militia at a time, which, by rotation, would train and discipline the whole militia.

Mr. Mason, who was fearful of creating insuperable objections to the plan, withdrew his original motion and moved for power "to make laws for regulating and disciplining the militia not exceeding one-tenth part in any one year and reserving the appointment of officers to the states."

General Pinckney, however, renewed Mr. Mason's original motion. He thought that for a part to be under the general government and a part under the state governments would create an incurable evil. He saw no reason for such distrust of the general government. Mr. Langdon, in seconding General Pinckney's motion, stated that he "saw no more to be afraid of the general government than of the state governments. He was more apprehensive of the confusion of the different authorities on this subject than of either." Mr. Madison thought that the regulation of the militia properly belonged to the general government, which was charged with the public defense.

On August 23, 1787, the convention again took up the question of the power of Congress over the state militia.

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out a portion giving the state authority over training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, but upon objection from Mr. Ellsworth, withdrew his motion. Mr. Gerry thought that by giving Congress this power, they were making the states mere drill sergeants.

Mr. Dayton proposed a substitute provision giving Congress the authority to establish a uniform and general system of discipline for the militia and to "make laws for organizing arming, disciplining and governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers and all authority of the militia not herein given to the general government". His motion was lost.

Mr. Langdon stated that he could not understand the fear of the general government. He said: "General and state governments were not enemies to each other, but different institutions for the good of the people of America."

Mr. Madison, who was most active in support of this proposition not only in the federal convention but in the state convention, said with great wisdom:

The primary object is to secure an effectual discipline of the militia. This will no more be done if left to the states separately than the requisitions have been hitherto paid by them. The states neglect their militia now and the more they are consolidated into one nation, the less each will rely on its own interior provisions for its safety, and the less prepare its militia for that purpose; in like manner such militia of a state would have been still more neglected than it has been, if each county had been independently charged with the care of its militia. The discipline of the militia is evidently a national concern and ought to be provided for in the national constitution.

The clause as submitted by the committee was agreed to.<sup>1</sup>

The fullest discussion of this constitutional provision was held in the Virginia convention. On June 2, 1788, Mr. Madison said:

Without uniformity of discipline, military bodies would be incapable of action; without a general controlling power to call forth the strength of the Union to repel invasions, the country might be overrun and conquered by foreign enemies; without such a power to suppress insurrections our liberties might be destroyed by domestic faction and domestic tyranny be established.

He thought a standing army one of the greatest mischiefs that can possibly happen and that the control given to Congress over the militia was the most effectual way of guarding against the standing army, since it rendered it unnecessary.

Mr. Nicholas very clearly set forth the reasons for giving Congress the power over the militia.

<sup>1</sup> Elliot's *Debates on the Federal Constitution*, Vol. V, pp. 442-445, 464-467. (674)

The great object of government in every country is security and public defense. . . . One of three ways must be pursued for this purpose. We must either empower them to employ and rely altogether on a standing army; or depend altogether on militia; or else we must enable them to use the one or the other of these two ways as may be found most expedient. The least reflection will satisfy us that the convention has adopted the only proper method. If a standing army were alone to be employed, such an army must be kept up in time of peace as would be sufficient in war. The dangers of such an army are so striking that every man would oppose the adoption of this government had it been proposed by it as the only mode of defense. Would it be safe to depend on militia alone without the agency of regular forces even in time of war? Were we to be invaded by a powerful, disciplined army, should we be safe with militia? Could men unacquainted with the hardships and unskilled in the discipline of war—men only enured to the peaceable occupations of domestic life—encounter with success the most skillful veterans enured to the fatigue and toils of campaign?<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Nicholas's remarks are well worth reading in entirety, as also Mr. Madison's further observations on June 14, 1788.<sup>2</sup>

(b) *Extent of control over militia conferred upon Congress.*

After the adoption of the constitution, Congress proceeded to carry out the powers conferred upon it by that instrument. It provided for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions and for organizing, arming and disciplining militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.

By the constitution, Congress is given the power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. This power of Congress to organize, arm and discipline the militia is unlimited, except in the two particulars of officering and training them according to

<sup>1</sup> Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, Vol. III, pp. 378-395.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 410-451.

the discipline to be prescribed by Congress, and may be exercised to any extent that may be deemed necessary by Congress.<sup>1</sup>

During the War of 1812, there was a conflict between the states and the federal government as to the extent of the power over the militia. Connecticut thought that the militia could not be called out upon the requisition of the president except in one of the exigencies specified in the constitution, and that the governor of the state had the right to judge whether the exigency authorizing the call of the militia of the state existed. In Massachusetts, the governor consulted the judges of the Supreme Court as to the true construction of the constitution. The judges of the Supreme Court were of opinion that the governors of the several states had the power to determine whether any of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution of the United States existed. They thought that the constitution did not prohibit the states from determining when the exigency existed and that it was, therefore, reserved to the states to make such determination. These states were also of the opinion that the militia when called out could not be taken from under the command of the officers appointed by the state or placed under the immediate command of an officer of the army of the United States, but were only to be commanded by the president.

The president of the United States declared that such a construction of the constitutional powers of the federal government over the militia was unfortunate and that he was of a different opinion. These questions remained unsettled until the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Martin v. Mott*.<sup>2</sup> In that case the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Story, stated that it was of the opinion that—

The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons. . . . The power itself is to be exercised under

<sup>1</sup> *Houston v. Moore*, 5 Wheat., 1.

<sup>2</sup> 12 Wheat., 19 (1827).

sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and under circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the Union. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object. . . .

If "the power of regulating the militia and of commanding its officers in time of insurrection and invasion has (as it has been emphatically said they are) natural incidents to the duty of superintending the common defense and watching over the internal peace of the confederacy", these powers must be so construed as to the modes of their exercise as not to defeat the great end in view. . . .

The case of *Houston v. Moore* (1820),<sup>1</sup> settled the other questions arising as to the national authority over the militia. It was there stated that after the militia is called out, it ceased to be a state militia and became a federal militia, subject to the exclusive control of the general government. In that case, Mr. Justice Washington said:<sup>2</sup>

On the other side it is conceded that after a detachment of the militia have been called forth and have entered into the service of the United States, the authority of the general government over such detachment is exclusive. This is also obvious. Over the national militia the state government never had or could have jurisdiction. None such is conferred by the constitution of the United States; consequently none such can exist.

When the militia are received into the service of the United States, the officers are recognized by the government as holding grades corresponding with their commissions. The organizations then become part of the volunteer army of the United States. Their officers remain in their several grades and positions until vacancies contemplated by law occur, and the governor has no further power of appointment or removal.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> 1898, 22 Opinions of Attorney-General, 228.

*(c) Extent of control of State over Militia*

In the Virginia convention, on June 14, 1788, the question was squarely raised as to the power of the state over the militia. Mr. Henry wished to know what authority the state government had over the militia. Madison thought that the state governments could do anything they thought proper with the militia when not in the actual service of the United States.

Upon the expression of doubt by some members as to the state power, Mr. Marshall's observations are pertinent and merit careful reading in this connection. I quote only a part.

The truth is that when power is given to the general legislature, if it was in the state legislature before, both shall exercise it; unless there be an incompatibility in the exercise by one to them by the other, or negative words precluding the state governments from it. But there are no negative words here. It rests, therefore, with the states. To me it appears then unquestionable that the state governments can call forth the militia in case the constitution should be adopted in the same manner as they could have done before its adoption. . . . All the restraints intended to be laid on the state governments (besides where an exclusive power is expressly given to Congress) are contained in the tenth section of the first article. This power is not included in the restriction in that section. But what excludes every possibility of doubt is the last part of it that "No state shall engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay". When invaded they can engage in war, as also when in imminent danger. This clearly proves that the states can use the militia when they find it necessary. . . .

He then concluded by observing that the power of governing the militia was not vested in the states by implication, because, being possessed of it antecedent to the adoption of the government and not being divested of it by any grant or restriction in the constitution, they must necessarily be as fully possessed of it as ever they had been. And it could not be said that the states derived any powers from that system, but retained them though not acknowledged in any part of it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of Federal Constitution, Vol. III, Elliot's Debates on Federal Constitution, pp. 419-421.

The view expressed by Mr. Marshall in the Virginia convention was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Houston v. Moore*.<sup>1</sup> In that case Mr. Justice Washington said: <sup>2</sup>

But as state militia, the power of the state governments to legislate on the same subjects, having existed prior to the formation of the constitution and not having been prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the states subordinate, nevertheless, to the paramount law of the general government operating upon the same subject.

It was there held that as long as the state militia had not been called forth to the service of the United States, the state had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government, but that while the state has retained power to control and organize the militia, that power cannot be exercised in conflict with the exercise of power by Congress. The power of Congress is paramount and supersedes all conflicting state authority. There is, therefore, no authority for the claim that the state militia could be disbanded at any time without the consent of the federal government. While there are instances on record, as said by General O'Ryan in his address in San Francisco on November 11, 1915, where states have refused to maintain an organized militia and where they have disbanded their organized militia against the wishes of the war department and governors have refused to permit participation of their state troops in the conduct of a war on the ground that in their judgment they could be better employed elsewhere; since the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, it can be hardly believed that any governor would attempt to assert the powers asserted by the governors of Connecticut and Massachusetts in 1812.

There is one important limitation on the power of the federal government to use the militia and that is that the militia may be called forth only "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions". It is very doubtful whether, under this power, the militia could be sent, with-

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

out their consent, for the purpose of attacking another nation and not for the purpose of repelling invasion. To that extent, perhaps, a constitutional amendment may be necessary. I have no doubt, however, that the courts would hold that in a defensive war the militia may be used offensively where such tactics are necessary to repel an invasion.

### III

From what has been written above, it is quite clear that the framers of the constitution were not unmindful of the dangers of so-called "militarism" when they gave Congress the broad powers to raise and support armies and to call forth the militia for the national defense. They did so in the belief that the safety of the nation and the preservation of its institutions outweighed the possible dangers resulting from a large standing army and a military class.

Militarism, however, does not necessarily accompany preparedness. A nation may be militaristic although unprepared. In our democracy, the glamor of military life, which is of the essence of militarism, can never have any dominating influence. It is the use of military power, whether adequate or inadequate, for aggressive purposes, and the spirit which prompts it, that produces militarism. There is no more danger of our nation becoming militaristic through preparedness than there was that the students of colleges would become ruffians or prize-fighters when the colleges made attendance in the gymnasium compulsory.

There is more danger of militarism from unpreparedness than from the maintenance of a sufficient army and navy. Can anyone doubt that any great defeat suffered by this country in war would change this country to a militaristic nation, because the man of the sword would become the national hero, since through him our national rights could most potently be restored?

The victory of this country over Spain in the War of 1898 did not make the nation militaristic, but a defeat in 1916 or 1917 would surely rouse this country and produce the very evil which the opponents of preparedness seek to avoid.

## A NEW VOLUNTEER SYSTEM<sup>1</sup>

HERBERT QUICK

Member U. S. Farm Land Loan Board.

**T**HE United States, facing as it does the necessity of an augmented army, would seem compelled to depend on one of two ways of securing men: by conscription or by the volunteer system.

Conscription is undoubtedly the ideal if carried to the ultimate democratic degree of universal military service. This, however, at the present juncture appears to be a political impossibility. Moreover, in fairness it must be admitted that there exists against universal service this perfectly cogent objection, viz., it would go far beyond our military needs in providing for us a military establishment. These considerations would seem to place universal military service or conscription outside the present field of practical statesmanship for the United States.

Let us now consider the only thing left, a volunteer army.

This may be considered under three heads: (A) The National Guard; (B) Our present regular army recruiting system; (C) The system which is presented later herein and which is described to some detail in an article which I contributed to *The Saturday Evening Post*, of March 4th, 1916, under the title "The Average American and the Army".

Consider these three volunteer systems in their order:

(A) While there is strong congressional support for the National Guard, both experience and military science force us to the opinion that it can never be made anything better than a fairly good second-line army, and that it can never be made anything better than a delusion and a snare as a first-line army or as a substitute for a regular army.

(B) The ability of the United States to secure volunteers

<sup>1</sup> Read by title at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

for the regular army under our present recruiting system is limited. Army service is attractive to a small number of men only, for reasons which are well known. The Hay bill, in its provisions for permanently increasing the regular army by recruiting, is in my opinion doomed to failure; but no more surely so than would have been the continental army plan proposed by Secretary Garrison. We therefore face a great national necessity, and a critical situation:

We must build up an army by the volunteer system: we have no system at present which enables us to get volunteers up to the number, say one million men, the minimum number of troops which, when one considers our military dangers, ought to be available at all times if the nation is to be safe against attack.

Therefore, the system of enlistment mentioned under (C) above is proposed. The following considerations justify the belief that this system is sound from a military viewpoint, as well as from a sociological standpoint, as a means of making the army more popular, and of rendering it a better understood and more beneficent force in our national life.

The proposal is that the army posts of the United States, and perhaps the Soldiers' Homes, now rapidly becoming useless for their original purposes, be converted as rapidly as may be into great army schools, in which young men from the ages of fifteen or sixteen to the age of thirty-five be permitted to enlist for educational purposes, their education being paid for by them, first, by service in the army and the taking of military training exactly as if they were soldiers in the regular army, as indeed they will be; and second, by remaining members of the reserve until disqualified by age or disability.

An analysis of this subject requires the consideration of three queries:

- 1st. Is the plan practicable from a military point of view?
- 2nd. Is it practicable educationally?
- 3rd. Will it give us an army of sufficient strength?

*First.* The statement may be made with perfect con-

fidence in its accuracy that the soldier's day, between the dates of September 1st and June 1st, may be so arranged as to give him three hours in the afternoon and two in the evening for study, without interfering with his military duties. This statement is made on the strength of assurances obtained from many regular army officers. The physical equipment is to be found in our army posts, where there is an ample supply of buildings well adapted for academic uses, and sufficient for the accommodation of several hundred thousand soldier-students if they are quartered in tents as, there is the best of reasons for thinking that they should be, with plenty of indoor accommodations during the day for study and recreation, under proper regulations.

*Second.* West Point experience proves the educational soundness of the plan. In that great institution, men are given a very excellent university education, and at the same time made perfectly proficient in the duties, not only of the common soldier, but also of the officer. The methods by which West Point cadets are chosen prevent their being in any high degree picked men, though they no doubt excel the average recruit in natural ability. But the requirements of their curriculum are very severe, while in the army school the course of study would be adapted to the average ability of the recruit. There is in West Point the tactical force of the institution which must necessarily be composed of military men separate from the academic faculty, and whose activities in the army system which is here proposed would be largely devoted to the drilling and training of the soldiers as soldiers. There is also at West Point the faculty of educational instructors, which in the army system here proposed would necessarily be composed of civilian teachers.

The average time which the college student gives to actual study does not amount, according to the best obtainable information, to more than one-third of the five hours which soldiers might be allowed without interfering with their military duties. The system, therefore, seems entirely and indisputably practicable from an educational point of view.

*Third.* Would it give an army of sufficient strength? This

can only be determined by trial. There is, however, no doubt that there is a great number of boys and young men up to the age of thirty-five, who are consciously suffering from present or past lack of educational opportunities. This is especially true of training along industrial lines; a need which consciously exists to a greater extent, probably, in states having educational systems supposedly superior to the average than in regions where the standards of literacy are low, and the educational needs therefore are not generally perceived. Sources from which troops could be drawn might be roughly scheduled as follows:

(a) Boys and men who live in regions unprovided with school facilities, and who are lacking in elementary education. The mountain regions and the Gulf states feel this need most keenly.

(b) Boys and men who have been forced out of school and into unskilled labor, by economic needs or lack of early appreciation of the necessity for training, and who now feel the awakened desire to add something to their present elementary knowledge.

(c) Boys and men who have, with fair educational equipment, engaged in mechanical, chemical, engineering or agricultural occupations, and feel the need of developing further training, that they may equip themselves for promotion and a higher type of work.

(d) Boys and men who wish to master special vocations of a mechanical, chemical, engineering or agricultural nature.

(e) Foreigners who wish to learn the English language, and who through such an army may become Americanized and finally landed upon farms on the public domain. The possibilities of such an army in relation to the use of the public domain are obvious on the mere mention of the subject.

(f) Negroes of the more ambitious sort, who desire the kind of education which some of them have been getting at the Tuskegee Institute under Booker Washington.

(g) Indians who make good soldiers and need industrial training and contact with boys and men of the ruling race that they may really acquire the white man's civilization.

(h) Boys who wish to prepare themselves for high school; this class being especially numerous in rural districts.

(i) Boys who lack preparation for college or for technical institutions, and who wish to give a year or more to study, that they may finish that preparation.

Such an army as this, operated with reference to the technical and vocational needs of the country, might be made, it seems to me, an agency for a constant increase in our national, industrial and intellectual efficiency; would be popular with the country; would furnish us all the men we need; would command congressional support because of the distribution of the now empty army posts; and should the Hay bill pass, would offer to the regular army an agency by which it could compete on the merits of the case with the National Guard, and if a regular army is as far superior to the Guard as it claimed, could overpass and outrun it in importance in a very few years. Such competition should benefit both the National Guard and the regular army.

In such an army plan the enlistment period should be for one year only, so that in its educational efficiency it would be placed in constant competition with life outside the army, and would therefore have to justify itself with the men from year to year.


These men should serve without pay; they would enlist from motives of patriotism strongly tinged with the desire for education. The educational facilities should be so excellent as to render them willing to serve without pay, or with nothing more than pocket money. A volunteer army to whom wages are to be paid at a rate high enough to tempt men from civilian occupations would cost more than is economically and politically possible. Unless such wages are paid, recruiting will fail. We must pay the men in the one thing for which young men are anxious to refrain from gainful occupations—education.

An amendment has been admitted into the pending army bill permitting enlisted men to take seventy-five hours of work in vocational training per month, if they desire, under civilian

instructors. While this provision may possess some value as recognizing a principle, there is reason to fear that it will fail of that success which its sponsors expect for it. This failure will come from the presence in the regularly-enlisted army of the professional soldier spirit, which, by reason of the admittedly inferior character of most of our army-post schools, and the antagonism in the breast of the common soldier toward "uplift work" in his behalf, will balk these well-meant efforts. The army plan proposed will place in segregated military units a very large number of men who will have gone into the army for the settled purpose of securing for themselves the advantages of training, who will be paid in education rather than in money, among whom there will be no exceptions in the matter of taking the training, and whose zeal for education will not be dampened by the cynical attitude of older soldiers, to whom the whole matter of study will be one of scoffing and ridicule.

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is the official organ of the Academy, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, and devoted to the historical, statistical and comparative study of politics, economics and public law.

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